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THE

PASSAGE OF THE FOUR ΓΑΡ.

A NEW EXPLANATION OF

ROMANS II. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,

WITH ITS BEARING

ON THE INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC SYSTEMS

OF

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH,

AND ON THE

PAULINE VIEWS OF THE TÜBINGEN CRITICS, AND OTHERS.

BY

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THE BISHOP OF SHREWSBURY

AS A TRIBUTE FROM THEIR AUTHOR OF RESPECT

TO HIS DIOCESAN AND OF

GRATITUDE TO HIS GREATEST BENEFACTOR.

St. Werburgh's, Chester,
January 19, 1880.

CORRIGENDA.

FOR—	READ—
Page 13, line 25, *inasmuch as they*	*being such as*
„ 21, „ 9, *at all* a legitimate object.	a legitimate object at all.
„ 27, „ 2, inasmnch as they	being such as
„ 37, „ 1, as	and as
„ 39, „ 23, to explain	to sustain
„ 39, „ 27. of	on
„ 43, „ 17, *cognatione*	*cognitone*
„ 49, „ 17, quoting ver. 14	quoting ver. 13
„ 61, „ 15, *subjiciter*	*subjicitur*
„ 63, „ 7, ὅτι δὲ νόμῳ	ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ
„ 71, „ 18, and of Chap. IV.	and the ἔργα of Chap. IV.
„ 83, „ 28 (note), ἀργὴν	ὀργὴν
„ 91, „ 17, ἐν νόμῳ διὰ νόμου	ἐν νὸμῳ ἐκ νόμου
„ 99, „ 11, How came the ζήσεται there?	How comes the ζήσεται there?
„ 100, „ 13, forth from) the νόμος	forth) from the νόμος
„ 100, „ 14, (or comes forth) the πίστις	(or comes forth) from the πίστις
„ 130, „ 3, himself,—the weightiest	,—himself the weightiest
„ 143, „ 2, τί οὖν; προχόμεθα;	τί οὖν; προεχόμεθα;
„ 157, „ 8, This embrace	Their embrace
„ 173, „ 8, δύναμος	δύναμις
„ 183, last line, the next ver. 26.	the next in ver. 26.
„ 189, line 19, the impious	the 'impious'
„ 190, „ 2, imputation?	'imputation'?
„ 224, „ 6, Salmaron	Salmeron
„ 234, „ 11, δικαιοσύνη	the δικαιοῦται
„ 234, last line, so suitable .... and so unsuitable	suitable indeed .... but so unsuitable
„ 252, line 6, logically includes	logically excludes
„ 259, „ 15, ever was or ever will be	ever was or ever can be
„ 257, „ 5, ROMANIS	ROMANOS
(Advertisement) line 21, Canon Farrar's Exposition of St. Paul	Canon Farrar's Exposition of the Doctrine of St. Paul
Page 263, line 27, (5) the 'Formula Concordiæ'	(5) the 'Formula Concordiæ' of the Prusso-German Evang. Church
„ 80, „ 11, logically commends	logically commands

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PREFACE

AND INTRODUCTION OF THE ARGUMENTUM VELATUM

I. In presenting to the reader the following interpretation of a famous dogmatic Passage, it will be useful, by way of introduction, to say something about its character.

There are three ways in which it should be looked at in order to its proper comprehension. It should be considered (1) in relation to all other and previous interpretations, and (2) in relation to the Greek Text which it explains, and (3) in relation to that doctrinal system of Extrinsic Justification which is the centre and foundation of the theology of the Reformation.

In the first place, then, the author presents the interpretation contained in these pages as *original*. He assumes it to be,—since he has good reason for believing it to be,—a *new* interpretation; one which has hitherto escaped the observation of theologians, commentators, and critics. And this, notwithstanding the apparent approximation to it which is found in St. Augustine,

(Lib. de Spiritu et Litterâ, c. 26) ;—" His verbis hoc unde agitur subjungit et dicit," &c. : notwithstanding, also, the real approximation which occurs in Jowett's commentary on the Passage ;—" Verse 14 is closely connected with verse 13, of which it forms an indirect proof." At the same time, it must be owned that this very character of novelty serves of itself to confront the author with a difficulty which, at first sight, may be fairly described as 'tremendous.' For the rejected interpretations and expositions,—various and conflicting as they are,—reach as far back as to those of Tertullian the Latin (adv. Marcion, B. v, c. 13) and Origen the Greek Father (Rom. B. ii, n. 7, 8, 9.)

II. In the second place, if the Author's confessedly novel and original interpretation be considered in relation to the passage (Rom. ii, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16) of which it claims to be the true explanation, it appears that there are several forms under any one of which it might have been submitted to the judgment of the reader. It might have been diffidently proposed as a *possible* interpretation; one which, on the plea of fairness, or on the plea of indulgence, demanded or courted a hearing. Or it might have been put forward as a very *probable* interpretation ; one which aspired, not merely to hold its ground, but even gradually to win its way to general acceptance. Or, lastly, it might have been advanced *hypothetically;*—under a form which secures to the advocate of a (supposed) truth the

full advantage of all that can be adduced in its behalf, without 'committing' him to any result, or involving him in any responsibility. Thus, it might have been urged that, *if* this interpretation were adopted, first those various difficulties which beset all other interpretations would disappear, and secondly, that certain consequences, exegetical and doctrinal, would ensue with respect to the following chapters of this Epistle, (as also to kindred chapters in Galatians and elsewhere), on the subject of Justification by Faith. And so on. These forms have been discarded as so many circuitous and unnecessary paths. It rarely happens,—how rarely!—that, in a case of this kind, an interpreter, mindful of the voices of prudence and modesty, nevertheless is able to invest his own determination of a difficult and variously-construed passage with the character of *positive certainty*. Yet that which rarely happens happens here. For the author presents the following interpretation as positively certain. The grounds of this certainty will reveal themselves in the course of these pages. Here, suffice it to observe, that on the very fundamental principles of Exegesis themselves, the *best* interpretation of a passage *must*,—if it be in such sort the best as that, not only no other equal to it can be found, but also if it be such that it itself leaves nothing to be desired and presents nothing to be disapproved,—must, it would seem, be the one true interpretation; must necessarily represent the very

thought or argument which the text is intended to convey. But these conditions are fully present in the instance of this Interpretation. For whereas, on the one hand, there is nothing to be alleged against it, so, on the other, it unites, as will be seen, every scientific and every natural advantage in its favour. It absorbs, in its fitness, all the conditions,—be they grammatical, be they lexical, or be they logical,—of the passage which it explains. And it, and it alone, of all fulfils this decisive part.* One objection, indeed, it has to encounter; the objection that all previous expositions by otherwise, though diversely, occupying the passage do, in a sense, a negative sense, exclude and oppose this. But how hollow this objection is will at once appear if we remember that, in order to its rejection by the interpreters who have not proposed it, but in its stead some other, it must have been *perceived*. But we submit that it was never perceived. To talk, therefore, of opposition or rejection where there has been no opportunity for judgment is to say for former Exegetes more than they could have said for themselves.

Of the nature of the interpretation itself the author will here subjoin a brief account. Though to do so is to anticipate and is somewhat out of place. The true interpretation, then, of this passage in the first place, makes ver. 14 sustain the whole of ver. 13, with a reason;—

* The word φύσει notwithstanding. See Chapter V. φύσει.

as also ver. 13 itself sustains the latter half of ver. 12, with a reason, and as ver. 12 sustains ver. 11 with a reason and as ver. 11 sustains vv. 9, 10, with a reason. And the reader must ever bear in mind that this adjustment is the head and front, though not the sum, of the new interpretation. Secondly, besides having this primary and obvious basis, it rests and turns, from ver. 12 to ver. 15, on what may be described as the *Argumentum Velatum;* or 'Veiled Argument,'—the argument, that is, wherein the Apostle through the medium of *persons,* and personal agency deals with the relations (together) of *things.* In such a manner as that, first, the personal surface, or, (so to speak), the external machinery of persons and personal agency *veils,—h.e.,* at once exhibits and conceals,—the relations and relative workings of things behind, (or beneath) : and secondly that the sole key which can unlock,—*h.e.,* connect and elucidate,—the language and reasoning of the Apostle is to be found in that inner sustaining argument, which, because it is inner, is not expressed but is nevertheless there;—is not subjectively devised, but is objectively, because necessarily there, within the verse. The *Argumentum Velatum,* moreover, which thus animates, as it were, and explains the Passage turns upon the reciprocal relations of δικαιοσύνη and the νόμος—that is of Justice and The Law;—turns on the relation of the Law to Justice and on the relation of Justice to the

Law.* In these verses we see (1) position, (2) change, and (3) counterchange: for in them the Apostle passes first ver. 12 B, from Sin, (and therein implicitly from Justice), to the *νόμος*: then from the Law,—the *νόμος*,—to Justice; (ver. 13) and finally from Justice back again to the Law, vv. 14, 15. And he reasons of things and their relations under the 'veil,' and through the medium, of persons and their actions. Because these persons and that action outwardly represent those things and those relations. The full elucidation of the *Argumentum Velatum*, together with the survey of its evidences and recommendations belong to a later page. Yet will not this brief indication,—even only this,—suffice for that keener critical eye which belongs to the few among the few; so that it will seek no more from these pages but will for itself, by its own insight and comprehensive range, work out their main contents?

III. Easy, however, though it may be to convey in a few words the nature of the Interpretation itself; with regard to the consequences which flow from it the case is different indeed. The consequences are numerous, far-reaching and of the highest importance.

For (1) it determines, once for all, the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* of Romans i. 17, iii. 21, 22, and x, 3,—the conception of the thing denoted and the import of the term or

* In other words, the argument of vv. 13-14 turns on the *nature* of the *νόμος*: its relations, contents and end.

phrase which denotes it: and this again, fixes the force or meaning of the Three Words, δικαιος, δικαιοσύνη, and δικαιοῦν in their connexion with Justification by Faith both as to the nature of the things meant and the corresponding import of the terms themselves.

It (2) absolutely removes all *hypothetical* basis and character not only from this passage but from *the entire chapter* in which it occurs and connects that chapter by a strong and direct logical *nexus* with those which follow it for many pages.

It (3) immovably fixes ver. 13 in the position of a fundamental, immutable, universal principle or law,—with or without the accident of the νόμος under which it is there presented.

By (4) demonstrating the identityof the Justice* of the νόμος (Law-fulfilling justice) with the Justice of Faith as confronting, with absolute opposition, the ἔργα νόμου (law-produced justice),—a purely Pauline phrase used by him alone in the entire Sacred Volume,†—it determinately moulds the whole face of the Apostle's language and teaching on this topic everywhere.

It (5) establishes the doctrine of Intrinsic Justification and excludes from the outset and throughout from first to last, the Extrinsicist interpretation of the Pauline Argument and that view or theory or system of Extrinsic

* Righteousness—Gerechtigkeit.

† And by him used *only nine* times. Common Text.

Justification which the Reformation has based upon the language and reasoning of the Apostle. Thus bringing St. Paul into a collision, the most direct and momentous, with the Reformers and their whole train. See Protestant Paulinism or Extrinsicism from Luther's 'Argumentum' in his Commentary on Galatians, to Meyer's Commentary on Romans, Baur's 'Paulus,' Pfleiderer's 'Paulinismus,' Renan's 'Saint Paul,' and Farrar's Exposition of Romans and Galatians in his 'Life and Work of St. Paul.'

In a word: *if* the interpretation of the Passage of the four γὰρ be the true key (here) of the Apostle's mind and language *then*,—if it may be permitted to venture on such strong and perhaps strange comparisons,—the movement of the earth, the law of gravitation, the circulation of the blood, are not made more certain from the teaching of nature than is the intrinsic nature of Justice and Justification 'of life'* made certain from the Epistles of St. Paul.

In the third place, then, this interpretation (1) hitherto undiscovered and (2) presented as certain, is, at the same time, (3) fatal to and subversive of, that general conception of the Scheme of Salvation and that large doctrine of Extrinsic Justification to which the term 'Protestant' is both popularly and properly applied, and which we more or less readily recognise in the writings of fifty

* δικαίωσις ζωῆς.

theologians whom we select from the mass of Protestant or Rationalist divines and name in the following catalogue. We select them either as being the most conspicuous, or among the most distinguished, representatives of the Extrinsic or 'Reformed' doctrine, in its fundamental outlines and essential structure. Representatives, notwithstanding certain modifications which are sure to be found in the various 'school-conceptions' of a great dogma never 'defined' by recognised authority. Luther, —the father and founder of 'Paulinism' or the Extrinsic system of Justification, because certainly the original inventor of Extrinsic Justice, — Melancthon, Calvin, Zwinglius,* Bucer, Cranmer, Jewell, Knox, Bullinger, Chemnitz, Beza;—Hooker, Davenant, Jackson, Chillingworth, Hammond, Bull, Waterland;—Gerhard, Michaelis, Bengel, Neander, Winzer, Tholuck, Usteri, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Winer, De Wette, Rückert, Wiesler, Schott (H. A.), Ewald, Meyer, Baur, Pfleiderer;—Chalmers, Morison;—Wesley, Simeon, Arnold, Julius Hare, Alford, Wordsworth, Trench, Ellicott, Jowett, Vaughan, Lightfoot and Farrar. For corresponding 'Symbolical' writings see Appendix.

IV. But one of the greatest of the consequences which flow from the interpretation here presented is to be found, as we have already said, in its bearing upon the

* Of Zwinglius, Meyer observes:—"We may add that with Luther's doctrine of Justification Zwingli substantially concurs. See, for defence of the latter (against Stahl), Ritschl," &c. Comm. Rom. i. 17, *note.*

Three Words, δικαιος, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοῦν,—chief factors in the Pauline doctrine of Justification, and, the last of them one of the most important words that the Greek Scriptures contain.

It conclusively, if not primarily, operates to determine the true import of these words in Romans and Galatians, and particularly in dogmatic and decisive passages. Not to extend these introductory remarks to too great a length, we will here merely observe that the meaning imposed by the Extrinsicists on δικαιοῦν, in its connexion with the πίστις, (*e.g.* in Romans iii. 24, 26, 28, 30, and in Galatians ii. 16, 17—iii. 8, 25), is, beyond all doubt and all shadow of a doubt, a *forged* meaning. That is to say a meaning produced to fulfil the conditions of the Extrinsic doctrine and not merely foreign, but essentially opposed, to the Pauline sense, no less than to the twofold import of the word in both Testaments.

V. Among the authorities and guides which may be profitably consulted on the passage under consideration, as well as on the chapter in which it occurs and the two Epistles in which St. Paul treats especially of Justification, the following Theologians and Commentators may be named. They are named as seeming, all of them, to deserve attention on account of the reputation they have acquired either recently or in former times.*

* They are named whether, in this or that instance, the author has had access to them or not.

Intrinsicist; Origen,* Chrysostom, Hilary (Ambros.), Jerome, Augustine (De Spiritu et Litterâ and Comm.), Theodoret, Ecumenius, Theophylact, Anselm, Lombard (Collect.), Aquinas (Hom.), Cajetan, Erasmus, Toletus, Bellarmine (De Justif.), Estius, Justiniani, Suarez (De Gratiâ), Alapide, Menochius, Tirinus, Piconius, Calmet, Beelen, Maier, Reithmayer, Bisping, Windischmann, Kenrick, MacEvilly, Perrone (De Gratiâ), Franzelin (De Deo Uno).

Extrinsicist; Luther (Comm. and Preff.), Melancthon, Calvin (Comm. and Instit.), Beza, Cranmer (Notes on Justification and Homilies), Hooker (Sermon on Justification), Davenant (De Justitiâ), Hammond, Bull (on Justification), Waterland (on Justification), Whitby, Bengel (Gnomon), Usteri (Comm. and Exposition), Winzer, Schott (H. A.), Tholuck, Winer, Rückert, Wiesler, Fritzsche, Olshausen, Baur ('Paulus'), Hilgenfeld, Hoffman, De Wette, Ewald, Meyer, Pfleiderer ('Paulinismus'), Morison (Monograph, Rom. iii.), Wordsworth, Howson, Peile, Alford, Jowett, Vaughan, Ellicott, Lightfoot, Farrar ('St. Paul'), and Renan ('Saint Paul').

The following Lexicists and Grammarians need no recommendation, but it may perhaps be of some use to mention them: Trommius (Conc.), Schmidt (Conc.), Stephanus, Wahl, Wilke, Schleusner, Bretschneider, Passow, Buttmann, Winer (N. T. Grammar), Klotz,

* Where nothing is added to the name, Commentary is understood.

Krüger, and lastly Kühner, whose larger Grammar is strongly recommended by Meyer in his Preface (Comm.) of 1872.

As representing the Common and other Texts, the author has habitually used Scrivener's (Cambridge) Greek Testament,—Textus Stephanicus, A.D. 1550,—which subjoins readings of Beza, Elzevir, Lachmann and Tischendorf, and, (to the year 1860), of Tregelles. He has, besides, kept before him the (now) complete Greek Testament of Tregelles; the text presented by Jowett and that by Vaughan in their Commentaries on Romans; that given by Ellicott and that by Lightfoot in their Commentaries on Galatians. He would here add that Meyer introduces each chapter of his Commentaries on these Epistles with a survey of the state of the text. For the Old Testament, the author has used Bagster's (London) volume of the Septuagint Version according to the Vatican Edition. And, in the working out of the subject undertaken, he has exclusively occupied himself with the Greek; no attention being paid to any other language, ancient or modern, except,—and that slightly, —as regards the words *νόμος*, *δικαιοῦν* and *φύσει*.

Such then is the character of the author's interpretation of the passage in Romans, chapter ii,—which he calls 'the Passage of the Four *γὰρ*'; such its internal nature; such its bearing on the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Systems of Justification by Faith; such its connexion

with the Three Words denoting Justice or Righteousness in St. Paul's Epistles; and such the means and aids which may be employed for the purposes of evidence and elucidation.

And,—apart from its high theological interest and importance,—he presents it to the student of the Greek Testament, as the true solution of an exegetical problem heretofore obscure.

CHESTER, 1880.

ERRATA.

(1) *For* Intrinsecist and Extrinsecist,—wherever they occur,—*read:*—Intrinsicist and Extrinsicist.

(2) *For* 'transgressors;' 'transgressed;' 'transgressions;' in pp. 3, 4, *read:*—'violators;' 'violated;' 'violations.'

(3) *For* words in note †, p. 3:—"that is to say, during the period, &c.," *read:*—"that is to say, even during the period, &c."

ROMANS II. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.

(11.) Οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν προσωπολημψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ.

(12.) Ὅσοι γὰρ ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται, καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται.

(13.) Οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται.

(14.) Ὅταν ΓΑΡ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος.

(15.) Οἵτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων κ.τ.λ.

Tregelles' Greek Testament.

ON THE FOUR ΓΑΡ.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

The Argumentum Velatum.

In the middle of the second chapter of the Epistle to the Romans we enter upon a highly-wrought ratiocinative passage commencing with ver. 11:—*οὐ γὰρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*,—"For there is no respect of persons with God,"—and ending with the words, *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*—"by Jesus Christ, according to my Gospel."

In this passage the word *νόμος* occurs for the first time in the Epistle. And it occurs no less than eleven times,—ten times out of the eleven being in the three short verses, 12, 13, 14.* In this passage also the word *ἥμαρτον* occurs for the first time. And, most noteworthy

* The *νόμος* of St. Paul is, we submit, always the Mosaic Law, whether with or without the article. This is shown (1) generally by this very chapter; (2) still more by the nature and consequences of the *Argumentum Velatum*; (3) quite plainly by the *περιτομὴ μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ ἐὰν νομον πράσσῃς* κ.τ.λ., ver. 25; on which verse see Appendix.

of all, bearing in mind the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ of chapter i. 17, and the Pauline aphorism ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (*ibid.*)—we have here, for the first time, the word δικαιωθήσονται, and this, moreover, in conjunction with δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ, ver. 13. These, together with the word φύσει, are the most striking lexical characteristics of our passage. But its most prominent *logical* characteristic is its introduction and the connexion of its component parts by the causal particle γὰρ. The γὰρ occurs four times, each time introducing its explanatory and confirmatory proposition,—or double proposition. Now, passing by the first of these four γὰρ,—the consideration of which does not belong to our immediate purpose,—we will take each γὰρ in the order of its occurrence. In the first place then the γὰρ of ver. 12 evidently sustains,—*h.e.* introduces a double proposition which sustains,—ver. 11, with a reason or explanatory proof. The ἀπολοῦνται of the ἄνομοι and the κριθήσονται of the ἔννομοι are, in ver. 12, adduced as a proof of the ἀπροσωπολημψία of God in the Day of Judgment, ver. 11. In ver. 12 the Apostle proves the fact of ver. 11 by another fact,—proves it not *à priori* but *à posteriori;* by holding up the judicial proceedings of the final Judgment, as evidencing and testifying before the whole world the impartiality of the divine judgments—which will be inflexibly regulated by a fixed standard. This logical connexion of these verses, through the γὰρ, has

never been denied nor disputed by any commentator. Nor could it be. It is too obvious and striking to be overlooked or obscured by accident or otherwise. No less evident is it that the γὰρ of ver. 13 sustains with a reason the latter half of ver. 12, καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται. Thus the reason given why those who have sinned ἐν νόμῳ shall be judged (and condemned) by the νόμος is *because* it is not the hearers of the νόμος who are just (righteous) with God, but it is the fulfillers of the νόμος who are justified. The force of the proof is as plain in this as in the former argument, vv. 11, 12. For, if only the fulfillers of the νόμος are just before God and so saved, then evidently the transgressors of the νόμος,*—that is, those who in the day of judgment are found to have been sinners (transgressors) to the end of their lives,—will be condemned and lost. And by sustaining the διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται by ver. 13 St. Paul is plainly reminding the Jews that if the ἔννομοι died in their sins, the possession of the νόμος would *not* serve to establish their δικαιοσυνη,† but, on the contrary, would serve to manifest in them the very reverse—to their grief. Here it should be observed that ver. 13 refers to the latter half of ver. 12 and to it alone: a point which should be carefully borne in mind

* And such the ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον must be: although ἐν νόμῳ is not εἰς νόμον. See Meyer ad. loc. opp. Luther.

† That is to say, during the period when the νομος was in force, namely from its institution by Moses to the Death of Christ.

as we approach the all-important connexion of ver. 13 with ver. 14. All commentators, so far as we know, are agreed here, and are unanimous in holding that this principle is levelled against the Judaiser. And naturally, or rather necessarily, so. The proof in ver. 13 will not admit of any other or more extended application. For if the double proposition of ver. 13 sustained the whole of ver. 12, it would equally sustain the first half of it taken separately. But how is the fact that those who have sinned without the *νόμος* (*h.e.* without transgression of a *νόμος* which they never had) shall perish without the *νόμος* (*h.e.* without the application to their case of the *νόμος* which they had never transgressed)—how is this fact sustained, or proved, by the fact that not the hearers but the fulfillers of the *νόμος* are just or justified with God? The hearers and doers of a *νόμος* which has been, in ver. 12 B. for the first time brought into existence? How can a process which involves the intervention and application of the *νόμος* be adduced in proof or confirmation of a process which, from its very nature, excludes the intervention and application of that same *νόμος*? There is no conceiving how. Logically, therefore, it is impossible to include the first half of ver. 12 as the object of ver. 13. But if it be not included, then ver. 13 relates to the latter half of ver. 12, and to it alone. From this it follows that neither the *ἀκροαταὶ νόμου* nor the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* comprehend or in

any way represent the ἄνομοι within their range. For if they included the ἄνομοι, then that comprehension would spoil or nullify the proof adduced in ver. 13 of the latter half of ver. 12 taken *as contrasted* with the first half;—the latter half being evidently presented in contrast with the first half.

And now before proceeding to the last and most important γὰρ,—that which connects ver. 14 with ver. 13;—we will return to ver. 12 in order, at this point to press a consideration which will yield the first opening-up of the *Argumentum Velatum*. We will press it in the form of a question; a question touching the latter half of ver. 12 in which as we have already said, the νόμος is, not indeed first presented to notice, but first brought into operative existence.

Why is it that ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον ("as many as have sinned in the νόμος"*),—διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται ("shall be judged unto condemnation by the νόμος")? We answer: because of the relation of the νόμος to sin and judgment severally. It is the instrument of the latter as being a rule. It is the detector of the former (the ἥμαρτον), confronting it with its opposite. But further still, how and why does the νόμος come to hold its twofold relation,—its relation to sin as detector and its relation to judgment as instrument? We reply: because of one fundamental relation,

* And have thus, in a positive and active sense, been *devoid of justice* ἐν νόμῳ.

viz. the relation which the *νόμος* holds to *δικαιοσύνη* (Justice,—Righteousness). Out of this fundamental relation spring up the other two. What is this relation? The *νόμος* is (1) the Depository and Standard of Justice, (2) the Manifestation of Justice ordaining the same, (3) the Document of Justice, *Documentum Justitiæ*, authoritatively setting it forth. That is to say of Justice *ἐν γράμματι*. The *νόμος means* Justice; "means" it in the threefold sense of that word. It represents Justice, it teaches Justice, it ordains Justice. Justice is the content, the burden and the end of the *νόμος*. The relation of the *νόμος* to the *δικαιοσύνη* may be summed up in this one word. The *νόμος* is the *Documentum Justitiæ*,—the *literal* Manifestation of Justice. This relation then of the *νόμος* to the *δικαιοσύνη* is the sole fundamental reason why those who have sinned *ἐν νόμῳ* shall be judged *διὰ νόμου*, and the recognition of this relation is the scientific answer to the question; How is this so? Why are these persons thus sinning, thus judged and thus condemned? There is no adequate reason or answer to be given other than that which consists in the assertion of this fundamental relation, —a relation which gives existence to, upholds, and is therefore necessarily involved in, the other two. So that these three are logically one. And, to proceed a step onward, the assertion of this fundamental relation is the reason actually given for ver. 12 B. in ver. 13,—in the words *οὐ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ . . . δικαιωθήσονται*,—though given in an implicit

and veiled form. For with respect to the *νόμος*, we ask again; (1) Why should the *ἀκροατὴς νόμου not* be *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ*? Why *not?* What is the *νόμος* that this should not be? (2) Why should the *ποιητὴς νόμος*, and he alone be justified? Why? What is there in the *νόμος* that this should be? And (3) why,—if it be indeed so in both cases,—why should the fact tha tit is so sustain and prove the proposition that as many as have sinned in the *νόμος* shall be judged (to condemnation) by the *νόμος*? We answer to the first point; because the *νόμος* is the Manifestation of Justice,—the Law *means* justice, *h.e.* intends it, ordains it, exhibits it. To the second, because the *νόμος* is the Manifestation of Justice. To the third, because the *νόμος* is the Manifestation of Justice. This pregnant relation of things together is the logical soul of the connexion, the key of the argument, the meaning of the reason introduced by the *γὰρ* of ver. 13. We foresaw it in ver. 12. We recognize its presence in ver. 13 in its proper place, *h.e.* as a reason for ver. 12 B. And how is it present in ver. 13? Under the personal veil of the *ἀκροαταὶ νόμου* and the *ποιηταὶ νόμου*. It is concealed by that very medium of personal agency through which it is exhibited. Nevertheless it is truly and objectively there. And but for its animating virtue and connecting power, the whole *σύνταγμα* of ver. 12 B. and ver. 13 would be dissolved, and become as it were mere lexical atoms,—a chain of sand.

The *Argumentum Velatum*, therefore of these verses

turns on the relation of the *νόμος* (1) to Sin, (2) to Judgment, and (3) to Justice. And the two former relations arise out of, and resolve themselves into, the last and greatest. Also it is the necessary argument. And lastly it is the only argument. It is the only argument which will fit the language and explain the reasoning of the Apostle. Only from the *νόμος* being the *Documentum Justitiæ* can the *ἥμαρτον* be detected by the *νόμος* as instrumentally applied. Only because the *νόμος* is the *Documentum Justitiæ*—the manifestation of justice,—can it be said of it that not its hearer but only its fulfiller is, and shall be "just with God."

Verse 13 conveys through a personal medium, in a veiled form, that very reason which, even without it, is and must be the only valid and complete reason for ver. 12 B. Only one diamond, it is said, will fit the setting which that diamond originally filled.

We will now return to the text and the consideration of the last *γὰρ*. Of the logical connexion of ver. 14 with ver. 13, Meyer says,—"The connexion of thought between ver. 14 and what precedes it has been *very variously apprehended.*"* And this most true remark invites at least, if it does not compel, the conclusion that the true view of that connexion has been hitherto undiscovered. The Apostle in order to sustain his assertion that *ὅσοι ἐν*

* Der Gedankemzusammenhang von v. 14 mit dem Vorhergehenden ist höchst verschieden gefasst worden.—*Meyer, Comm.* Rom. ii. 13, 14.

νόμῳ ἥμαρτον διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται,—has said *οὐ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται.* He proceeds,—*ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος κ.τ.λ.* "*FOR* when the Gentiles who have not, &c.—do the things of the *νόμος* (*h.e.* the things contained in the *νόμος*), these not 'having' the *νόμος* 'are' &c." Now it will be admitted on all hands that the natural and obvious connexion is that which refers the *γὰρ* to the preceding verse,—to the whole verse, indeed, but especially to the latter half of it. This will be readily admitted even by those who with Calvin, Alapide, Menochius, Tirinus, Suarez, Franzelin, and others* leaping over ver. 13 and ver. 12 B. find a more distant object for the *γὰρ*. Such an adjustment is, on the face of it, neither the natural nor the obvious one. For it is more natural that the Apostle should proceed upon that which he has just presented to the reader than that he should go back. And it is more obvious to join the verses together because by so taking the connexion we are taking the path which lies before us instead of deviating from it and striking out another. Moreover each of the three preceding *γὰρ* does, we see, directly relate to the proposition preceding it. So that

* Suarez, Lib. I. De necessitate Gratiæ ad opera naturalia, cap. viii. n. 27. Franzelin, De Deo Uno Secundum Naturam. (Thesis iv.) Calvin, Alapide, Menochius, Tirinus, in their Commentaries.

we have presumptive evidence that the γὰρ will hold the same direct relation here. Also, as Fritzsche points out, the τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν of ver. 14 has a marked affinity with the ποιηταὶ νόμου of ver. 13.* So that to presumptive evidence of the close connexion of the two verses internal evidence is added. Again a similar dependence on the ποιεῖν is seen in both verses. Lastly, the vast majority of commentators and theologians, both ancient and modern, adopt and maintain this connexion. The dissentients, though including eminent names are comparatively few. But at this point an extraordinary thing is seen. Not one of all that vast majority from first to last apply the γὰρ of ver. 14 to sustain or make good the (double) proposition of ver. 13. As far as we can discover, not one.† Yet it is every whit as natural and obvious that the γὰρ should *sustain* that (double) proposition as that it should *refer* to it. What is the logical office of the γὰρ? By rendering a reason to sustain or "make good." To "make good" what? Something previously said and, by far for the most part,—if not always,—said immediately before. And what do we mean by "something said"? We mean that which is verbally contained in and conveyed by the preceding passage. That which is *in* the text and *of* the text, that which arises naturally or properly or necessarily *from* the text. Why should not ver. 14 make good ver. 13, even as that verse

* Fritzsche, Rom. ii. 13, 14. † Jowett, of course, excepted. *Vid. inf.*

makes good ver. 12 B. and ver. 12, ver. 11, and ver. 11 that which precedes it? To the neglect, however, of this natural and obvious application of our γὰρ to ver. 13 the expositors ancient and modern (who rightly refer it to ver. 13 in what De Wette calls its "certainly natural connexion"),* with few exceptions employ the particle and the passage it introduces to make good—what? Not the δικαιωθήσονται as affirmed of the ποιηταὶ in preference and opposition to the ἀκροαταὶ νόμου, *but* the comprehension or inclusion of the ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα within the range of the ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται! Rejecting this exegetical venture and reserving our criticisms on it, —or rather our refutations of it,—for a later page, we will, on sounder principles of exegesis, adopt the natural and obvious adjustment of the γὰρ,—that which makes it sustain the entire previous verse, and particularly the affirmative half, and proceed with the development of the *Argumentum Velatum.* As before we asked with pointed reference to the νόμος (1) why first "the hearer" of it should not be justified; (2) why its fulfiller should be justified; and (3) why its fulfiller should be so in preference and opposition to its hearer, and received for answer that the reason lay in the relation of the νόμος to Justice (δικαιοσύνη)—lay in the fact that the νόμος *meant* justice: so now, pursuing the same method of investigation and elucidation, and *in view of* the established fact

* "Die allerdings natürliche Verbindung."—*De Wette*, Rom. ii. 13, 14.

that the *νόμος* is *εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, that the Law is a manifestation, &c. of Justice, we proceed to ask with pointed reference, this time, to the *ἀκροαταὶ* and *ποιηταὶ*, (1) why the hearer should not be justified; (2) why the fulfiller should be justified; and (3) why he should be so in preference and opposition to the hearer? We press the question and we answer, Because of the relation of the *δικαιοσύνη* to the *νόμος*—of Justice to the Law. Because Justice (or Righteousness) is the end of the *νόμος*. Because justice existing and extant in the *ποιησις νόμου* fulfils the content and intent of the *νόμος*. Because the Justice manifested and ordained by the *νόμος* must *enter into* the *ἔννομος* and through the *ποιησις* reside and *live* in the *ποιητὴς νόμου*. So that the *δικαιοσύνη* manifested in the *νόμος* being, as it were, embodied and enshrined in the *ποιητὴς νόμου* renders him himself the depository and document of Justice. Thus rendering him, as to Justice in *reality* what the *νόμος* is to Justice *ἐν γράμματι*;—for thus he holds the same relation to the *δικαιοσύνη* that the *νόμος* held before. And as the *νόμος* 'bearing Justice,' is holy and just and good *παρὰ θεῷ* so the *ποιητὴς νόμου*, by 'bearing Justice' is, in like manner *παρὰ θεῷ* holy and just and good. This then,—in view of the relation of the *νόμος* to Justice, in view of the *νόμος* being 'unto' Justice,—is the *reason why* not its hearer but its fulfiller is just and justified before God. This is the answer to

the second question and it is given by giving the relation (this time) of Justice to the *νόμος*. Justice is the fulfilment, the content, and the end of the *νόμος*. Not the hearers of the *νόμος* are just with God but the fulfillers of the *νόμος* are justified, *because* Justice is the fulfilment, the content and the end of the *νόμος*. And as, on the one hand the proposition of ver. 12 B. rests for its reason on the relation of the *νόμος* to the *δικαιοσύνη*, so, on the other the double proposition of ver. 13 rests for *its* reason on the relation of the *δικαιοσύνη* to the *νόμος*. Advancing next to ver. 14, and assuming that it is placed by the Apostle to sustain or make good the double proposition of ver. 13, we here again press a question. Why should the Gentiles who do (or when they do) the things of the *νόμος*—that is, who without the *νόμος* yet fulfil its requirements,—why should these be said *ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι νόμος*? We answer because of the relation of Justice to the Law. Because the Gentiles thus possessing justice, manifesting justice in and by the *ποιησις τῶν τοῦ νόμου* hold the same relation to *δικαιοσύνη* that the *νόμος* held before. *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος. οὗτοι ἑαυτοῖς*. They are *themselves** the *νόμος*. Themselves *in* themselves. Observe the Apostle's words. He says: *οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*. How? He explains :† *οἵτινες ἐνδείκνυνται—inasmuch as they* (*οἵτινες*

* The dative (*ἑαυτοῖς*) could alone be taken, unless a nominative were *coined.*

† He does not say, *ἐνδείκνυνται γάρ*. For he is *explaining* the

= *quippe qui*) show, or they manifest,—the work of the *νόμος* (*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου* the whole work of the Law, to be taken *in sensu integro*) written in their hearts,—*γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδιαις αὐτῶν*. What is the work of the *νόμος*? Justice, Righteousness. And how is the Gentile of himself the Law? Because that justice which the *νόμος* manifests *he* manifests. He holds to it the very relation which the Law holds. He exhibits it as it were written. Justice is written; but how written and where? *ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι ἀλλὰ πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος* οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις, ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίας σαρκίναις*. 2 Cor. iii. 3.

Thus, then—as before happened with ver. 12 B.—the reason foreseen when we considered ver. 13 is found within ver. 14. And the latter sustains the former because the underlying fact which forms the ground or inner reason for the proposition of ver. 14 (and is explained in ver. 15), is the reason, and the reason offered, for the double proposition of ver. 13. That fact, as exhibited in ver. 14, shows why not the hearers but

remarkable phrase,—so singular as applied to the *ἀνομοὶ*—*ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*.

* "You are our Epistle, written in our hearts which is known and read by all men. Being manifested that you are the Epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God: not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart." 2 Cor. iii. 2, 3. Comp. (1) "Hearken unto me ye that *know righteousness* . . the people *in whose heart* is my Law." Isa. li. 7. (2) Yea thy Law is *within* my heart, Ps. xxxviii. 18. (3) *In* illâ (justus) est potius quam *sub* illâ. Aug. Com. Gal. 2 § 17. (4) Aug. De Spiritu et Litt. *var. loc.*

the fulfillers of the *νόμος* are just "with God." It is because of the relation of Justice to the Law. Justice is a 'telic' *νόμος*. As before, in ver. 13, it appeared that the *νόμος* was 'representative' Justice, so *now* in ver. 14 it appears that Justice veiled under the *τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν* is a 'telic' *νόμος*. The Apostle reasons (1) from Justice (implicitly), to the *νόμος* in ver. 12 B. (2) He reasons from the *νόμος* to Justice in ver. 13. (3) He reasons from Justice back again to the *νόμος* in ver. 14. And here, turning to the critical reader, we would ask: Could St. Paul have chosen a proof at once more artistic, more scientific, and more penetrating, at once more skilful, more forcible and more deeply instructive,—of the double proposition of ver. 13 than that which is produced by *taking away* the *νόμος* and presenting to the Judaiser, who claimed to himself the *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς* under and through the *νόμος*, the righteousness—the actual justice —of the Gentiles who had *no νόμος*? And this too for the purpose *not* of proving some statement respecting the Gentiles, *but* of making good a truth which related to the Jews alone. We say the Jews exclusively; for if ver. 14 sustains ver. 13, and in particular the *δικαιωθήσονται*, as is here assumed, its subject, &c., cannot possibly be included under the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* of ver. 13. St. Chrysostom, commenting on this passage, explains the Apostle's argument in these words: *οὐκ ἐκβάλλω τὸν νόμον, φῆσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαιῶ τὰ ἔθνη.* But

no.* Rather does St. Paul say: *ἐκβάλλω τὸν νόμον καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ νόμου δικαιῶ τὰ ἔθνη.* "Behold I take away the *νόμος* through the possession and profession of which the Jew (not every Jew, but the Jew with whom I am reasoning)† claims his *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* and I show him a *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* existent and extant *without* the *νόμος*. And this I do in order to prove to him that not the hearer but the fulfiller of the *νόμος* is just with God!" The *νόμος* is nothing and worse than nothing without Justice. But Justice, through fulfilling the things‡ (*τὰ δικαιώματα*, the "justices" or the requirements) of the *νόμος*, flourishes most effectually without the *νόμος*—nay, forms a *νόμος* for itself out of the heart of the *ποιητὴς τῶν τοῦ νόμου. νόμος οὐ πάρεχει δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη νόμον.* Lex non trahit justitiam sed justitia Legem. 'Justice does not revolve round the *νόμος*, but the *νόμος* revolves round Justice.'

* Let not the reader be set against us by this pointed rejection of St. Chrysostom's explanation. Alapide and Franzelin must also necessarily reject it, since these expositors, together with Calvin and others, connect ver. 14 with ver. 12 A., resolutely refusing to include the Gentiles within the range of ver. 13. We, from our point of view, agree with both sides in part, and in part differ from both. We hold St. Chrysostom (as also St. Augustine) to be right in connecting ver. 14 closely with ver. 13, and Calvin, Alapide, and Franzelin to be wrong in divorcing them from each other. On the other hand, we consider St. Chrysostom to be in the wrong in comprehending the Gentiles within ver. 13, and Franzelin in the right when of ver. 13 he says: "Clarum prorsus est sermonem esse *unice* de Judæis qui acceperunt Legem—*τὸν νόμον.*" *Franzelin, De Deo Uno*, cap. I, thesis 3, *note*.

† *τί γὰρ εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες*; Rom. iii. 3.

‡ *τὰ τοῦ νόμου=the content* of the *νόμος*.

Such is the nature of the *Argumentum Velatum*. First, the reason for ver. 13 under *one* aspect is the reason rendered for ver. 12 B. By virtue of this reason, ver. 13 sustains ver. 12 B. Secondly, the reason for ver. 14 is the reason rendered for ver. 13 under *another* aspect. And by virtue of this reason, ver. 14 sustains ver. 13. And the aspects are changed according as we direct our attention either to the *νόμος* which connects ver. 13 with ver. 12 B, or to the *ποιηταὶ* and *ἀκροατοὶ νόμου* which connect ver. 14 with ver. 13. In a word the key of our passage is to be found in the reciprocal relations of the *δικαιοσύνη* and the *νόμος*. It is found and applied *underneath* the text. Thus it possesses, for the scientific exegete, the great merit and recommendation of leaving both the surface and the natural and obvious order of the text inviolate. That surface is the *personal* veil through the medium of which the reasoning about *things* and their relations is conducted. The critical reader, moreover, will observe this new and important principle of our interpretation, namely that in it we take the *νόμος* in relation to *δικαιοσύνη* not in primary and direct relation to Instruction (and the party instructed). We take it as a *documentum justitiæ*, not as a *regula dirigens, jubens et judicans*. In doing this we reject, it may be, the *quod semper quod ubique quod ab omnibus*,—or nearly so,—of the exegetical world;*

* See a later Allocution of Pius IX and a recent one of Leo XIII

at least as regards the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*. We present the *opus Legis*, (see Augustine,) "De Spiritu et Litterâ," instead of the *officium Legis*, as the object before the Apostle's mind. We interpret the passage, *not* with Soto, Franzelin, and so many other exegetes, both Intrinsecist and Extrinsecist, as treating *de notitiâ* (or *de cognitione veritatûm*) *but* as treating throughout *de justitiâ*.* The *νόμος*, we repeat, is placed before us here, not as a *regula dirigens, jubens et judicans* but as a *documentum justitiæ*, a manifestation of Justice. For,—and let the reader mark this well,—the Apostle's theme from chapter i. 16 onward, is Justice and Justification, the Justice of God and its attainment; its bestowal by God and its acquisition by man. And the two great 'factors' in his argument are *πίστις* and *νόμος*. Hence the great significance and weight of the *δικαίος παρὰ θεῷ*, and still more of the *δικαιωθήσονται*, occurring here for the first time. We will now, taking the text as it stands, proceed to consider still more closely, if possible, the logical *nexus* of ver. 14 with ver. 13. If, as is assumed, the *ὅταν γὰρ . . . ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος* sustains the *οὐ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ . . . ἀλλὰ . . . δικαιωθήσονται*, then the counter-

(1879), also Franzelin, Beelen, Vaughan, Baur, Pfleiderer, Farrar, &c., &c., who from ver. 14 gather the *natural* light and law of the Gentiles.

* That the *δικαίος παρὰ θεῷ* and the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* together yield us the substantive *δικαιοσύνη*; and that the fulfilment of the *νόμος* is legal justice are plain from the *τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου κ.τ.λ.* of Rom. x. 5. That this *δικαιοσύνη*, moreover, is *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ*, is equally plain from our passage.

part or equivalent of the δικαιωθήσονται (which repeats the δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ) must necessarily be found in ver. 14. For if not where is the proof, the argument, the logical validity? There would be none. To what rational purpose or effect would St. Paul,—in order to prove, or make good, the δικαιωθήσονται of the ποιηταὶ (in preference and opposition to the ἀκροαται νόμου), put forward the Gentiles who not having the νόμος on the one hand, neither fulfilled its requirements nor were just 'before God' on the other? What would he make good by that logical move? What would he gain? How would he advance his point? The confirmation of the truth that δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ is the portion of those who fulfil and not of those who only 'hear' the νόμος is certainly not to be found in instancing the doings of those who possess neither the one nor the other! Nor is the *explanation* of the truth either. For the adducing of these doings yields no reason for, no account of, the affirmed connexion of the δικαιωθήσονται with the ποιηταὶ instead of the ἀκροαταὶ νόμου. To say that when the Gentiles do *some things* of the νόμος they are a νόμος to themselves gives us nothing to the purpose—in the way of reason or explanation—either as to the subject or as to the predicate of the preceding proposition. Neither does it make good, nor does it elucidate the δικαιωθήσονται in its connexion there. No. Either the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ is placed in both verses or there is

no argument. We do not refer the logical process here to the syllogism, but this we affirm that not more surely must the 'middle term' of a syllogism be found in the 'major' and in the 'minor' premiss than must the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* be found in both these verses. It is the one common point, the one common bond between them. What thing is common (1) to the *ποίησις νόμου* (2) to the *ποίησις τῶν τοῦ νόμου* and (3) to the *νόμος* itself? We answer: Justice; *δικαιοσύνη*. Upon this hinge then, through the *γὰρ*, the argument hinges and turns and the reasoning of the Apostle attains its end. And it lies *within* the structure and *beneath* the surface of the text. In order, therefore to discover the argumentative drift of the writer the critic should, as a sure method, subject each separate proposition of the entire Passage, as well as the connexion of each through the *γὰρ*, to *question upon question*, nor cease until he has duly grasped the fundamental relations of things. By so doing he removes the veil.

CHAPTER II.

The Rejected Interpretations, and the Grounds of their Rejection.

1. We will now present for consideration those various connexions and constructions of our Passage which have been heretofore adventured and proposed;—pointing out as to each explanation in turn, the manifest discrepancies, of whatever kind, which forbid its adoption. All of them, we may say at the outset, in refusing to recognize ver. 13 as the object of the γὰρ of ver. 14, equally fail, as we might naturally expect, in providing that γὰρ with *at all* a legitimate object. The exegetes in quest of that object have hitherto mostly returned with nothing better than a succession of clumsy or subtle *fabrications* of an object. That object, let us remember, must be in the text. There may be an *immediate* object of the γὰρ—suppressed and understood; but the object for the sake of which the γὰρ (and its sentence) is introduced *by the writer* must be in the text.* It must be written down. Though not always *in reality* directly connected with the γὰρ nevertheless it is always *ostensibly* directly connected.

* See Winer's N. T. Grammar for the γὰρ: also Klotz on the γὰρ.

Again; the passage which is the object of the γὰρ, though for by far the most part it immediately precedes the γὰρ, need not necessarily so precede it. An intervening passage may occur (as happens in vv. 23, 24, 25, of this very chapter) which is, however, linked with the object proper to the γὰρ and thus is sustained along with it by the γὰρ.

To return: Interpretation I.—adopted by Calvin, Suarez, Franzelin, and others,*—unnaturally and needlessly leaping over ver. 13 and regarding it as a parenthesis, connects ver. 14 with ver. 12 A. so as to make the γὰρ of ver. 14 sustain or make good the proposition ὅσοι ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται. And by what process? By the conjured-up medium of an 'occupatio,' or intervening consideration. This view supposes an occurring thought or interposed question,—and reads the ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη κ.τ.λ. as making good ver. 12 A. by removing an objection which presents itself and requires to be met. "How," it is objected, "can those who have not the νόμος (or who have no νόμος, no external, 'positive' law) either sin or perish?" Or,—for the difficulty may be presented in a different form,—"How can those who have no law, internal or external, sin and perish? Is such a statement as ver. 12 A. consonant with the justice and goodness of God?" And then in answer ver. 14 ὅταν γὰρ, &c., is made to sustain ver. 12 A.

* Alapide, Menochius, Tirinus, and others.

as being consonant with Divine providence (and so as being true and holding good) by explaining that the Gentiles, though they have not the *νόμος*, nevertheless, when they do the things of the *νόμος*, are a *νόμος* to themselves;—*ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος*. Now how, we ask, does ver. 14 present a fitting explanation of this conjectured difficulty and so make good ver. 12 A.? In no respect. Neither (1) first as to the *νόμος*, if the objection takes that shape; nor (2) as to law—as a 'regula' internal or external—if the objection takes *that* shape. First not as to the *νόμος*. For if God has placed the Gentiles without the *νόμος*, why should the Apostle seek to connect them with it? To connect them with it by a roundabout and illusory argument, which in reality places them no nearer the *νόμος* than they were before? Why is he at the pains *νομιζεῖν τὰ ἔθνη* when by God's appointment they are *ἀνόμοι*? If he argues thus in deference to the supposition that all men must be placed under the *canopy*,—as it were,—of the *νόμος*, in order to validate their economy, he is only ministering to a false conception,—countenancing a false major premiss,—on the part of the objector. For it is not the *νόμος* which is necessary to validate their economy, but the manifestation of the will of God—a manifestation of which the *νόμος* is but one form. And again it is, after all, not the *νόμος* which he gives the Gentiles in ver. 14, but merely the semblance of it. So that the connexion

pretended is needless and fallacious, on the one hand, useless and empty on the other. If the Apostle designs to sustain ver. 12 A. and show that it is conformable to the Divine justice, &c., that the *ἀνόμοι* should sin and perish though they have no *νόμος*, why does he not say plainly out:—"For albeit the Gentiles have not the *νόμος* (or have no *νόμος*) yet they possess another law?" *That* is the right answer to this conjured-up occupation. *Not* a sentence which on a false view, *seems* to connect the Gentiles with an economy with which they are wholly unconnected. For neither in fact nor in argument have they anything whatever to do with the *νόμος*.* But consider the passage itself. "When the Gentiles do the things of the *νόμος* they are the *νόμος* to themselves." What? The *νόμος* as *νόμος*,—the *νόμος* in its distinctive form, *h.e.* as contrasted with the natural law? Most certainly they are not. For the *νόμος* which the Apostle presents and names thrice in this verse is—according to the interpretation we are now considering which views the *νόμος* throughout in *direct* relation to the party instructed—a revealed ('positive') law. And it is as the *νόμος*, it is especially under the aspect of its being a *revealed* as distinguished from an *inward* natural

* The conjectural intervening question springs, we say, from a false supposition: viz. that where the *νόμος* is not there can be no *ἥμαρτον* and no *ἀπολοῦνται*. But, instead of correcting that supposition, the Apostle is made by the *ὅταν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* to countenance and minister to it. Besides, who would interpose such a question? Certainly not the Jew, nor the Gentile either, if he had attended to vv. 19, 20, and 32 of Chap. i.

law, that it is here presented.* But they are not and cannot *be*,—we submit,—*νόμος as νόμος* to themselves. A revealed, a 'positive' Law to themselves! No. For the *νόμος*, so taken, is a thing to 'have' or not to 'have' (*φύσει ἔχειν*). It is not a thing to 'be' or not to 'be' (*ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι*).

But if, on the other hand, we regard the *νόμος*, according to the interpretation of the *Argumentum Velatum*, in relation to Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) and not, as above, as an instrument of instruction and in direct relation to the party instructed,—if we thus change the relation the case would be quite different. Then the meaning would be: "For when the Gentiles, who have—bestowed upon them from heaven and confronting them, no manifestation of righteousness, no *documentum justitiæ, h.e.* no *νόμος*—fulfil the things contained in the *νόμος* they are *themselves* (*ἑαυτοῖς*) such a depository, such a manifestation, such a 'document' of justice. *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*. They are themselves in themselves the *νόμος*.

To dwell further on this point. If, according to the hitherto accepted interpretation, the *νόμος* be taken in rela-

* Not under the aspect of its being a *Regula Moralis*. For the Gentiles have such a regula, but the *νόμος* they have not. As to the other form of the 'occupatio' which we have not considered in the text—"How can the Gentiles sin and perish without a law?"—observe, that the Apostle does not say that they are without *law*, but only without the *νόμος*. But ver. 14 can only be employed to make good what he has said, not what he has *not* said. Besides, ver. 14 replies to *νόμος*, not to law generally—*ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*.

tion to *person*,—to the party instructed and understood as a *Regula moralis*,—then its external revealed form is essential to the thing denoted by the term. Moreover, it is under this, as its distinctive form, that it is here presented for logical ends. In this case it cannot with propriety be *identified* with the person. Without him it must ever be, when viewed with respect to that with respect to which it is presented—its distinctive form. Within him it can never be. We cannot say ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος any more than we can say that man without revelation is by virtue of his natural knowledge a revelation *to himself*.* If, on the other hand, the νόμος be taken according to the *Argumentum Velatum*,—as it ought to be,—in relation to the *thing*, *h.e.* Justice, then the external relation vanishes from sight, and the νόμος can be regarded either (1) as confronting the person, or (2) as represented by the person. For the Mosaic Law is a document of supernatural justice, and the Gentile who fulfils the work which it requires to be done and exhibits "the work of the Law" (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου) written in his heart, is of himself, no less, a depository and document of supernatural justice, without the accessory of the Law. That this is the Apostle's meaning is sufficiently clear from ver. 15, which is added to explain (not sustain) the words ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος, words which might perplex or

* Its character of *revelation* is essential to the *conception* of the νόμος if viewed as a Teacher.

mislead the reader. "They are," he says, "of themselves the *νόμος* inasmuch as they show (*οἵτινες ἐνδείκνυνται = quippe qui ostendunt*) the work of the Law," &c. What is this, evidently, but to say (1) that the *νόμος* manifests Justice, and (2) that they manifest Justice, and that in this fashion they are themselves in themselves the *νόμος* of which he speaks ?*

These considerations seem to throw some true light upon the *ἐχειν* and upon the *εἶναι*,—upon the *ἔχοντα φύσει* and the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν*. And they form an independent proof of some value of the truth of our interpretation. For they show that in this verse, when examined by itself, the *νόμος* must be understood in relation to *thing* (*h.e.* Justice) and not to *person* (*h.e.* the party instructed). It is this former relation which alone fits these verses and underlies the argument of the entire passage. From (1) the distance then between ver. 14 and ver. 12 A. which renders the conjectured close connexion between them strained and unnatural, and still more (2) from the discrepancies which reveal themselves on an analysis of the reasoning involved in that construction we conclude that ver. 14 is by no means intended to sustain, or make good, the proposition *ὅσοι ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται*. The object thus pro-

* By *νόμος* of course St. Paul means the whole Law, moral and ceremonial. But we know that he contemplates it at different times under different aspects,—as here under its aspect as a Moral Law.

posed for the γὰρ of ver. 14 is far-fetched and incongruous, and is therefore to be finally rejected.

The latter half of ver. 12 may be dismissed at once from the question. For no one* has ever yet applied ver. 14 to sustain it: nor can it be so applied. The Gentiles are not ἐννόμοι.

We now come to the first half of ver. 13. Philippi and Hoffmann find the object of the ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη κ.τ.λ. in the proposition οὐ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ (τῷ) θεῷ. This construction, like the preceding, is plainly a venture. Like the preceding, it means no more than groping and patching in the dark. The objections to it are stated with sufficient force by Meyer. It unnaturally and needlessly (1) severs the double proposition of ver. 13, and (2) prefers the remote and negative to the proximate and positive clause. It overlooks the affinity between the ποιηταὶ νόμου of ver. 13 B. and the τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν of ver. 14,—a resemblance which cogently invites the association of the former with the latter. And lastly, in addition to the ever-recurring misinterpretation of the ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος, this nexus, according to Philippi, makes the argument of the Apostle turn upon the *having*—as opposed to the *not having* of a νόμος. See Meyer's *Comm.* Whereas St. Paul's argument turns upon the *hearing*,—as opposed to the doing,—of the

* Except possibly Luther himself. Luther, Rom. Pref. in the Latin of Justus Jonas.

νόμος (in respect of justification). *His* antithesis is between the ἀκρόασις νόμου and the ποίησις νόμου,—between the fulfilment and the non-fulfilment,—between the practice of the Law *as a whole* and the profession of it *as a whole*.* That Law which the Jews had received from God, and which in respect of righteousness was their trust and their boast. Comp. vv. 17, 18, 19, 20. On the other hand, according to Hoffmann, this nexus makes the argument turn upon the *form* of the application of the νόμος,—whether it be a Law *without* (*h.e.* a *heard* law) or a law *within*. Whereas the Pauline argument turns upon the *use* made of the νόμος by those who 'have' it. Hoffmann thus makes the ἀκρόασις express the relation of a mere *material* hearing. Whereas it expresses a *moral* relation subordinately involving a material one. For the ἀκροάσις is opposed to the ποίησις νόμου,—its fulfilment to its non-fulfilment, on the part of those who profess and embrace it. Lastly, it is opposed to all the objections which beset Philippi's construction except the one proper to the latter; in lieu of which, however, it provides its own.

We arrive, last of all, at the most important, the most interesting, the most subtle, and, we will add, the *worst* of all the applications of ver. 14 in the interpretation of the passage. We say the worst, notwithstanding that it,

* As a whole; for many things, or some things, the ἀκροατης ever did. But he did not *fulfil* the Law.

without doubt, rightly connects this verse with what immediately precedes it. It is the application adopted by Böhme, Fritzsche, De Wette, Winer (Grammar N. T.), Rückert, and a host of others, and in particular by Meyer,* whose exposition of these verses, among the most interesting and elaborate extant, should be carefully studied. He has taken the greatest pains with it, and has had before him the constructions of all the principal commentators, ancient, modern, and contemporary. We call it "the worst," because, though it connects ver. 14 with ver. 13—as it ought to be connected, and as it is connected by the majority of expositors ancient and modern—nevertheless it does not employ the former to sustain the latter. What is the consequence? The object of the γὰρ which the Apostle presents—and for the sake of which he adds ver. 14, &c.—being rejected, another has to be found. And since it is not in the text, it has to be *fabricated*. Thus it comes to pass that a proposition (ver. 14), which the writer designed to sustain and explain the double proposition (ver. 13) to which it is subjoined, is employed by the commentator to make good not the proposition presented by the text, but a construction—and an unnatural construction to boot—which he himself substitutes *for* the text. And this construction is to the effect that the proposition οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται comprehends the Gentiles within its

* Meyer, Comm. Rom. ii. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

range! Thus generated, a proposition comes to light which is purely subjective, which is altogether distinct from the text, and which is presented as the object of the γὰρ of ver. 14. Thus this verse becomes *the explanation of an explanation.* It is employed to support and defend an interpretation: an interpretation, moreover, which in the case of Meyer, Fritzsche, Böhme, and others, consists of an unnatural—nay, as we shall presently see, an inadmissible—extension of the words οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου, and so of the whole proposition, to the Gentiles. It is usurped to make good not what St. Paul says *in* ver. 13 (*i.e.* that not the hearers but the doers of the νόμος shall be just with God)* but what the commentator says *of* ver. 13. And what he says of it is this: that it applies to the Gentiles—that it includes the Gentiles in its range. "For," he continues, "when the Gentiles, &c. . . . they are a law to themselves." Now, not only is this application, this explanation, or assertion or subjective proposition not the proposition of the text (which alone is the true object of the γὰρ), but it is plainly incompatible with the language of the text. For the critical reader will observe that what the double proposition of ver. 13 was when St. Paul placed it to make good ver. 12 B. *that* it must remain. It cannot change its character and aspect when he comes to ver. 14. The *face*

* παρὰ θεῷ = *Deo Judice.* The δίκαιος is intrinsic to man, and objective to God. *Vid. inf.*, as to our use of the four terms—Intrinsic, Extrinsic, Objective, and Subjective, instead of only two.

it shows to the latter is the same as that which it shows to the former. Now it is placed by St. Paul to sustain ver. 12 B. *in its contrast* to ver. 12 A.* Consequently from the very nature of the argument it is written with exclusive reference to the Jews,—or ἔννομοι. But being so, it must so remain. How then can it change its aspect when ver. 14 comes to be written, and how be opened to receive the Gentiles within its range? It does not and cannot include them. For neither does the ποιηταὶ νόμου properly mean *virtual* fulfillers of the Law, nor, when viewed in connexion (1) with the ἀκροαταὶ νόμου and (2) with the διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται can it mean any others than the ἔννομοι. The three propositions, ver. 12 B. and ver. 13, and their argument, alike turn on the presence of the νόμος. Now to say that ver. 13 B. comprehends the Gentiles,—to make that assertion the object of the γὰρ of ver. 14 (in preference to the proposition of the text), and then to use that verse in support of that assertion,—these steps exhibit both inaccuracy and exorbitance of commentary. We say *exorbitance*, because here, in fact, the commentator is intruding upon his author, making use of his author's words for his own purposes; in order, that is, to make good not what his author says, but what he himself conjectures,—and not happily conjectures either. St. Paul affirms of the doers

* To make good the διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται in its contrast to the ἀνόμως ἀπολοῦνται.

of the *νόμος* that they are justified *παρὰ θεῷ*. The commentator (*e. g.* Meyer, Fritzsche, Böhme) affirms of the proposition *ποιηταὶ νόμου*, &c., that within its range it comprehends the Gentiles. St. Paul subjoins the *ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη*, &c. to explain and make good *his* proposition. The Commentator employs the *ὅταν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* to make good *his* proposition, viz. his application of the words *ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται* to the Gentiles,—which amounts to a proposition, a subjective one. Thus the Pauline object of the *γὰρ* of ver. 14 gives place to the commentator's object of the *γὰρ*,—an object which is formed by an arbitrary and unnatural application of the *ποιηταὶ νόμου, κ.τ.λ.* to the Gentiles, the *δικαιωθήσονται* being, as far as confirmatory proof is concerned, entirely set aside.

For the purpose of elucidation Meyer has given us a paraphrase of vv. 13, 14; a brief attentive consideration of which will show the reader how this celebrated commentator has actually *imposed upon himself*—in his attempt to interweave and combine his own view with the text of the Apostle. The thesis he presents is not in the least sustained by the proof which he subjoins in its support, and which he introduces with a *denn* evidently intended to represent the *γὰρ* of ver. 14 in the text. He says: "The connexion, therefore, may be paraphrased somewhat thus: 'With right and reason I say "the doers of the Law shall be justified;" *for* (denn) as to the case of

the Gentiles that ye may not regard them as beyond the reach of that rule it is proved in fact by those instances in which Gentiles, though not in possession of the Law of Moses, do by nature the requirements of this law, that they are a law unto themselves; because namely, they thereby show that its obligation stands written in their hearts,' &c." That is to say (1) the 'right' and 'reason' with which the δικαιωθήσονται is affirmed of the ποιηταὶ in preference and opposition to the ἀκροαταὶ νόμου is shown by the fact that the Gentiles are not beyond the range of that proposition and the reach of that rule,—though you would naturally think so,—which fact is in turn made evident by the fact established in ver. 14,—the fact that when they do the things of the νόμος they are a νόμος to themselves. How does the inclusion of the Gentiles, on whatever ground from ver. 14, show the 'right' and 'reason' of the assertion that not the hearers but the doers of the νόμος are justified? For Meyer's *denn* the thesis should have been this: 'The term ποιηταὶ νόμου and so the proposition, comprehend the Gentiles within their range, *for*' "as to their case that you may not regard them as being beyond the reach of that rule," &c. &c. But St. Paul does not say that of the ποιηταὶ νόμου: that is, the Author does not say in ver. 13, what the commentator borrows his (the author's) proof in ver. 14 to prove. Again, Meyer explains the γὰρ of ver. 14, as "introducing the *proof* that the proposition of ver. 13 also holds of the Gentiles." But

that the proposition of ver. 13 'also holds of the Gentiles' is *his* assertion; not the Apostle's,—for it is not in the text. Therefore he furnishes the γὰρ with a fabricated object. Neither is the οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται "the general fundamental law of God who judges with righteousness," as Meyer affirms and, as such, applies to the Gentiles, as well as to the Jews, in the day of God's universal judgment. This adjustment is forbidden by the nature and relations of the νόμος on the one hand, and by the principle implied in the ἀνόμως ἀπολοῦνται on the other. We have dwelt to this length on Meyer, because, as he is one of the latest, so he is one of the greatest of the Protestant commentators on the Pauline Epistles.

De Wette is more remote and visionary, more arbitrary and subjective still.* Like Meyer, rightly connecting ver. 14 with ver. 13,—unlike him rightly refusing to place the Gentiles under the νόμος this commentator employs ver. 14 to make good, in respect of the Gentiles, not only what is said in ver. 12 A. concerning them as ἀνόμοι, but also what is said in ver. 12 B. and ver. 13 concerning the Jews (or ἔννομοι) as contrasted with the ἀνόμοι. But as to the latter text (ver. 12 B. 13) to make good what? What the text says? By no means. What then? His own extension or application of it analogically to the Gentiles! He says "The correct view of the connexion of our verses (14, 15) with the foregoing (12, 13)

* De Wette, Rom. ii. 12, 13, 14. See Appendix.

will therefore be this; that they (14, 15) are intended to make good (*begründen*) with reference to the Gentiles what is affirmed in ver. 12, 13." He means 'make good' *the application* of what is affirmed. He means 'they are intended to make good an extension and application of the statements in ver. 12 B. and ver. 13 to the Gentiles,'—not to make good *the statements themselves* which he himself in opposition to Meyer refers exclusively to the Jews. So that manifestly De Wette's object of the γὰρ is his own arbitrary and unlikely extension of ver. 13 to the Gentiles. His own arbitrary extension, we repeat, and nothing whatever else. Here we plainly see the commentator substituted for the author, his explanation for the text, and the subjective for the objective. He adds that the introduction of ver. 14 is intended "not merely to make good the one-sided proposition in ver. 12 A. that the Gentiles also will be *punished* but to show that there is, in their case also, a *justification*, —which is *said* in ver. 13 merely in reference to the Jews but is *tacitly extended* also to the Gentiles." That is to say the extension is not in the text but is *his own thought* and he usurps ver. 14 to give it colour and support. What the text of ver. 13 really designedly presents to the reader is not a principle of universal application but a special double proposition turning purely on the νόμος —just introduced—dealing exclusively with the ἔννομοι and strictly intended to support the διὰ νόμου

κριθήσονται as affirmed of the ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον as opposed to the ἀνόμως ἀπολοῦνται. It is written to present to the reader what it expresses, not something else which it *may suggest*. But since St. Paul had no thought of putting forward in ver. 13 a general principle,—to be applied to the Gentiles,—he cannot have intended to make good such a position by ver. 14. No; all this is done for him by a commentator, who unable to discover any better ratiocinative connexion between the verses, presents as the object of the γὰρ,—not the text which the writer presents,—but a deduction of his own drawn from it, and altogether distinct from the double position which it very definitely conveys. Thus Meyer puts, in the place of the text a pretended range and De Wette the extension of something deduced. And thus De Wette no less than Meyer, Fritzsche, Böhme, *fabricates* an object for the γὰρ.* Moreover taking the νόμος in direct relation to the party instructed and as a *regula dirigens, jubens et judicans*—De Wette says that, when the Gentiles do the things of the νόμος, they are the νόμος—*h. e.* a Lawgiver (*Gesetzgeber*)—to themselves. But they are a Lawgiver to themselves by the constitution of nature, by the natural law implanted within

* Beelen, a highly-esteemed commentator, takes substantially the same line. He (1) places the Gentiles in ver. 13, (2) asks how they get there, (3) uses ver. 14 to answer how; making the γὰρ a *nempe* or a *scilicet*. He may spare himself, however, both the question and the answer, for the Gentiles are not in ver. 13 at all! He 'explains' something which the Apostle has never said. Besides the ὅταν γὰρ evidently means *proof*.

them,—whether they do the things, of the *νόμος* or not, that is to say independently of and before the *ποίησις τῶν τοῦ νόμου*. The Lawgiver precedes not follows obedience to the law. But with the Apostle the objective fact indicated by the *ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν* is the indispensible condition upon which the succeeding fact indicated by the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος* depends for its existence. When they fulfil &c. they *are*: when they do not fulfil they are *not*.

Fritzsche,* following Böhme, adopts the same view of the connexion, and the same principle or method of interpretation as that which Meyer unfolds. He too employs ver. 14 to make good not that which the text presents and the Apostle says, but a conjectural, unnatural, improbable interpretation of ver. 13, imposed by himself. Perceiving, however, more clearly than the others the difficulty arising from the simple tenor of the language of ver. 14: *ὅταν . . . ποιῶσιν . . . ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν*, he takes away from the *ὅταν* its usual meaning of 'when' (*quando*) and substitutes the rarer one of 'since' (*siquidem*): then, to balance this, he gratuitously supposes a *δῆλον ὅτι* before the *οὗτοι* and refers us in his defence (1) to a passage (1 Cor. xv. 27) where *δῆλον ὅτι occurs* in the text; and (2) to those brachyologies where, in fact, *ἐὰν* not *ὅταν* is the word. So that the instances are not so much to the point as could be wished. This construction even if in part

* Fritzsche, Comm. Rom. ii. 13, 14.

admissible, is nevertheless strained and unsatisfactory. We submit that it is safer and sounder exegesis to observe fidelity aud take the words exactly according to the text. The interpretation which so takes them has plainly the advantage over that which handles them dangerously. The writer, we insist, means to tell us that *when* the Gentiles do the things of the νόμος they are themselves the νόμος and not otherwise. But if we here regard the νόμος in primary (or direct) relation to the party instructed as a *regula dirigens, &c.* this dependence could not be. For so long as the '*lex naturalis*' dictated to the Gentile, some things of the νόμος,—that is, some of those things which the νόμος would teach him if he had it,—in this he would be a νόμος to himself whether he 'did' any thing,—*h. e.* obeyed—or not. But lastly Fritzsche, and he alone has recourse to this construction of ver 14 in order to smooth down *one* of the many discrepancies which beset this widely-adopted interpretation of the verses. The exegetical crime of a fabricated object for the γὰρ (and such an object!) is his, if possible, more than it is Meyer's or De Wette's. He employs a subjective explanation of ver. 14 to explain a subjective explanation of ver. 13. The objective import of both verses being overlaid or set aside, the commentator buries the author and carries away his γὰρ.

We say Fritzsche alone puts this construction of

ver. 14. But perhaps the commentary of Aquinas* should be resolved to this explanation of the text. 'Hujus modi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex,—inquantum scilicit funguntur officio legis ad seipsos, instruendo se et inducendo ad bonum.'† But it is not true that the doing of the things of a revealed law (*lex positiva*) shows that the Gentile is a '*lex revelata*' to himself. [And this, to say nothing of the insertion of the δῆλον ὅτι which we are here ascribing to St. Thomas, instead of making him think that the discharge of the office of the νόμος follows and depends upon obedience.] St. Thomas is not, we submit, close enough to the text. The νόμος of St. Paul must be taken in the same sense,—that is, in the same relation to that to which it is intended to relate,—in the ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος as in the μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα; else the point of the argument is destroyed. If it be taken in relation to the party instructed, then it wears the aspect of a revealed law in contrast to the natural law which the Gentile has. (Comp. cap. i. vv. 19 and 32.) Then the νόμος must mean the very thing which no man can 'be' to himself. But if it be taken in relation to δικαιοσύνη and understood as a *documentum justitiæ*, then the

* Aquinas, Hom. Rom. Lectio. 3.

† St. Thomas could say the same of 'Revelation:' but how is a man without revelation, by natural light a 'revelation' to himself?' He cannot be *in the place of* a revelation to himself. For 'Revelation' is *external*.

Gentile 'has' it not indeed as the Jew 'has' it (*sc.* φύσει) but he himself 'is' it.

Along with that great majority of expositors who connect ver. 14 with ver. 13 is one of the most distinguished and trusted of English commentators—Vaughan.* But what explanation can well sit looser to the Pauline text than this divine's paraphrase of vv. 13, 14? Let the one be carefully compared with the other, which is as follows: "I say that there may be hearers of a law who are not doers of it: I go further and say, that there may be doers of a law who are not hearers of it: *for* (= the γὰρ of St. Paul) *whenever Gentiles who do not possess a law,* that is, an express revelation of duty, *do by nature,* without revelation *the things of such* (τοῦ) *law,* the things which God's law, if they possessed it, would prescribe to them, *these, though they do not possess a law, are a law to themselves:* to them belongs, so far as their knowledge extends, both the advantage and the responsibility of persons living under a Divine law: *because they show the work,* the purport or requirement *of the law* to be *written on their hearts,*† though not on material tablets like those of the Ten Commandments (2 Cor. iii. 3; οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίας σαρκίναις)," &c. Now does the Apostle say (1) 'I say that there may be hearers of a law who are not doers

* Vaughan (C. J.) Comm. Rom. ii. 13, 14.

† The italics are those of Vaughan.

of it;' or (2) 'I go further and say that there may be doers of a law who are not hearers of it;' or (3) does the 'for' of Vaughan represent the logical *nexus* or relation of the Apostle's γὰρ? By no means. St. Paul is not contrasting 'doing' with 'hearing' in respect of law. He is contrasting the doing of the νόμος with the hearing of the νόμος in respect of justification,—*h.e.* being rendered just before God. Again, he does not say: 'I go further and say that there may be doers of a law who are not hearers of it.' This is the flight of the commentator. Yet this sentence, which bears no resemblance to ver. 13, Vaughan substitutes for the double proposition of that verse in order to form the object of the γὰρ of ver. 14. '*For,*' he adds, 'when the Gentiles,' &c. And this 'for' is intended to represent the Pauline γὰρ. But observe further, that in this paraphrase he does not introduce a single word as to Justice or Justification;—the strangest omission. For it is in fact *for the sake* of the δίκαιοι παρὰ (τῷ) θεῷ that the Apostle adds ver. 13. These words are the standard and test to which the ἀκροαταὶ and the ποιηταὶ νόμου are successively brought. It is thus that he proves his previous affirmation (ver. 12 B.) that 'as many as have *sinned* in the νόμος shall be judged (and condemned) by the νόμος.' And we will here add that by subjoining ver. 14, to sustain and 'prove' ver. 13, he causes the latter to sustain (or prove) ver. 12 B. with

additional force. For the more he works the whole argument out, the more cogent does each part of the whole piece of ratiocination become. When, therefore, Vaughan omits all notice of the two words denoting righteousness or justification with God, he must needs be drifting clean away from the Apostle's line of thought and reasoning.

It seems indeed strange to us that Franzelin* should not have perceived (1) the importance and *weight* of the δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ and the δικαιωθήσονται, and (2) that through the ποιηταὶ νόμου of ver. 13 and the τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν of ver. 14, they form a bond—partly latent, partly patent—between these verses; and thus should have chosen with (Calvin, Alapide, and others) to sever ver. 14 from ver. 13, and take it back to ver. 12 A.; and should have interpreted ver. 14 as speaking *de notitiâ* or *de cognatione veritatûm* instead of *de Justitiâ* as it really does. But it is still stranger that Vaughan who rightly connects the verses together, should overlook altogether these two chief 'factors' in the argument of the text.

Erasmus connects the verses and paraphrases ver. 14, and its connexion with the preceding in the following words:†—"Neque enim satis est audisse legem ut justus habearis apud Deum; ne quid hoc nomine blandiaris

* Cardinal Franzelin. Franzelin, De Deo Uno Secundum Naturam, p. 73.

† Erasmus, Comm. Rom. ii. 13, 14.

Judæe, sed qui factis ac moribus legem exprimunt præstantque ii denique, judice Deo, justi habebuntur. Amplectitur Deus approbatque bene facta etiamsi nulla sit lex et magis aversatur eos qui cum legem habeant legi non obediunt; quamquam nullis omnimodo deest lex. *Etenim* cum nationes a lege Mosaicâ alienæ ultro (φύσει) naturâ ducti quæ læge jubentur faciunt quamvis nullo legis Mosaicæ præscripto moveantur, tamen ipsi sibi legis vice sunt," &c.* Here the word *etenim*, which he intends to represent the γὰρ of the text, makes good his own 'quamquam nullis omnimodo deest lex.' Is not the object of the γὰρ here openly interpolated and the Pauline proposition set aside to make way for it?

Köllner between the verses introduces the words: *und damit auch die Heiden*† ('and therewith also the Gentiles'); thus forging an explicit object for the γὰρ. And this he does, not with any warrant at all from ver. 13, but in accordance with what ver. 14 *suggests to his mind.*

Winer in his New Testament Grammar (p.58 Ed. Fr.)‡ says (1) that ver. 13 'relates to the doing not to the hearing of the Law.' Not so. It relates to Justice and Justification by the doing in preference and opposition to

* Those who study paraphrases or explanations in English, German, or Latin, should remember that the words 'Law,' *Gesetz*, Lex, are generic, and represent *natural* as well as *revealed* law; whereas νόμος is specific, and means solely *revealed law*, and further still the Mosaic Law. Νόμος is *the* νόμος.

† Köllner, Comm. Rom. ii. 13, 14.

‡ Winer, Grammar N. T. (γὰρ).

the hearing of the Law—in the case of the ἔννομοι. Like Vaughan, Winer neglects the δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ and the δικαιωθήσονται in his collection. Again he says that from vv. 14, 15 it appears that 'the heathen' (ἔθνη here is *not* heathen but Gentiles *i.e.* non-Jews) 'who live righteously are also doers of the Law." That is he adopts the view that ver. 13 B. comprehends the Gentiles within its range. And like Meyer and the rest he employs ver. 14, to sustain *that view* to the neglect and exclusion of the textual proposition. Moreover, as we have before shown, the inclusion of the Gentiles under the ποιηταὶ νόμου is inadmissible. For the νόμος there presented—as confronting the ποιηταὶ,—is the same νόμος as that which confronts the ἀκροαταὶ and objectively governs both nominatives. It is also the same νόμος as that twice mentioned in the preceding verse. So that the term connects the doers of an external (positive) law and these alone. The 'form' of the νόμος formalizes the ποιηταὶ. To be a ποιητὴς νόμου implies the presence of the νόμος. Contrasted with it we have the ποιηταὶ τῶν τοῦ νόμου (ver. 14),—advertently so termed because they have not the νόμος. A little later on the Apostle speaks of the Circumcision* as keeping τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου. Why does he not simply say τὸν νόμον φυλάσσῃ? Because they have not the νόμος. So to express their obedience would be informal and

* Ver. 26.

inaccurate. But why then in ver. 27 is the *ἀκροβυστία* described as *τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα*? Because one who has not the *νόμος* can be said in all strictness *τελεῖν τὸν νόμον*—though he cannot accurately be said *πρασσεῖν* or *ποιεῖν* or *φυλαττεῖν τὸν νόμον*. *τελεῖν* presents the notion of 'end' and 'substance.' It refers directly and primarily to the content of the *νόμος* (the triune charity), which may exist apart from the *νόμος*.

We have all along proceeded on the assumption that the object of the *γὰρ* of ver. 14 must be presented in the text. This is a most firm foundation. The *γὰρ* never was that did not, by the intention of the writer, refer to what he *had written*—in order to make it good to render a reason for it, to sustain it by a statement or explanatory proof. Every *γὰρ* is and must be preceded by a *sententia expressa*, which the writer designs to support by that which the *γὰρ* introduces, and which is therefore the intended object of the *γὰρ*. This *sententia expressa* is always *intentionally* the immediate object of the *γὰρ* though not always *in fact* the immediate object. There may be, and often is, a *sententia intellecta*, an intervening thought, a simple or a complex one, a logical link or chain. But this is subordinate and subservient to the object presented by the writer, and is left to the mind of the reader. With this subordinate and subservient element the writer does not concern himself. It is not *his* 'object.' The object therefore which he

textually presents to the reader is the sole proper object of the γὰρ—in exegetical view. And the same rule holds with the Latin '*enim*,' the German '*denn*,' and the English 'for,'—which all alike refer the reader to what has been before said, and almost always *just* before said.*

Wahl,† therefore, certainly errs when in his 'Clavis' he divides the object of the γὰρ into two kinds, the *sententia expressa* and the *sententia intellecta*, as though the latter held the same exegetical relation to the causal particle as the former. No. The sole proper object‡ of the γὰρ must always be that which is textually presented to the reader. The *sententia expressa* is never absent from the γὰρ. Never, therefore, can its place be taken by the *sententia intellecta*. Ever does the latter, when required, hold the place of medium between the *sententia expressa*—*h.e.* the presented, the intended, the *proper* object of the γὰρ—and the passage which the γὰρ introduces. The γὰρ joins passages; and connects them under the proper form of its logical office. As well might the καὶ reinforce,—the ἀλλὰ oppose,—the οὖν conclude from, as the γὰρ sustain something not previously said. In every one of the New Testament references which Wahl accumulates under the head of

* See Grammarians—Winer, Klotz, Kühner, &c.

† Wahl (Clavis N. T.), γάρ.

‡ That is to say, the writer's sole object.

sententia intellecta we find the *sententia expressa* in the preceding text—that is, we find the object presented and intended by the writer. Nor is the *sententia intellecta* at all required, it would seem, in all the cases which Wahl gives. Take an example. The *ναὶ κύριε* is the object of the *καὶ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.* of the Syro-Phœnician woman.* 'Certainly it is *not* right to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs.' It would be a wanton as well as an improper act;—why? *Because* the dogs,—dogs though they be,—are otherwise provided for; *sc.* by superfluity which is not the 'children's bread' at all. She establishes her point out of our Lord's own mouth. Wahl spoils the keen reasoning of the mother with his *sententia intellecta*,—with his "neque tamen fame perire sinimus canes fieri *enim* (*γὰρ*) patimur ut micis vescantur," &c. Never anywhere can the *sententia expressa*, the writer's object, be thrust aside to make way for the *sententia intellecta*,—the reader's thought.† The explanation then of ver. 13 B. by aid of which Bengel, Fritzsche, Meyer, de Wette, Winer, and so many others provide an object for the *γὰρ* is not the text nor of the text, but rather resembles a *scholion* whose proper place is in the margin of the text. But it has no right even to be there, for it presents a view of the *ποιηταὶ νόμου*

* Mark vii. 28.

† But, whenever this does need introduction, it is required as ministering to the *sententia expressa*, as explaining by what process of reasoning it is that the *γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.* sustains its proposition,—the preceding text.

δικαιωθήσονται which is forbidden (1) by the whole argument of the passage, (2) by the introduction of the νόμος ver. 12 B. in contrast to the *a*—νόμος (*ib.* A.), (3) by the antithesis between the ἀκροαταὶ and the ποιηταὶ, (4) by the formal relation between the ποιηταὶ and the νόμου. At the same time all these commentators are right in closely connecting the two verses together through the γὰρ. For first it is the natural and obvious connexion. Secondly, there is strong internal evidence of affinity. Thirdly, the attempted connexion of ver. 14 with any other verse is condemned by its too conjectural character on the one hand, and by manifold and manifest discrepancies on the other.

In drawing near to the *Argumentum Velatum* and the true interpretation of our passage, we draw near to St. Augustine's* treatment of it in chapter 26 of his book 'De Spiritu et Litterâ.' Quoting ver. 14, in the Latin, he adds the words: "His verbis hoc unde agitur subjungit et dicit; 'Cum Gentes qui legem non habent,'" &c.—leaving out the *enim*. Since we cannot certainly say whether he understands ver. 14 to sustain ver. 13, we can only ask; May he not have done so? May he not have had an imperfect perception of the ratiocinative basis underlying the whole passage and formed out of the *nature, h.e.* the meaning and end, of the νόμος—out of the reciprocal relations of the νόμος and the δικαιοσύνη (παρὰ

* Augustine (De Spiritu et Litterâ, c. 26).

τῷ θεῷ)—the relation of the Law to Justice with God and the relation of Justice to the Law? And (2) may he not have employed the *factorem Legis* of the passage: 'Unde autem factorem Legis Græcum justificatum diceret sine gratiâ Salvatoris,'—as representing the ποιηταὶ τῶν τοῦ νόμου of ver. 14 and not the ποιηταὶ νόμου of ver. 13—understanding it (the Latin term) in a virtual and not in a formal sense; with no thought of comprehending the Gentiles under a proposition which relates to the Jews alone? Be this as it may, still the words '*hoc unde agitur*' arrest and demand attention.

We have at length arrived at the interpretation which is given by Jowett* in his "Commentary on Romans." "Verse 14," he says, "is closely connected with ver. 13, of which it forms an indirect proof. 'It is not the hearers but the doers of the Law who are to be justified; *for* the Gentiles are sometimes justified who know not the Law.'" And just before, he observes that "the Apostle here speaks of the doers of the Law as to be justified." We must acknowledge Jowett for our precursor and, as far as we know, our sole precursor. Here is real light though not all the light. The truth but not the whole truth. But defective as the interpretation is —for this commentator seems to have derived the justification of the Gentiles from the lexis rather than the logic of the passage, from the τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν

* Jowett (Comm. Rom. ii. vv. 13, 14).

rather than from the reasoning involved (which, if ver. 14 is to sustain ver. 13, necessarily requires the equipollent of *δίκαιοι. π. θ.* and *δικαιωθήσονται* in ver. 14) —defective, as it is, still it (1) contains the kernel of the Apostle's argument, and (2) is scientifically worth all the other interpretations, ancient and modern, put together. For first, it brings to light the fundamental fact of the argument, viz. 'Lex non trahit Justitiam sed Justitia Legem.' In the second place, as it excels Calvin, Alapide, Suarez, Menochius, Tirinus, Kopp, Flatt, Mehring, Franzelin, &c., by adhering to the natural and obvious connexion of the verses, instead of arbitrarily referring ver. 14 to ver. 12 A.; as it excels Hoffmann and Philippi in refusing to sever ver. 13 into halves and then reject the half nearer ver. 14 and alone resembling it,—so above all, by boldly embracing ver. 13, it excels Bengel, Piconius, Meyer, De Wette, Rückert, Vaughan, and *all* the others who, under whatever form, fabricate an object for the *γὰρ* instead of accepting that which the Apostle places in black and white before them. Moreover this interpretation gives their due weight to the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* and the *δικαιωθήσονται*,—their true integrity to the expressions (1) *τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν*, (2) the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*, and (3) the *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*; and their true significance to the *γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν*—words which point, not to the precept and rule, but to the *δικαιοσύνη* which is *ἐν πνεύματι* as

opposed to the 'literal' Justice graven on the Tables of the Law. In a word, Jowett, and he alone of all, properly appreciates the γὰρ of ver. 14, on the one hand, and the δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ and the δικαιωθήσονται of ver. 13, on the other.* That he did not, however, grasp the *Argumentum Velatum* is sufficiently clear both from the brevity and the wording of his annotation.

* As Baur and Pfleiderer have equally failed to do. Baur's account of the connexion of these verses is to be found in his 'Paulus,' Part III, chap. II ('The doctrine of Justification') Engl. Trans. p. 137. Pfleiderer's explanation of ver. 14 appears in his 'Paulinismus' chap. I ('Sin and the Law') Engl. Trans. p. 63.

CHAPTER III.

Verse 13 (in effect) St. Paul's Foundation.

1. It is nothing short of certain that in the judgment of the critic whose determinations are governed by the principles of scientific exegesis, all considerations, logical lexical and grammatical will concur in demonstrating the correctness (1) of connecting v. 14, immediately or, as Jowett says, 'closely' with ver. 13, and (2) of making the γὰρ of ver. 14 and the verse itself sustain or prove the double proposition of ver. 13. It is the natural and obvious course to suppose that the Apostle designs to establish and enforce what he has just said as to the hearers and the fulfillers of the νόμος with respect to Justification; *h.e.* to show *how* and *why* it is that within the sphere of the νόμος, not the former but the latter are justified and just 'with God.' And this supposition soon ripens into a clear and firm conviction when it appears,—as upon an attentive consideration of the whole passage it must appear—that if ver. 13 be not accepted as the object of the γὰρ, another will have to be found. And such an object can only be supplied

either by divorcing ver. 14 from ver. 13 and connecting it with some other proposition in the passage,—say ver. 12 A; *or*, while maintaining the nexus of vv. 13 and 14, by boldly and ingeniously fabricating an object out of ver. 13, in the shape of an idea connected somehow with the verse and, as it were, seeming to blend into it. And this is contrived by substituting an explanation of the text for the text itself. The *first*, however, of these exegetical 'ventures' is condemned, as we have seen by the inherent incongruity of a conjectural connexion which is far fetched in itself. The *second* by the fact that it substitutes the commentator for the writer and a commentary for the Text. But the γὰρ always and invariably connects passage with passage and always (even when called an 'explanatory' γὰρ, see Beelen, *sup.*) renders a reason and 'makes good.' And neither preacher nor professor, neither expositor, nor annotator can interpose himself between the Author and his reader.

Considering then that ver. 14 is certainly intended to sustain and prove ver. 13, and to show how and why it is, that not the hearer but the fulfiller of the νόμος is just 'with God,' it is remarkable that the Apostle should have had recourse to the Gentiles;—remarkable that he should betake himself to those who have not the νόμος, in order to establish a point which relates exclusively to those who are within the sphere of the Law. For he is not here laying down a general principle comprehending

the Gentiles within its range, (see De Wette) but presenting the true relation of the *νόμος* to Justification (according to the declaration and mind of that *νόμος* itself),* and, by this, sustaining the *διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται* of ver. 12. What have the Gentiles, who have not the *νόμος* to do with the matter? And again, how does the fact that the Gentiles when doing the things of the *νόμος*, 'are themselves a *νόμος*' make good the previous assertion that not the hearers, but the fulfillers of the Law are just before God? How does the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος* prove the *δικαιωθήσονται*? To these questions the discovery of the *Argumentum Velatum* supplies the true answer, while, at the same time, it brings out in its fulness, the skill and force of the Apostle's reasoning. Behind or beneath the veil of personal action he is dealing with *things*. What things? The *νόμος* and the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* and their reciprocal relations. The relation of the Law to Justice as being its depositary, manifestation, *documentum:* the relation of Justice to the Law as its content and end. Reflecting on this relation (which yields us the *nature* of the *νόμος*) we understand *how* and *why* it is that not the hearers but the fulfillers only of the Law are justified,—*h.e.* just 'with God'; we perceive how and why it is that the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος* of ver. 14 makes good the *δικαιωθήσονται* of ver. 13. Then it is that we understand why the Gentiles—

* *ὁ ποίησας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.* Lev. xviii. 5.

the *ἄνομοι*,—are brought forward at this point. What have they in common with the Jews—the *ἔννομοι*? Something they must have in common, or else why are they introduced and why is the Jew (whom the Apostle is addressing throughout the whole of this chapter), here confronted with them? What is the common point upon which the argument hinges through the *γὰρ*? Not the *νόμος*; for the Gentiles have it not. Not the *ποιηταὶ νόμου*, for the *ποιηταὶ τῶν τοῦ νόμου* are a distinct and different class. What then is that which the former and the latter have in common with each other and which, at the same time makes the latter, themselves of themselves the *νόμος*? Manifestly the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ*. *This* is 'the work of the Law'—*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου* whether a man be *ἄνόμος* or *ἔννομος*. *This* binds Jew with Gentile. *This* binds ver. 14 with ver. 13. *This* reveals the true relation, end and nature of the *νόμος* and its connexion with St. Paul's theme of divine Justification. *This* abases the proud and sinful and deluded Jew and exalts the just and holy Gentile. *Justice* not the *νόμος* determines the relation of man with God in this life and his fate hereafter. And what justice, what righteousness? Intrinsic righteousness, with or without the accident of the *νόμος*. 'Not the hearers of the Law are just with God, but the doers of the Law are (shall be) justified: *For* when the Gentiles who have not the Law by nature (*φύσει*),—do the justices of the Law, *these*, not

'having' the Law, 'are,' themselves the Law; inasmuch as they show the work of the Law written in their hearts.' This being the true solution of the reasoning of our passage it necessarily follows that the *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται* rests on an actual not on a hypothetical basis. For the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* contained in ver. 13 is found in the Gentiles, is found historically, as it were, and in the concrete in ver. 14. The *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου* are not presented by St. Paul as hypothetical persons, but under the same aspect as the *ἀκροαταὶ, h.e.* as realities. Moreover resting on an actual basis and dealing with *real 'factores Legis,'* ver. 13 proclaims with respect to those who are within the sphere of the *νόμος* a fundamental and exceptionless law.* To say that not the hearers but only the doers of the *νόμος* shall be justified with God is to say, as to the *ἔννομοι*, that the doers of the *νόμος* and these alone are justified and so saved in the last Judgment; is to say that (1) the fulfilment of the *νόμος*, and (2) justification with God in and through that fulfilment is not only a possible and an actual, but for salvation a *necessary* thing. See reasoning of the whole passage, &c. By ascertaining, therefore, the true logical connexion of the verses we find that ver. 13,—for the sake of which ver. 14 is introduced,—establishes with regard to Justification a fundamental system

* A law guaranteed by that other great law: *οὐ γάρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία παρὰ θεῷ*, ver. 11.

on an actual basis. The ἔννομος,—*h.e.* he who is within the sphere of the νόμος,—(1) can fulfil the νόμος; (2) is justified παρὰ θεῷ, is just before God, with legal justice (3) absolutely must have fulfilled the νόμος in this life,* if he would be saved in the next;† (4) will receive eternal life in reward of its fulfilment,—for "God will *repay* every man according to his works."

These several principles let the Extrinsecist mark well and bear in mind, for in the day of Judgment, if we are to believe our Author, they will all be presented under the form of matters of fact.‡ What then is the place and position of this verse, and especially of the second half of it, in the Argument and teaching of the Apostle on Justification,—that argument and teaching which he enters upon in vv. 16, 17 of chap. 1 and opens with the aphorism: ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται? What place does this verse hold under that heading or text of his discourse? This. It gives St. Paul's *foundation*. It is (in effect) the foundation of that rudimental doctrine, of those bold outlines of Justification by Faith which occupy the epistle from chap. i. 16, down to the δικαιώθεντες

* By having divine charity at the last moment,—if not before: "Love is the fulfilling of the Law."

† Saved at the Last Day; for ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται. These words present no 'general' law or principle, but a certain fact of the future,—as certain as the δικαιοκρίσια τοῦ θεοῦ at that Day.

‡ "Paul is undoubtedly speaking of *the Judgment of the World* which God will cause to be held by Christ." Meyer, Rom ii. 5, 6. See also Pfleiderer on the Last Judgment. 'Paulinismus.'

οὖν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ of chap. v. 1. It is the first of four great *principia* which are successively unfolded by the Apostle in chaps. 2, 3, and 4. Let the scientific critic, by concentrating his exegesis on these four opening chapters, once grasp the mind of the Apostle throughout them, and he must and will possess the key both to Romans and Galatians, with respect to the Pauline system of Justification by Faith.

That we rightly term it the 'foundation' (in effect) of the Pauline doctrine of justification and the first and chiefest of the four *principia* which occupy the first four chapters of this Epistle, will appear from these considerations: (1) The theme of the Apostle from vv. 16, 17 of chap. i. is Justification, that is to say, Justice and the attainment of Justice. It is of the gift of Justice that he speaks,—its bestowal on the part of God, its acquisition on the part of man. The δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ which he first introduces in v. 17, is the condition of *eternal life;* for it is that whereby man lives to God and lives for ever. ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.* It is unveiled in the Gospel, ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται. It is manifested in these latter days 'being witnessed by the Law and

* Where the δίκαιος is, *at the very outset*, used in that intrinsic sense which is proper to it everywhere else in the Sacred Volume from end to end, and even wherever St. Paul himself uses it. See Rom. ii. 13; iii. 10 (where he substitutes it for the ποιῶν χρηστότητα of David); v. 19; vii. 12, &c., &c.

the Prophets,' iii. 21. It is 'unto all and upon all who believe,' v. 22. It is that Justice of God to which the Judaisers (not the true Israel*) would not submit themselves, x. 3. Its attainment is the *proximate* end of the πίστις, which is subordinate and subservient to it and for its sake exists. For were there no need for men to be in the state and relation of δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ, then there would be no call for the πίστις, which is 'the beginning, the root and foundation of Justification.' [As in like manner salvation, σωτηρία (v. 16) is the *remote* end of the πίστις which,—through the medium of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,—is subordinate and subservient to it, and for its sake exists.] So that in the Evangelic aphorism, ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πιστεως ζήσεται, the word of chief importance to the exegete is neither πίστις nor even ζήσεται but δίκαιος; if as seems certain this δίκαιος represents, in a personal connexion the same thing as that presented in the preceding δικαιοσύνη; that is to say, if the person here is termed δίκαιος in respect of his enjoying the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. Of chief importance, we repeat, for on the one hand the ζήσεται is not St. Paul's direct or proximate subject, and on the other, the πίστις is certainly subordinate to the δίκαιος. But if the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,—its bestowal and acquisition be the Apostle's theme: if the application and possession of this gift constitutes the δικαίωσις of chap. iv. 25, and

* τί γὰρ; εἰ ἠπίστησαν τίνες, chap. iii. 3.

the δικαίωσις ζωῆς of chap. v. 18,—is it not before all things needful to know what is the *nature* of this Justice? Would not the circumspect and scientific disciple of any teacher of the scheme of Justification, of any expositor of the Pauline Argument and system, interpose and ask: 'Before you proceed to tell me (1) by what means this Justice of life can*not* be attained; and (2) by what means alone it *can*—that is how Justification alone comes; and (3) by what method or order of things it is bestowed and acquired—that is what is the particular process of Justification,—explain to me, first of all, what it *is*. Is it, for instance, *intrinsic* and *objective*, intrinsic as to man objective as to God (*quæ objicitur oculo Judicis*). Or, on the contrary, is it an *extrinsic and subjective* Justice; extrinsic as to man, subjective as to God (*quæ subjiciter judicio Dei*)?* Tell me this, for here is a primary and fundamental question; and the answer and the knowledge which that answer gives will become the foundation of the entire system of Justification.' Now this

* We would here inform the reader, once for all, that in speaking of Justification, we have chosen to employ *four* terms instead of *two*. And this is a more scientific arrangement of terms. For since the words 'subjective' and 'objective' are commonly speaking *mental* terms, it seems better to employ them exclusively in a mental relation or connexion; otherwise some confusion of thought might arise. But the words 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' are here and throughout used in a *physical* sense and relation. Again, the former pair we use purely in reference to God, but the latter purely in reference to man. Other writers—*e.g.*, De Wette, Baur, Jowett, Pfleiderer, &c.—use 'subjective' and 'objective' for 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' respectively.

knowledge is evidently supplied in our verse: *οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται.* For first it is proved by the Argumentum Velatum that this verse is placed here on an actual and not on a hypothetical basis. The *ποιηταὶ νόμου* are not hypothetical or imaginary agents, but actual realities. Seeing that they virtually exist without the *νόμος* (v. 14), we know that they formally exist within the *νόμος*. Men can certainly fulfil the *νόμος*, because men actually do fulfil the things of the *νόμος* (*τὰ τοῦ νόμου*), and actually manifest the justice of the *νόμος* (*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*).* Causes which are adequate to produce the one *ποίησις* are adequate to the production of the other. And not only man can but *must*. For as many as have sinned,—whether in or out of the *νόμος*,—shall be condemned (v. 12, B.) and shall perish (v. 12, A.) in the day of Retribution. Secondly, there is,—and from the days of Adam there ever was,—but one Justification

* Hence we see that according to the mind of the Law and the Lawgiver 'perfect' fulfilment is not required (*opp.* Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and all other Extrinsecists), but only a fulfilment adequate to the satisfaction of the Lawgiver and the Law,—adequate to the *ζήσεται* of the legal aphorism and to the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* of the Apostle. 'God does not require impossibilities.' Therefore (1) the Jew could fulfil the Law, for God commanded him to 'keep' it. Therefore (2) He was not required to fulfil it 'perfectly,' for that would have been impossible, for man is not a perfect agent, and 'God does not require,' &c. In building on a required 'perfect' fulfilment ('nulla est justitia nisi perfecta et absoluta' Calvin), the Reformers and all Extrinsecists are building on an artificial basis by establishing a standard unknown alike to the Law and to St. Paul.

of Life (δικαίωσις ζωῆς). There is *de facto* only one such Justification. And this one Justification is the one which St. Paul upholds and unfolds in Romans and Galatians. It is, with adults, the Justification by Faith, —ἐκ πίστεως, and διὰ πίστεως. It is the Justification with a Justice by which alone a man is δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ. Ὅτι δὲ νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ δῆλον, says St. Paul, Gal. iii. 2. Why δῆλον? Because it is by the Justice which is 'of Faith,' and that Justice alone that a man is just 'with God,' (deo judice). His reason is ὅτι ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (*ib.*). Again he says, Gal. ii. 16, οὐ δικαιοῦται (*h.e.* οὐ δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ) ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Now let the critical student of v. 13;—considering closely these things and these passages,—with insight mark.

If there be but one *de-facto* Justification; but one in which a man is rendered δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ;—(for both the παρὰ θεῷ of Rom. ii. 13 and the παρὰ θεῷ of Galatians iii. 2, indicate a δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς, as both the term itself assures us and as the argument of each passage text and context conclusively demonstrates) *then* the very Justification presented in our passage (Rom. ii.) *must*,—not may but must,—be that one and nothing else. For first the Justification of our passage is itself, as it is plain to see, a *de-facto* Justification 'of life.' We have it possible, actual, necessary. It is (2) moreover a Justice

which by the very force of the reasoning (*οὐ γὰρ . . . ἀλλὰ* v. 13) is absolutely opposed to and excludes the *ἥμαρτον*,—preventing it from entering in to destroy saving relations here and salvation hereafter,—the very thing which divine Justification confessedly has to do. What necessarily follows? That the legal Justification here presented by several most positive, clear and solemn assertions in a chain of reasoning (from v. 3 onwards) which connects, explains and enforces them, is *identical* with that Justice and Justification which is 'of God' and 'of Faith'—the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως*. Also that the legal justice here presented is the 'actual' form of that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* which is the Apostle's theme, and from which alone the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* can be derived. What further follows? That the Justice and Justification which St. Paul is upholding; which in chaps. i. and iii. he is deriving from the *πίστις* and from *θεός* and which in chap. ii. he is opposing to the *ἥμαρτον*—the precise opposite of Justification—and sealing with the *παρὰ θεῷ* and which in all three chapters he is crowning with the *ζήσεται*, is *intrinsic* Justice and Justification. For the actual or active exhibition of that Justice is formally or virtually, *legal* justice or righteousness. Whatever remains of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ lies beneath* this actual final 'phase' of justice—the *ποίησις νόμου* or the *ποίησις τῶν τοῦ νόμου*,—and is (*β*) the habitual justice, and (*α*) lastly the fundamental gift or virtue, the *πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης* or

the πνεύμα ζωοποιοῦν. From this the habitual and, (through it,) the actual justice are radically derived, and this itself is the Grace of God's Holy Spirit in the soul, the free gift of God to those who believe: δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. Compare v. 5 and viii. 4. These three elements, presenting as many 'phases,' so to speak, comprise together the whole of that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ which St. Paul preaches: to wit (1) the πνεύμα δικαιοσύνης or fundamental power or virtue, (2) Habitual justice, (3) Actual justice. This is all the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,—in which St. Paul sees cause in effect and effect in cause, the πνεύμα in the habitual and actual justice and these again in the πνεύμα. And it is, in the first place, wholly intrinsic, all of it without any exception. In the second it is, in its actual 'phase,' legal righteousness or justice: *formally* legal of the νόμος during the period of the νόμος (which was born on Mount Sinai and died on Mount Calvary and embraced Jews and proselytes), *virtually* legal with all who, whether before or during or since the νόμος, have been placed by God χωρὶς νόμου. In the third place this δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ if once proved intrinsic is proved so from first to last; from Adam and Abel to ourselves. Once intrinsic always intrinsic. The justification of Abel is our justification: (Ἄβελ τοῦ δικαίου. Matt. xxiii. 35, comp. Heb. xi. 4.) We repeat the argument of identification. There is but one *de facto*

Justification and Justice 'of life' and 'with God,' cancelling sin and procuring eternal life. But the Justice and Justification of our Passage is (1) *de facto*, and is (2) a δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ and a δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς,—the ἥμαρτον being cast out. (vv. 12, 13, *arg.*) Therefore it is that one. But that one is (with adults)* ἐκ πίστεως. Therefore *this* one is ἐκ πίστεως, &c. If I am certainly informed that path *x* and it alone leads to the city of God, and I *see before me* a path manifestly reaching there, I know for certain that the path I see is the path of which I have been told. The answer, therefore, to the inquiry *vid. sup.* whether the Justice and Justification which the Apostle teaches is intrinsic and, (to God) objective *or* extrinsic and, (with God) subjective is given in the *identification* of the Justification of our Passage and the whole of chapter ii, with the Justification of the Evangelic Aphorism (chap. i. 17), and of chapters iii. and iv. and of chapters ii. iii. and iv. of Galatians. The Pauline system then is a system of intrinsic and purely intrinsic Justice, &c. Demonstrably so. For reject the identity which has been above established and you necessitate a perfect and insoluble self-contradiction† on the

* With adults who have not been *previously* justified; *h.e.* justified by the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in infancy. The justice of those justified in infancy is not a δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως—though the same justice.

† Let the reader consult Pfleiderer ('Paulinism,' Vol. I. pp. 77, 78, 266, 267) and Farrar (Life and Work of St. Paul, Vol. II. pp. 200, 201, 229, 230, 231 ff.) on the Justice and Justification of this second chapter of Romans—which they, with others, wish to identify with the ἔργα νόμου of

Apostle's part developed to the extent of forty verses. A self-contradiction or rather self-refutation such as no explanation, however subtle on the score of 'antinomy' or doctrinal aberration, will ever avail to render endurable. For so we should have an altogether inadmissible opposition. We should have advanced in the same subject and the same train of argument, two systems which necessarily exclude each other. For, positively, the *raison d'etre* of the one is the impossibility of the other. This is by no means the apparent contradiction of an 'antinomy' but a logical self-contradiction in the domain of logic. Moreover it is not only quite intolerable, but quite needless to boot. For the whole confusion and mischief arise from the importation of that 'Imputative Justice' which is Luther's gloss on the Pauline δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, and which rests on not one single sound basis either in Romans or Galatians or anywhere else. Least of all upon the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον of chap. v. 12.*

Romans and Galatians. Of which ἔργα νόμου the Apostle says (1) that they are *no* justice before God (ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, Rom. iii. 20), and do not exclude and banish sin, and ἀπολεία from the soul (*ib.*), and (2) which, when speaking of the attainment of justice (which he is *not* doing in vv. 2 and 10 of chap. ii.), he *always and everywhere* absolutely opposes to the δικαιοσύνη πίστεως (= θεοῦ = ζωῆς), so that they absolutely exclude each other in the matter of Justification. Observe that the Justice, &c., of our Chapter, which is *de-facto*, must be identified *either* with the ἔργα νόμου, *or* with the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. There is no *tertium quid*.

* It is in the Lutheran Gloss, and not in the Pauline text, that we have what Pfleiderer calls "the wholly original idea of righteousness by Faith" ('Paulinism,' Vol. I). The Apostle's δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ and δικ. παρὰ θεῷ was a very different thing, and not at all original. It was 'witnessed

At this point of his commentary on Romans Melancthon writes: "Hæc descriptio est justitia Legis." 'Here we have the righteousness of the Law.'* Most true. The righteousness presented in ver. 13, and previously from ver. 6 is, virtually or formally, the justice of the *νόμος*. Here Melancthon speaks for all Exegetes and Theologians, Intrinsicist and Extrinsicist, Catholic and Protestant. Moreover in this and in the preceding verses we have, as he rightly says and as all will say, the *phrasis legis*—the language of the Law. But what if this 'justitia legis' be itself the 'justitia fidei' in its actual form and final 'phase,'—remainder lying beneath in the soul? What are we to say in this case to the latter part of Melancthon's sentence: "Quæ nihil impedit alia dicta de justitiâ fidei"? Nothing less than that the 'justitia legis' of this passage and this whole chapter utterly and on the very threshold of the Apostolic argument and doctrine excludes the 'justitia fidei' of the Reformation. For Melancthon, following Luther and accompanied by Calvin, opposes with a fundamental antithesis the 'justitia fidei' to the 'justitia legis.' With his master he conceives of the former as of a thing essentially different from the latter and incompatible with it *in the matter of*

by the Law and the Prophets.' Adam, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Job, Melchisedec, Abraham, Moses, David, Simeon, Zacharias, all enjoyed both the idea and the thing. On the other hand the German Reformer was truly 'original.' He made Protestantism, and his originality made him. For some remarks on Rom. v. 12, see Appendix.

* Melancthon, Rom. ii. 6 ff.

Justification. He fixes a great gulf between the Justification of Christ and the justice of the *νόμος*. He casts out the latter absolutely. Not 'secundum quid' but absolutely. He upholds extrinsic and subjective* Justice and Justification as the Justification of Man. He sets it forth logically in opposition to, and doctrinally to the exclusion of, intrinsic and objective Justice and Justification.† And he says, "nihil impedit" and again "nihil prorsus impedit," because (1) he places ver. 13 on a hypothetical basis;‡ because (2) he fundamentally assumes the fulfilment of the *νόμος*—according to the mind of the *νόμος*,—to be impossible; because (3) on the ground of certain things said by the Apostle in chaps. i. iii. and iv. he divorces justification altogether from the *νόμος*, and maintains that man is by no means justified with God in its fulfilment:—thereby affirming that obedience (*h.e.* the *ποίησις νόμου*, which according to him is represented by the *ἔργα νόμου* of chap. iii. and of Galatians and the *ἔργα* of chap. iv.) is no part of and has nothing to do with the Justitia Fidei,—the 'righteousness of Faith.'

* Subjective Justice—*h.e.* a *δικαιοσύνη*—a state or relation of being just with God—springing from God's subjective and *ex arbitrio* view of the soul.

† Objective Justice—*h.e.* a *δικαιοσύνη* which God, who has placed it there, beholds in the soul. 'Objicitur oculo Judicis.'

‡ So at least with Meyer we understand him to do. But if he accepts it as *real*, and Farrar seems to us so to understand him, then he neither appreciated the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* nor the *δικαιωθήσονται* which repeats it, nor penetrated the argument of the passage either before the verse or after.

Now we would have the scientific critic attentively consider this Passage of the four *γὰρ*, first in itself, and then in connexion with all that precedes and all that follows it in this chapter, and ask himself what is the value of the extrinsic system of Justification,—the system that is of Luther, of Melancthon, of Calvin, of Chemnitz, of Beza, of Knox and of Cranmer, to say nothing of its adherents in our own and the intervening centuries,—when closely tested by the standard of the Pauline text before him? What sort of doctrine is that which is built on the denial of two demonstrated truths? Or, to put the point scientifically; what sort of theory or system is that which exists and can only exist by the assumed non-existence of two, not merely apparent, but manifest and undeniable facts? The words *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται* show, both of themselves and by their logical lexical and grammatical connexion with both the preceding and the following verses, that the fulfillers of the *νόμος* are by no means hypothetical persons but realities, as much so as the *ἀκροαταὶ* with whom they are contrasted,—making it evident that man can fulfil the *νόμος up to the point* of being *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ*. Again they show that these *ποιηταὶ νόμου* are (and shall be as a matter of fact) just and justified with God. These two points are proved beyond a doubt by the application of the *Argumentum Velatum* which discovers the true connexion of our verses. But the extrinsic system, which

is the system of the Reformation (and the modern 'Evangelical' system also), is constituted on the basis of the two opposite points, viz.: (1) that no man fulfils or can fulfil the *νόμος*, and that all men are, and to their death remain, more or less transgressors (*παραβάτης opp. ποιητὴς νόμου*: *αμαρτωλοὶ opp. δίκαιοι*): That (2) in the fulfilment of the *νόμος* no man is or ever was just 'with God.' On this double basis the Reformed system of Justification—the scheme of the Justitia Fidei, as opposed to the Justitia Legis, is reared. How clear it is, on the other hand, that if intrinsic Justice is established at the outset and on the threshold of St. Paul's teaching,—the *δίκαιος* of the Evangelic aphorism being purely intrinsic,—the plain evidence of its existence destroys the *ratio*, the double *raison d'etre* of Extrinsicism. And how clear it is too that the *ποίησις νόμου*, presented *no less than six times* in chap. ii. so far from being identical with the *ἔργα νόμου* of chap. iii. and of Galatians, and of chap. iv. is opposed to them with that very same opposition with which the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* is opposed to them, being in fact itself *identical* with this *δικαιοσύνη*. So that we have a Justitia Legis (*gen. objecti*) and a Justitia Legis (*gen. subjecti, gen. originis*). (1) a law-fulfilling righteousness, and (2) a law-produced or law-begotten righteousness: the *ποίησις νόμου* and the *ἔργα νόμου*. Of which the *first* is impossible without the gift of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, for the Law *cannot itself get itself*

fulfilled; the *second* constitutes no justice and justification before God, Rom. iii. 20. The overlooking of this important 'division' of legal justice is a fundamental and fatal flaw in the extrinsic system. For if the Justitia Fidei be identical with the Justitia Legis the double *raison d'etre* of Extrinsicism is effaced. What then becomes of the famous 'Justitia Fidei' of the Reformation, of Evangelicalism, of Rationalism? *εξεκλείσθη. κατήργηται.* It is anticipated, excluded, abolished, as a superfluous proposition or an idle invention.

CHAPTER IV.

The Four Principia.

In the double proposition then of ver. 13 (for both should be taken together) we have given us, whether of set purpose or incidentally, the *foundation* of the Pauline doctrine of Justification and Salvation, and the first of those four 'principia'—as we have termed the positions, —with which the commencing chapters of Romans are occupied. Taken together they constitute the unfolding of the aphorism from Habacuc: *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται* which forms the Apostle's text or heading. In the next place this foundation is to be referred especially to the *δίκαιος* of the aphorism. It serves to determine the import of the term,—the nature of the thing denoted by it. And the same remark applies to the substantive *δικαιοσύνη* immediately preceding,—which the adjective reflects, and as it were, reproduces. For it indicates the same righteousness. In the *δίκαιος* we have justice in a personal aspect or connexion. In the *δικαιοσύνη* we have justice, or righteousness, in itself. In the *δικαιωθήσονται*

we have justice viewed in its state of application; justice possessed; justice moreover, in its actual form, which is its final phase and consummation, or actual conformity to the will of God. So that the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* of chap. i. 17, and the *δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως* of the aphorism denote a justice which is, as regards man, wholly intrinsic, and as regards God, purely objective. Now it is in this sense, and in this sense only, that we call ver. 13 the 'foundation' of St. Paul's fundamental doctrine of Justification; *namely*, that it determines, once for all, the Pauline conception of Justice and Justification. It manifests the intrinsic nature of the one thing presented under the three forms of *δίκαιος*, *δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαιοῦν* (or *δικαιοῦσθαι*). Let us not be understood to mean that the *νόμος* is the foundation of Justification. Quite the contrary. The *νόμος* was adventitious—was transitory. But Justification by faith, normal and for all time. It was before the *νόμος* (see chap. iv.), and it was after the *νόμος* (see chap. iii.). Indeed it was the grand object of the Apostle in Galatians to *free* Justice *from* the *νόμος*. No: we call this verse the foundation of the Pauline doctrine, inasmuch as by it —before telling us (1) how Justification is *not* derived, and (2) how it *is* derived, and (3) what is the precise mode of its attainment,—the Apostle informs us by explicit and implicit teaching in what it *consists*. Thus our passage and the entire chapter serve to unfold the true nature of the *δίκαιος* of the Evangelic aphorism,—

which we find once in Romans and once in Galatians,* and in which St. Paul uses the δίκαιος in the same usual and proper intrinsic sense that it holds everywhere else, from Genesis to Revelation. Such then being the first of the four Principia, what are the other three? We have already sufficiently indicated them. The second is given in the words: διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθησεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ. Justification before God is not to be derived ἐξ ἔργων νόμου,—nor yet ἐξ ἔργων without the νόμος chap. iv. ver. 1. This principle is absolute and universal. There is no exception to be found or sought for. The third is given in the words: λογιζόμεθα οὖν πίστει δικαιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου (iii. 28). Justification (in the case of moral adults) is (to be) derived from Faith and is *only* to be derived from Faith. This position too is absolute and knows no exception, as we learn both from the aphorism itself (see Winer, Gal. iii. 11) and from several passages in Galatians. The last of the four 'Principia' we have in the words: ἐπίστευσε δὲ Αβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην—as explained by the Apostle in chap. iv. The method of the attainment of Justification is through the intervention or *medium* of a λογισμὸς κατὰ χάριν. And as it was with Abraham so it is with all, iv. 24, 25. Then follow the words δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ιησοῦ

* Once in Habacuc and once in Hebrews.

Χριστοῦ. Here there is a pause and a division; for the πίστις does not reappear for several chapters. This then is the order of the Pauline Argument. (1) The just from Faith shall live: (2) Within the sphere of the νόμος not the hearer but the doer of the νόμος shall be just with God: (3) Out of the 'works' of the νόμος (ἔργων νόμου, =Law-begotten justice) not a soul of unregenerate man (=σὰρξ) shall be rendered just: (4) Without the 'works' of the νόμος and only by Faith is man rendered just:* (5) Abraham believed God and it was reckoned to him unto Justice—by a λογισμὸς κατὰ χάριν—a gracious reckoning of award, the δικαιοσύνη here (chap. iv.) being the very justice by the acquisition of which, through the free gift and gracious λογισμὸς of God, his justification was constituted.

* Is only justified by Faith—not is justified by Faith *only*. See Gal. ii. 16, in which Meyer is wrong, and Winer, Ellicott, and Lightfoot are right.

CHAPTER V.

The Seven Points.

Point 1.—*οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται.*—Ver. 13.

Returning now to the first of these four Principia,—or St. Paul's foundation,—we will consider some points out of which difficulties or objections might arise. In the first place the *δικαιωθήσονται*, here introduced for the first time in the Epistle is the same *δικαιοῦσθαι* (1) in relation to God, (2) to sin, and (3) to Life and Salvation as the *δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* of chap. iii. 20, which occurs in the second of the positions or 'principia' of Justification; is the same *δικ.* as the *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι* (ver. 24) and the *πίστει δικαιοῦσθαι* (ver. 28) which occur in the third of the 'principia;' and is the same *δικ.* as the *ἐδικαιώθη* of chap. iv. 2, and the *δικαιώθεντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως* of chap. v. 1, which occur in the last of the 'principia' and at a sort of conclusion of the outlines of the Pauline doctrine. In other words the Justification here intended is the true valid and salutary Justification of the Evangelic

aphorism, chap. i. 17. Franzelin says of this first δικαιωθήσονται: 'Qualis justificatio hic intelligenda sit non est undequaque liquidum.* Nay; but it is made manifest, by every test which it is needful to apply, that the word, in this connexion, conveys implicitly and explicitly the very justification which the Apostle is everywhere upholding for the salvation of all whether Jew or Gentile, whether in 'Romans' or 'Galatians.'† First the verb itself used *absolutè* means justification 'of life' in this place as much as it does in every other place where the Apostle uses it *absolutè;* and where without one single exception in either of our Epistles, it signifies justification 'of life,' or salutary justification.

And this holds good even should we, with a double incorrectness, put a 'forensic' sense on the verb and participle, active and passive, wherever they occur.

Secondly the finality and *in-salutem* force of the word in this passage is proved by the παρὰ θεῷ which evidently belongs to the verb as to the preceding adjective and which is no accidental or indifferent, but an essential and very definite term of qualification.‡ For how much the Apostle means by the phrase δικαιοῦσθαι

* Franzelin, 'De Deo Uno secuudum Naturam,' chap. i. Thesis 3, *note:* where he adds, with perfect truth, the words: 'Sed clarum prorsus est sermonem esse unice de Judæis qui acceperunt Legem (τὸν νόμον).'

† Franzelin himself holds this to be the most probable meaning, p. 73.

‡ The παρὰ (τῷ) θεῷ means Deo Judice, and the δίκαιος is an intrinsic δίκαιος, and objective to God (*opp.* Meyer), like the δίκαιος of iii. 10.

παρὰ θεῷ is plain from Galatians iii. 11 : *ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ δῆλον. ὅτι ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται ;*—where the argument manifests two things ; first that the *δικαιοῦσθαι παρὰ θεῷ* is equivaleut to the *δικαιοῦσθαι εἰς ζωήν* and secondly that the only *δικαιοῦσθαι παρὰ θεῷ* that there is for 'man,' is in the *δικαιοσύνη πίστεως*. For the Apostle says, not many verses before, *οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος* (*h.e. δικ. παρὰ θεῷ* or *ἐνώπιον θεοῦ* Rom. iii. 20), *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως* I. X., Gal. ii. 16. From which comparison it becomes clear that the *δίκαιος*, the *δικαιοσύνη*, and the *δικαιοῦσθαι παρὰ θεῷ* are one and the same thing with the *δίκαιος* the *δικαιοσύνη* and the *δικαιοῦσθαι* which, with adults, involve both the *πίστις* and the *ζήσεται*.

Moreover the *δικ. ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* Rom. iii. 20, is one with the *δικ. παρὰ τῷ θεῷ* of Galatians iii. 11, and with the *δικ.* (*absol.*) of Galatians ii. 16, since *ἐνώπιον θεοῦ* and *παρὰ θεῷ* are of precisely the same force* in this connexion both signifying 'justified' according to the standard of God's judgment. Therefore the *δικ. παρὰ θεῷ* of our passage and the *δικ. ἐνώπιον θεοῦ* of iii. 20, alike denote a justification (1) of life (2) unto life eternal and (3) one which shuts out the *ἁμαρτία*.† Com-

* *Ganz gleich.*, Meyer. Baur and Usteri are to the same effect.

† That the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* of ver. 13 is a 'phrasis suprema' of St. Paul is trebly proved : by its connexion (1) with the *ζήσεται* of the *νόμος*, (2) with Rom. iii. 20, and Gal. iii. 11, (3) with the argument of our Passage, and what precedes it. It only occurs twice—Rom. ii. 13, and Gal. iii. 11.

pare vv. 12, 13, with chap. iii. 20, especially the *ἥμαρτον* of the former with the *ἁμαρτία* of the latter. Great therefore is the force and effect of the *παρὰ θεοῦ* of our passage. Indeed it is only from the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* that the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* can possibly spring as the *νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* of iii. 21, by its connexion (1) with the preceding *ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* and (2) with the *διὰ γὰρ νόμου, κ.τ.λ.* quite demonstrates. Given then the latter we have the former. But the former involves the *ζήσεται* and the *σωτήρια*. Therefore the *δικαιωθήσονται* of our passage logically commends 'life' and eternal life.

Thirdly, in our passage, we recognize the 'phrasis legis,' as Melancthon has it,—the language of the *νόμος*. We have the *νόμος* presented no less than *ten times* in three very short verses (12, 13, 14). Now what says the Law of Moses, which the Apostle knew to be of divine origin ?* *ὁ ποίησας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.* 'The man that doeth them shall live in them.' Here the *ζήσεται* is not merely annexed to the *ποιητὴς νόμου*, but is indeed bound up with the *ποίησις*; for the expression 'shall live *in* them,' is very significant. But what the *ζήσεται* of the *νόμος* involves in its range, Christ himself, the divine Lawgiver, tells us. When asked by the lawyer: 'What shall I do that I may inherit eternal life ?'

* He appeals to the damnatory clause: *ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς, κ.τ.λ.* (Gal. iii. 10), as a declaration of conclusive force, inasmuch as it was part of the *νόμος*. He says *γέγραπται γὰρ.*

τί ποιήσας κ.τ.λ. (St. Luke x. 25 ff.), he replies: 'What is written in the Law, how readest thou?' ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τί γέγραπται; κ.τ.λ. Now had there been nothing about eternal life, and still further nothing as to the mean or condition of obtaining eternal life in the νόμος, Christ of course, could not have referred the lawyer to the Law. He in effect says, 'Your own law, if you understand it right, answers your question.' The lawyer replies by giving the sum and substance of the νόμος —the triune charity. And Christ rejoins: 'Thou hast answered rightly, *do this and thou shalt live*: τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ, showing, by the way that 'Love is the fulfilling of the Law.' To the rich young man his answer is the same: 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments,' and then mentions some precepts of the Law. Now if the νόμος according to the divine Lawgiver's own interpretation of it, awards eternal life to legal justice—*h.e.* to the fulfilment of itself—and that on the (1) legal principle and (2) the judicial principle of *retribution*, must not the δικαιωθήσονται of our passage which reproduces that justice and that fulfilment, mean justified εἰς ζωήν and εἰς σωτηρίαν? It certainly must. Christ on his part affirms the ζήσεται and implies the δικαιωθήσεται. St. Paul on his part affirms the δικαωθὴσεται and implies the ζήσεται. Both teachers appear before us as confessed *legalists*. The Master in respect of 'life'. The Apostle in respect of 'justice'. For

the 'life' is the 'justice' and the 'justice' is the 'life'. *Excipiunt se invicem.** Moses therefore and St. Paul —the Lawgiver and the Apostle,—are evidently of one mind in the matter of Justice 'before God' and Salvation. Both are one in Jesus Christ. And Luther and 'Evangelicalism' are clearly 'condemned'.† What that 'legal' righteousness or justice is which St. Paul opposes uniformly and absolutely to the justice of Faith, and sternly excludes from Justification: what he *really* means by the ἔργα νόμου of Romans and Galatians and the ἔργα of Romans iv. will be shown later on. But again the Apostle says Rom. vii. 10: 'and the ἐντόλη which was ordained εἰς ζωήν.' What does this εἰς ζωὴν import, except that to the fulfilment of the νόμος eternal life was promised by the ordinance of God, and according to the declaration: ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς? Is not the ζωή of the Apostle the ζήσεται of the νόμος? And does any one dream that he had a thought of disputing that it was divinely and truly so ordained?

Fourthly the *context* of our verse (13) demonstrates, in

* Compare Rom. v. 12 ff., where ἡ ἁμαρτία and ὁ θάνατος are set over against ἡ ζωὴ and ἡ δικαιοσύνη, and Adam over against Christ in a way that leaves little doubt indeed as to the intrinsic import of the reasoning of *that* chapter.

† From Moses, our Lord and St. Paul (Rom. ii. 13), we undoubtedly have three axiomatic statements of legal Justification. Now since, on the one hand, the νόμος is divine, and the legal declaration ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ κ.τ.λ. is the 'word of God,' and since on the other hand, with adults, acc. to St. Paul Faith commands the *only* ζήσεται (Rom. i. 17), it must *necessarily* follow that the δικαιοσύνη νόμου *is* the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως.

the most convincing manner, that the word *δικαιωθήσονται* is the same as that which St. Paul everywhere presents,—and presents as involving 'life' and eternal life. From ver. 5 to ver. 16 the so-to-speak *logical background* is the day of Judgment* (ver. 5), in which only

* Pfleiderer, who holds the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* and the *δικαιωθήσονται* to be presented by the Apostle as *realities* and not as the creatures of hypothesis, would account for the palpable contrariety between Rom. ii. and the Extrinsicist view of the Pauline doctrine of Justification by supposing the Apostle to adopt here "the standpoint of *ordinary morality*, and especially of the Jewish Law from which standpoint the impossibility of works of the law and a reward for them *did not strike him*." (Paulinism, Vol. I. p. 78.) Farrar, who *looks* like Pfleiderer, considers that here St. Paul is "only applying the current language of morality to the concrete relations of actual life." ('St. Paul,' Vol. II. pp. 230, 231.) Now, apart from the (verbal or, where not verbal, the equivalent-to-verbal) inspiration of the Scriptures—which seems out of the question in the case of reasoning like this,—let us say that rather the Apostle is using and reaffirming the language of the divine Law (the *phrasis legis*) as enforced and guaranteed by the Judgment Day: that he is speaking of sin and justice from the double 'standpoint' of the Law and the Judgment Day,—the *νόμος* and the *ἡμέρα ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ Θεοῦ*,—both of which he held to be matters of divine revelation. Thus not mere *relative* truths, such as the rising and setting of the sun, but *absolute* truths such as the truth of the Gospel which he had by revelation from Jesus Christ. As to the *ἡμέρα*, it is abundantly evident that he is speaking in all earnestness to a momentous fact. As he did before Felix. *Λογίζῃ δὲ τοῦτο . . . ὅτι σὺ ἐκφεύξῃ τὸ κρῖμα τοῦ θεοῦ . . . ἢ καταφρονεῖς . . . θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὀργὴν . . . ὃς ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα . . . οὐ γάρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*, &c., &c. As to the *νόμος*, that he held it to be of divine origin is evident as from many other passages, so especially from Rom. ix. 4. He there places the *νομοθεσία* in the same catalogue with Christ. But further, the language and reasoning of our passage seems fatal to Pfleiderer's account of the Apostle's view and doctrine of 'righteousness by Faith' and its formation. (Paulinism, Vol. I.) By the passage of the four *γάρ*, and by the *Argumentum Velatum* St. Paul introduces, and through the remainder of the chapter applies, an argument confronting and contrasting the *νόμος* without Justice in the Jew,—with Justice without

two issues are placed before us,—the issue of eternal life and the issue of eternal death and one or other of these is inevitable. The Good and the Evil must each receive its recompense. Each must reap its proper

the *νόμος* in the Gentile. An argument from the 'shell' (*νόμος*) to the 'kernel' (*δικαιοσύνη*), and from the kernel to the shell, such as surely could never have proceeded from a mind already possessed with 'the characteristic idea' of the non-existence and impossibility of intrinsic (legal) righteousness: an idea resting (1) on the logical ground of an assumed Extrinsic (or as Pfleiderer would term it *objective*) justice; (2) on the real-logical, *h.e.* psychological ground of the absolute inability of human nature to fulfil the Law of God. For a writer who thus doubly, deeply held the fulfilment of the *νόμος* and justice with God in that fulfilment to be unattainable things, would it not have been an impossibility to say of the Gentiles that (1) when they do the things of the *νόμος*,—*ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*: and then in explanation (2) add that they exhibit *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις*: and then (3) expand the thought in detail? The mental effort of forming such an argument must surely have recalled the supposed fundamental view to his mind. The true reason why "the impossibility of works of the Law and a reward for them *did not strike him*," was because the notion of that impossibility was one which *never entered* the Apostle's mind *at all!* We may add here that Pfleiderer confounds the *ἔργα* and *ἐργάζεσθαι* of chap. iv. with the *ἔργα* and *ἐργάζεσθαι* of this chapter. In truth the former,—with which as with the latter the notion of merit is certainly connected,—relate to justification in this life, are hypothetical, and are opposed to the *πιστεύειν*. Whereas the latter precede glorification in the next life, are the *ἔργα* of the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* (who have the *πίστις*), and merit an eternal reward. The former 'face' Grace in this life. The latter 'face' Glory in the next—proving the doctrine of 'merit' to be Pauline. As to 'perfect' fulfilment, *vid. inf.* The words in which Pfleiderer himself condemns the explanation of the Protestant commentator are fully applicable to his own. It "may be very convenient to relieve his embarrassment, but is utterly unsatisfactory," p. 78. Farrar says (p. 230) St. Paul is here speaking of 'the Justification of the Law'—by which Farrar means 'justification by works.' But a Justification which is (1) a justification *παρὰ θεῷ*; which is (2) a 'justification of life' which (3) casts out the *ἥμαρτον* cannot possibly belong to the *νόμος*, but on the contrary evidently belongs to the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. Again he says

fruits. Now, since ver. 13 sustains ver 12, making good the *διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται* as affirmed of the *ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον*, by showing how and why it is that 'as many as have sinned in the Law shall be judged and condemned by the Law,'—*because*, according to the *νόμος*, only the doers of it are just with God,—it is plain that ver. 13, by the *οὐ γὰρ* casts out the *ἥμαρτον*, and by casting it out removes the *διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται*. For if, at the Last Judgment, the *ἔννομοὶ* are found to have been *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* in life by fulfilment of the *νόμος*, they could not and would not be judged to condemnation *by* the *νόμος*. The *ἥμαρτον* would not be *in* them at the Judgment, and so the *κριθήσονται* could not involve them in the consequence which is grounded on the presence of the *ἥμαρτον*. But if the *ἥμαρτον* and the *κριθήσονται* are both removed and we have in the place of the former the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* and the *δικαιωθήσονται* (for the

(*ib.*) that St. Paul is not reasoning here in the *materia* of divine Justification. How can he say that, when the *ζήσεται* of the two aphorisms (the Legal and the Evangelic,) is the same and when, consequently, the *δικαιοσύνη* of the two *ζήσεται* must be the same also? For there is but one *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς*; viz. the *δικ. θεοῦ*, and the Legal aphorism is no less divine than the Evangelic or Pauline. The fact is that the Legal aphorism must ever present the gravest difficulty to those who adopt the Extrinsicist view of St. Paul's language and reasoning on the subject of Justification. For (1) that aphorism is 'God's word' and (2) St. Paul well knowing it to be so *re-affirms* it, in his own form, in a most decisive connexion. For what test can be more decisive than the 'Judgment' of that Day when God will make good all his 'word.' We challenge the Extrinsicist to produce anything said anywhere by St. Paul in behalf of the Justice of Faith stronger than this re-affirmation of the Justice of the *νόμος*. Therefore the two *must* be the same.

former is their true opposite *not* the *κριθήσονται*) then eternal life manifestly enters in. If one door is closed the other is opened. If men are not 'lost' at the Day of Judgment they are 'saved.' Therefore though the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* and the *δικαιωθήσονται* belong as much as does the *ἥμαρτον* to the sphere of this life, as is plain from ver. 19 and from the *Argumentum Velatum*, still they may be carried onward to the scene of the Last Judgment (like the *ἥμαρτον*, which, as Meyer well observes, "is spoken of from the standpoint of the time of judgment,") and thus inherit their judicial award (*ἀπόδοσιν*) of salvation. Salvation it must be, since the *κριθήσονται* has disappeared with the *ἥμαρτον*. Either eternal life or eternal death must enter in at last. But eternal death (*ἀπωλεία*) is excluded with the exclusion of the *ἥμαρτον* and its attendant dark *κριθήσονται*. Therefore eternal life is introduced. Such is the argumentative import of ver. 13. And hence it follows that the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* 'means' salvation. But if the *δίκαιοι*, then the *δικαιωθήσονται*.* Further still: that the *δικαιωθήσονται* of our passage indicates a Justification of 'life' and salvation and is one with the *δικαιωθήσεται* of iii, 20, the *δικαιούμενοι, δωρεὰν* of iii, 24, with the

* The *δίκαιοι π. θ.* and the *δικαιωθήσονται* belong to this life as much as do the *ἀκροαταὶ* and the *ποιηταὶ* and the *ἥμαρτον*, and as much as the other forms of the word which occur in the two following chapters. The *δικαιωθήσονται* here means 'are, or shall be, rendered actually just' *h.e. in* the *ποίησις*. It in fact repeats the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* substantially and is only preferred for linguistic reasons.

δικαιοῦσθαι of iii, 28, and lastly with the δικαίωθεντες of v. 1, is made clear by an attentive survey of the preceding verses as far back, at least, as ver. 6: ὃς ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. The whole of the argument from ver. 6 to ver. 16 (to go no further back) is one solid piece of reasoning. It is bound up together by the passage of the four γὰρ And in particular ver. 11, οὐ γάρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ sustains the preceding verses 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 as applications of the ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ. First in respect of the good and the bad; secondly, in respect of the Jew and the Greek. The divine ἀπροσωπολημψία lies in fact *behind* the δικαιοκρίσια (ver. 5), and as it were, protects and secures it. If in the Day of Judgment the προσωπολημψία (which has especial reference to the Jews as the νόμος, argumentatively following, proves), had sway, the five preceding verses would simply fall to pieces. Then there would be no δικαιοκρίσια in the ἀποδώσει, and so no ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα. In ver. 12, we have an exemplification on the dark side, and therefore substantially a re-affirmation of the ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα. In the ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ (looking to the dark side to which we now confine ourselves) we have presented to us a *fact*,—a certain fact of the future,—exhibiting a retributive process or law as seen *on the side of God*. In the ὅσοι ἄνομως and the ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον we have presented to us a fact,—a certain fact of the future

exhibiting the same law, but seen *on the side of man.* The point of view is changed from God to man because the Apostle is coming down upon the Jew. Whenever therefore, (whether without or within the sphere of the *νόμος*), the *ἥμαρτον*,—that is to say intrinsic actual iniquity, *or rather* privation o *δικαιοσυνη* seen in its actual and positive issues,—is found at the end of life, is found *in exitu,* and is placed before the tribunal of the Last Judgment, the *ἀπολεία* will follow as a most certain fact of the future. All (1) who have been sinners, (2) all who have been transgressors of the *νόμος* shall perish. For the argument here turns strictly on the *ἥμαρτον,* and on the *ἥμαρτον as ἥμαρτον,* as we learn from the preceding verses and especially ver. 6. And secondly here is no hypothetical basis,—for reference is made, through the *ἀπροσωπολημψία,* to the veritable and actual *δικαιοκρίσια* and *ἀπόδοσις* of the Last Judgment. All, all is matter of fact. As though one should say: 'On such a day as many as have committed murder this year will be executed.' What follows from this? That within the sphere of the *νόμος* only the doers of the *νόμος* shall be justified and saved. That, in the case of the *ἔννομοι,* (and the principle holds equally of the *ἀνομοὶ,*) the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* which the *ποίησις νόμου* presents is necessary to eternal salvation. This alone casts out the intrinsic *ἥμαρτον.* But the *ἥμαρτον* must be cast out, for this intrinsic evil remaining to the end

and—inasmuch as it "is here spoken of from the standpoint of the time of judgment,"—bearing its guilt with it before the Tribunal, infallibly reaps perdition. The intrinsic righteousness therefore presented in vv. 13, 14, 15 and 16 is, in the case of moral adults, necessary to salvation and to eternal life. So that the δικαιωθήσονται of ver. 13 *means* δικαιωθήσονται εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. And it pertains to the agents named in ver. 14, as much as to those of whom it is expressly affirmed. As the *Argumentum Velatum* shows. And lastly this intrinsic righteousness as, on the one hand, it is considered from a legal point of view in our passage, so on the other it is there described on the side, and in respect of its *result*, that is as a δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ and a δικαιοσύνη ζωής: whereas in chap. i. and elsewhere the same justice is described on the side, and in respect of its *origin* or *derivation*, that is as a δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ and a δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως. But we know that the same justice must be meant because we know that (1) the δικαιοούνη θεοῦ and the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως must be the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ and the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς, and that (2) the latter must be the former.

Point 2.—The Passage of the Two ζήσεται.—Gal. iii. 11, 12.

We will now proceed to another point, and, placing them side by side, compare our passage of the four γὰρ

with the passage of the two *ζήσεται*, Gal. iii. 11, 12, *ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ δῆλον, ὅτι ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως ἀλλ' ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.'* Now the passage of the four *γὰρ*, rightly understood, demonstrates (1) that the *δικαιοσύνη* of the *νόμος* is justice 'of life'; (2) Secondly that it is not unattainable either formally by Jew or virtually by Gentile,—either by *ἔννομος* or *ἄνομος*, but (3) that it is possible, actual and necessary to salvation. Now there is but one Justification of life; but this is a Justification of life. Therefore *this* Justification is *that* Justification. Consequently the legal aphorism,* *ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*,—of which the *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται* is merely a Pauline reproduction,—is a statement (and of course as being divine a true statement), of Justification *from a legal point of view*. It is an express declaration of the divine *νόμος* and Christ† stands behind it (Luke x. 28, &c.). Never then can this legal aphorism be set in an opposition of 'antagonism' to the Evangelic aphorism *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, though they may be contrasted, (as in Rom. x. 5, 6), in respect of their characte-

* We have called this legal declaration,—or clause of the *νόμος* opposed to the damnatory clause '*ἐπικατάρατος*,' &c.—an 'aphorism' for convenience sake in order to match it with the Evangelic aphorism: *ὁ δίκαιοι ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.*

† Luther's explanation, therefore, of the Pauline language, &c. brings the Apostle into direct collision with Christ. From his premisses the Tübingen conclusions inevitably follow.

ristic forms. Why never set in opposition? Because the δικαιοσύνη νόμου, (*gen: objecti not gen: originis*), which is the δικ. arising out of the ποίησις νόμου is identical with, 'part and parcel' of, the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως. The latter includes the former as part of itself, —its actual final part.

Turning then to Galatians, iii. 11, ff. where the Apostle says that no one is justified ἐν νόμῳ;—ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ δῆλον. κ.τ.λ.—we see that he cannot possibly mean that no ἔννομος ever was or could be justified. For Moses and Elias were. As little that no ἔννομος ever was or could be just with God in the fulfilment of the νόμος. For in our passage he affirms that it is the doers of the Law who are justified and saved, and they alone. No: what the Apostle means to say is that no one ever was or could be justified in the νόμος *through* the νόμος—ἐν νόμῳ διὰ νόμου. Examine the passage. It is plain from the logical connexion of the words ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ with the Evangelic aphorism which follows that those words mean that no one shall attain to the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς through the νόμος. The reason being that the ζήσεται can only be gained from and through the πίστις and,—what necessarily follows,—that the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς can only be gained through the πίστις; *h.e.* through that *principle* or the principle of that 'means.' But to him who, disregarding the πίστις, betakes himself to the

νόμος in order to gain the δικ. ζωῆς the νόμος addresses the *principle* of the τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ (Luke x. 28) as the immediate means of possessing the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ and with it the ζωὴ,—the ποίησις νόμου *being*, in its fulfilment, that δικαιοσύνη. The Law does this because it *is* the Law and nothing else; because it is a *documentum justitiæ*, ordaining justice. But the νόμος is not ἐκ πίστεως. That is, the νόμος does not present the πίστις as the *means from and out of and through which* the δικ. ζωῆς is to be attained or gained. The 'proposition' of Faith,—the putting forward of that '*principle*' of origin or derivation is not within the scope and office of the Law. It does not *derive* its content and ends from the πίστις but from the ποίησις: to which, and not to the πίστις, it directs its seeker. He therefore who betakes himself to the 'principle' of the νόμος—τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ as a means to get at the δικ. ζωῆς which is undoubtedly contained in the νόμος—(as the Law itself, Levit. xviii. 5, and Christ, Luke x. 28, and the Apostle, Rom. ii. 13, all bear witness)—will never attain to it because he seeks it not through that 'principle' or that primary means from which it can alone be gained.* For it can only be gained by the δικ. θεοῦ. What we see in the two aphorisms is a difference of 'principle of deri-

* The νόμος cannot 'procure' justice 'of life'—*not* because its fulfilment is not justice 'of life' for it *is*,—but because it cannot of itself 'procure' its own fulfilment. It cannot 'get itself done.' Comp. Gal. iii. 21.

vation' for the ζήσεται and so for the δικ. but no 'antagonism' whatever. There is no antagonism save that which the Pharisee or Judaiser calls into existence either during or after the 'reign' of the Law by betaking himself to the latter, instead of to the former, for justice and salvation and seeking to be justified (comp. Rom. ix. 32, x. 3.) ἐν νόμῳ διὰ νόμου. Yet for all this the δικαιοσύνη contained in the νόμος is as true a δικ. ζωῆς as the δικ. of the Evangelic aphorism where its derivation from the πίστις (from which alone it can spring) makes Faith 'the beginning the root and the foundation' of the Justification of adults. To oppose therefore, in the sense of antagonism, the πίστις of the Evangelic, to the ποίησις of the Legal aphorism is (1) not only quite to overlook the intrinsic import of the word δίκαιος in the former and the subordinate relation to it of the latter but is also (2) to assert a principle of opposition which must end in a falsification of the νόμος. But, worse still, to place the πίστις in opposition to the ποίησις,—to oppose the δικαιοσύνη of the one to the δικαιοσύνη of the other,—with that absolute opposition and that essential antagonism which is most certainly found in Romans and Galatians between the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως and the δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων,—an opposition in which they *mutually exclude each other*,—what is this but directly and openly to falsify and bring to naught the declaration of the Law? A declaration which is (1) divine in its

origin, is (2) repeatedly and signally ratified by Christ, is (3) reaffirmed and upheld and argued upon by the Apostle himself, Rom. ii. 12, 13? We say directly and openly to falsify the *νόμος* of divine revelation. For, in the first place, what is the meaning of the *ζήσεται* of the legal aphorism: *ὁ ποιήσας . . . ζήσεται.*? We answer; it means the same thing as the *ζήσεται* of the Evangelic *ὁ δικ. ἐκ. πίστ. ζήσεται,* given in the preceding verse, Gal. iii. 11. That is to say that, no less than the Evangelic *ζήσεται,* it bears a supernatural meaning;—'shall live to God and live for ever.' That St. Paul gives it this supernatural meaning,* both in Romans and Galatians is amply evinced (1) by the connexion in which we find the legal aphorism in both Epistles. If this aphorism had been understood by the Jews and the Judaisers in merely a *temporal* sense it would never have lain in the Apostle's path in his teaching and arguments about Justification and Salvation. The *νόμος* would not have fallen within the scope of his argument. He would not have encountered it. But as a matter of fact he necessarily had to deal with it. For it was well understood among the Jews that the *ζήσεται* of the *νόμος* connoted a life and a blessedness far higher than their mere temporal prosperity, and far beyond it. And this acceptation was sustained by Rabbinical learning and

* Does he not expressly call the *νόμος—πνευματικός.* And what is *πνευματικός* but 'supernatural'?

commenting.* In this supernatural meaning the Judaiser urged it: 'Except ye be circumcised and keep the law of Moses ye cannot be *saved*.' And as it was in this sense that it was understood in Jewry so it was in this sense that the Apostle encountered and accepted it in his preaching of the Gospel and his teaching on Justification. But, further, that he took the supernatural as the original and proper meaning of the ζήσεται is quite clearly shown by his ascribing it directly to the νόμος itself. He says: ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως ἀλλ' ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.' That is 'the νόμος says,' &c. But the νόμος only *says* what the νόμος *means*. More forcibly still is this shown when he says (Rom. x. 5 ff.) Μωυσῆς γὰρ γράφει ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς. If then the Apostle takes the word as we have seen he must have taken it, and did in fact take it, in a supernatural sense, and also directly ascribes it to Moses and to the νόμος, then that sense must have been with St. Paul the original true and proper sense. For otherwise what had Moses to do with it? 'Moses writes,' says St. Paul. In like manner Christ says to the lawyer, ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τί γέγραπται. That is: 'What does the Law say on the subject of eternal life and the way to gain it? Consult your own Law upon the point.' A perplexing direction if the νόμος spoke only of the temporal and was silent

* See Fritzsche, Comm. Rom. and Lightfoot Comm. Gal: on the legal ζήσεται of the Targums.

as to the supernatural and eternal! Besides; that the *ζήσεται* of the *νόμος* is supernatural is shown by our passage, ii. 13. As we before proved the range and meaning of the *δικαιωθήσονται* of ver. 13 by the legal *ζήσεται*, so conversely—since ver. 13 is only a reproduction of the legal aphorism,—can we prove the import of the latter word by that of the former. Only by different points. First by the words *διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται*, that is 'shall be judged, &c. at the day of Judgment'. What is the *νόμος* doing in the next world if it have but a temporal range? But if the *νόμος* is found in the next world where all temporal interests have ceased and if it be a *νόμος* to which Reward and Penalty are attached then the principle of recompense which it embodies must go with it also thither. For this principle is an integral part of itself. Thus according to St. Paul the sinful *ἔννομος* will be judged and condemned by the *νόμος* at the last Day; and according to Christ he who has fulfilled the *νόμος* shall, in conformity with its promise, receive an eternal reward (*κληρονομία*). *Τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ.* 'This do and thou shalt live.' This meaning of the legal *ζήσεται* is further proved by the *δίκαιοι* and the *δικαιωθήσονται παρὰ θεῷ* of our passage if viewed as carried forward to the judgment day, though of themselves they relate to this life. For with the *ἔννομος* the *νόμος* would be the standard *there* of the righteousness attained *here*. Lastly the majority of the expositors and commentators

(except, however, Bull and Alapide) give the same meaning to the Legal as to the Evangelic ζήσεται: though several (*e.g.* Jowett, Schott (H. A.) do not regard it as being the original and proper meaning. We submit, however, that though not perhaps the superficial, it was nevertheless the primary, deep and latent meaning. Such being the legal import of the ζήσεται in the legal aphorism, how, we ask, does it come to be there? How is it,—if, as Luther, Lightfoot,* and others assure us, the legal is in direct antagonism to the Evangelic aphorism—that we find it in the former *at all?* ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως. If the antagonism between the πίστις and the νόμος founded on these words by the Extrinsicist expositors amounts to this: that even if a man *did* fulfil the Law still he would not therein possess the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς; then the declaration of the νόμος is a complete falsehood. For in that declaration we have both the δικαιοσύνη and the ζωὴ; the former in the ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ, the latter in the ζήσεται. A complete falsehood on the part of a declaration confessedly divine, aye every whit as divine as the δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. But if the antagonism founded on the words

* Luther, Comm. Gal. ii. 16. Lightfoot, Comm. Gal. iii. 11, 12. Position 1. The fulfilment of the νόμος is impossible: but (Position 2) *even if it were possible,* still life and life eternal belongs not to the righteousness of the νόμος but only to 'the righteousness by Faith,' these two mutually excluding each other. '*For*,' says the Extrinsicist,'—ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως.

ὁ δὲ νόμος κ.τ.λ. be so understood as that it still be allowed that if a man *did* fulfil the νόμος he would indeed be justified, then so open and direct a falsification of the νόμος would be avoided. But for all that a secret and ultimate falsification could not be prevented. For this reason that the ἔργα νόμου (which all Extrinsicists identify with the ποίησις νόμου—the 'justice' of the Law) are so absolutely and essentially opposed to the πίστις and the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως as mutually to exclude each other. Take them as actual realities,—and it is thus and thus alone that St. Paul presents them,*—or take them as

* That the Pauline ἔργα νόμου,—the phrase is purely his own,—are extant and real and not hypothetically presented to the reader can be proved thus: It appears from the *Argumentum Velatum* that the ποίησις νόμου of Rom ii. 13, is not hypothetical but actual. But, if this be so then the Pauline ἔργα νόμου of Rom. iii. 20, must also be actual or real, for they fall far short of the *true* fulfilment of the νόμος,—being compatible with the ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι of Rom. iii. 9, and the ὑπὸ κατάραν εἶναι of Gal. iii. 10. [They are in truth works done through the teaching of the νόμος—and traceable therefore to the *parentage* of the νόμος,—out of man's *own fund* and strength without the Faith and Grace of God through Christ.] But actual once they are so always,—throughout Romans and Galatians. Not so the ἡ ἴδια δικαιοσύνη and the ἔργα of chap. iv. of which the Apostle speaks in Romans, and which indicate a justice 'of life' of one's own making. If then the ποίησις νόμου be identified with these ἔργα νόμου then the legal aphorism is intrinsically falsified. For in that case the ζήσεται is a lie. But since on this account it cannot possibly be on the side and in the 'scale' of the ἔργα νόμου which are in the Evangelic opposition to the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως I. X. it must of necessity be in the opposite 'scale' that is on the side of the πίστις and not on that of the νόμος. Thus the two aphorisms are on the same side. And from this it follows (as will be seen more clearly as we proceed), that the δίκαιος of the Evangelic aphorism is of intrinsic import,—as also the δικαιούμενοι δωρεάν,—Rom. iii. 24, and the πίστει δικαιοῦσθαι, ver. 28.

hypothetical and merely imagined,—as he does not present them,—yet either way, whether extant or imagined, if so be, they yield no *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς*, since it is *only* on the side and in the opposite scale of Faith that the *δικ. ζωῆς* is to be looked for and found. The *πίστις*,—besides that it leads to,—also enters into the very notion and nature of that *δικαιοσύνη*. No *πίστις* no *ζωὴ* is the axiom contained in the Evangelic aphorism. So if the *νόμος* is 'not of Faith,' according to the Extrinsicist interpretation of the words *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως*, the question at once arises: 'How came the *ζήσεται* there? What is it doing there?' We must therefore evidently see that though the *νόμος* does not concern itself with the *πίστις* nevertheless the latter necessarily underlies it. Otherwise the Apostle teaches us to very little purpose in Romans and Galatians with his,—*ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται* in the first chapter of the one Epistle, and his—*εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη ἄρα Χριστὸς κ.τ.λ.* in the second of the other. No antagonism, therefore, between the *πίστις* and the *ποίησις* can be founded on the words *ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως* without falsifying the declaration of the Law. But, to say nothing of Christ and his Apostle (Luke x. 28, Rom. ii. 13), the *νόμος* is divine. What finally does the presence of the *ζήτεται* in the legal aphorism show? That the *ποίησις νόμου* is on the side of the *πίστις* and in the same scale with it,—the *ἔργα νόμου* being in the opposite scale and side. And does

not the Apostle say that "by the works of the Law shall no flesh be justified before God," Rom. iii. 20, and, on the other hand, that "not the hearers of the Law are just with God but the fulfillers of the Law shall be just?" a thing which would not be true if the *ποίησις νόμου* were on the side and in the scale opposite to that *πίστις* and that *δικαιοσύνη* with which alone the *ζήσεται* is found.

Finally, the passage in Romans x. 5,* which is ever associated with this of Galatians, and has great affinity of thought with it, may be thus approximately explained by the light of the *Argumentum Velatum:* 'This is Moses' *programma* of Justice as it appears (or comes forth from) the *νόμος*: 'He that doeth them shall live in them.' But justice as it appears (or comes forth) the *πίστις* speaks thus for herself: 'Say not,' &c. If we are asked why we combine or associate the written *programma* of the *νόμος* with the spoken proposition of the *πίστις* and see the former *δικαιοσύνη* in the latter, the legal justice as part and parcel of the Evangelic justice, we reply: Because the *ζήσεται* is in both cases the same. And both declarations are divine. Yet, at the same time, the *δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου* is but actual justice, whereas the *δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ πίστεως* is (1) the Spirit of Justice awarded to the believer; (2) Habitual justice; (3) Actual justice. And the whole is the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. So that

* The difference of the two readings makes no difference to us. We prefer, however, the Common.

the former, the legal, is strictly speaking, *as an object*, a different object from the latter. All however is intrinsic. The two propositions are contrasted by the Apostle on account of their *different forms*, and not because the δικ. of the one differs from that of the other. For we have in each instance, but each considered from a different point of view, the same δικαιοσύνη; that, namely, which is introduced in the preceding verse: τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι. Besides, *whose* are the words: μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, τίς ἀναβήσεται κ.τ.λ.? They are the words of Moses (Deut. xxx. 13). Moses knew the truth of Divine Justification and of Justification by Faith as truly as St. Paul himself, if not in so apocalyptic a manner. On this passage Jowett observes; "Surely this is the righteousness that is of faith." It is; and, further, Moses meant the same righteousness by the ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ κ.τ.λ.

Point 3.—φύσει.—Rom. ii. 14.

A third point and one of great importance to be considered is the meaning and connexion of the word φύσει in ver. 14. The question will be asked how, if the Gentiles (1) do the things of the νόμος and (2) are themselves the νόμος and (3) show the work of the νόμος written in their hearts and thereby are δίκαιοι with a δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ which is one and the same thing

with the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς and the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,—how, if this be so, are we to understand the word φύσει? Nay, how comes it in this connexion at all if it is to be interpreted,—as from the days of Tertullian and Origen* to our own it has been nearly always interpreted,—on what we will for convenience call the 'naturalist' principle? That is to say, interpreted to mean 'by nature,' *h.e.* by the force of natural endowments. For that high, that true fulfilment of the νόμος (the fulfilment of the Law according to the mind of the Law) which alone constitutes justice with God according to the ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται παρὰ θεῷ (ver. 13) cannot possibly proceed from the mere resources of nature but only from supernatural endowments; from the δύναμις εἰς σωτηρίαν (Rom. i. 16) of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. But if this true fulfilment of the νόμος cannot possibly proceed from unregenerate, unaided nature, then neither can it, with any propriety be *ascribed* to nature; not merely not to nature *only* but not even to nature κατ' ἐξοχήν. The ποίησις being from its commencement to its consummation *due* to supernatural endowments,† it is *not* due to the power of merely natural endowments. And 'would not St. Paul,' it will be asked, 'have been of all men the last to set down such a ποίησις to 'nature' κατ' ἐξοχὴν,

* Tertullian adv. Marcion, b. v. c. 13. Origen Comm. Rom. b. ii. n, 7, 8, 9.

† The will, however, being free and co-operating. Conc. Trid. Sess. vi. chaps. i. and v.

much less to nature only?' Above all in the very chapters where he is showing that the *only* δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ is that which springs from the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ? To these questions we reply as follows. First it must be borne in mind that we present it as a most certain fact that the Gentiles here spoken of are just 'with God'. And as such they must necessarily possess all the endowments requisite to that state. For the object of this verse is to make good the double proposition of the preceding and to show how and why it is that not the hearers but the doers of the νόμος are just with God. And this is done by laying bare the *nature* of the νόμος, by showing the reciprocal relations between it and the δικαιοσύνη: and by pointing out that the value of the νόμος to salvation is precisely the value of the δικαιοσύνη which is its content and end. So much so that if even the ἄνομος possesses this δικαιοσύνη he is himself in himself the νόμος. He is his own νόμος manifesting in himself 'the work' which is the righteousness of the Law. Moreover if ver. 14 makes good the δικαιωθήσονται of the 'doers' in opposition to the 'hearers' of the νόμος, then the equivalent of that verb and of its concomitant adjective must be found in ver. 14 itself otherwise there is no real argument, no logical hinge, no force nor wisdom in the γὰρ. In short the *Argumentum Velatum* alone unfolds the true ratiocination of the whole passage from ver. 12 onward, If this key be disregarded no other explanation satisfactorily fulfilling the logical,

lexical and grammatical conditions of the passage will ever be forthcoming, let the exegete be who he may. And consequently ver. 14 will always hang loose like a broken finger.

Secondly, viewing the case in this light, it will be seen that, as regards the φύσει, the struggle,—if struggle there is to be,—is between the lexis of a single term on the one hand,* and the combined logic, grammar and lexis† of the whole passage on the other. In this struggle the united force of the latter evidence but particularly and above all, the simple force of the logical proof will, we confidently submit, prevail over the lexical force of the solitary term φύσει so as to regulate its meaning in accordance with the ascertained tenour and character of the argument in which it occurs. We say that, as on the one hand the φύσει *can* be conformed to that tenour and character without any violation of lexical and grammatical propriety, so on the other it *must* be so conformed. So decisively cogent is the logical and with it the grammatical and lexical force which can be brought to bear upon it. The term φύσει cannot and must not regulate and mould the argument and the other expressions of the whole passage; but, on the contrary, by them it both can and must have its import and its use determined.

Thirdly, from the periods of Tertullian and Origen to

* To which however is added a slight point of syntax, viz.: the position of the φύσει *after* the ἔχοντα.

† The lexis, *e.g.*, of (1) ἔργον and (2) of νόμος.

our own the *φύσει* of this passage has been interpreted for by far the most part in one or other of three well-known ways, yet always upon the same 'naturalist' principle: that is to say always upon the understanding that it represented *human nature,*—natural as opposed to supernatural endowments.

The first way is the way of Pelagius. According to his interpretation *φύσει* means simply 'by nature,'—*viribus naturæ, h.e.* by natural knowledge and by natural strength. This simple and obvious interpretation is adopted by Suarez,* by Dominic Soto, by the Schoolmen and by other expositors ancient and modern. All these, however, differ from the heresiarch in this that they refuse their integral meaning to the expressions (1) *τὰ τοῦ νόμου,* (2) *ἑαυτοῖς ἐσιν νόμος,* (3) *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου* and understood by them the *νόμος in certain respects.* By which restriction, admissible though it be, they seem, (to us at least), to leave a clear lexical and grammatical advantage with Pelagius. For if no extraneous consideration forbade what exegete would not prefer, and strongly prefer, to take these three phrases *in sensu integro?*

The second way is the way of St. Augustine, whose modification of Pelagius' construction, while it retains the direct lexical force of the word, changes its dogmatic import. By *φύσει* he here understands: *naturâ per*

* Suarez. De necessitate gratiæ ad opera naturalia.—Cap. viii. n. 13 ff.

gratiam sanatâ (*vel reparatâ*). He has, indeed, another interpretation, but this is believed to be his favourite way. In both he is followed by Aquinas and others.* In the Gentiles of ver. 14 he recognizes, no less than his antagonist, the 'justified and just with God'. While on the other hand, unlike Pelagius, he recognizes the necessary presence of supernatural endowment, that is, of divine Faith and Grace according to the due order and process of Justification. This fact alone exhibits St. Augustine as a manifest Intrinsicist and places him in antagonism to Luther and the Reformers,—as Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin were all well aware. We will be so bold as to say that no three men in Europe in the sixteenth century knew the 'mind' of St. Augustine on this topic better than these three. The third way is the way of Tertullian, Origen, Chrysostom, and many others, ancient and modern.† By these the word is set in exact opposition to the *νόμος* and explained to mean the teaching, or the light, or the dictate of nature,—the 'strength' of nature being left in the background, and the authoritative teaching of 'nature' being contrasted with the authoritative teaching of the *νόμος*.

Such are the three ways. But if, on the other hand, the *Argumentum Velatum* be the true key of the passage,

* See Estius, Comm. Rom. ii. 13, 14 ff. and Aug. 'de Spiritu et Litterâ c. 26.

† *e.g.* Meyer, Fritsche, Vaughan, *al.*

and if, consequently, the Gentiles here named be, one and all truly justified and *virtual* ποιηταὶ νόμου (of the Law according to the mind of the Law), and are, as such, argumentatively adduced by the Apostle; then there arise decisive reasons against each of these classes of interpretations and indeed against interpreting the φύσει on the 'naturalist' principle at all. First as to the interpretation of Pelagius. This Epistle is said to have been his favourite authority, and if so, it is easy to see that this chapter must have been his favourite chapter, and this very sense (supported by ver. 27, ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα κ.τ.λ.) his favourite verse. But it is plain from the opening chapter of this same Epistle that the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,—that Justice by which alone a man can become δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ—comes not from the 'wells of nature', *ex puteis naturæ*, that is from the resources, the endowments, and the faculties of the natural man, but comes down from the fountains of heaven,—*de fontibus cœli*. It is a δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. It is a δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως. If we have it not we are to seek it from God by faith in Christ. We are to seek it ἐκ πίστεως, and not ὡς ἐξ ἔργων νόμου (Rom. x. 4). For the πίστις as it were sends us to Christ for the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. It is what the Apostle calls it: δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως I.X. εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. That its source is from without and not from within, from above and not from below, from

God and not from ourselves (either through the teaching of the *νόμος* or any other law), is still further evinced by the Apostle's more detailed account of the process of Justification in chapter iv. in connexion with Abraham: *ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. The *δικαιοσύνη* comes from the intervention of a *λογισμὸς*; of a *λογισμὸς* which takes place *κατὰ χαρὶν* and a *λογισμὸς* without which there would be no *δικαιοσύνη* at all. It is as thus bestowing the gift of Justice on the believer that St. Paul describes God as *δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ*. And it is as thus receiving from God this gift of Justice (awarded to their Faith) that the believers are described as *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*—they being, up to the point of that justification, under the *ἥμαρτον*. But Pelagius drew (1) the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ*, (2) the *ποίησις νόμου*, (3) the *ποίησις τῶν τοῦ νόμου*, and (4) the *ἔργον τοῦ νόμου* from mere natural endowments, and he grounded his demonstration before all other evidence, on the *φύσει* of our passage, affixing to it the meaning, which in the fifth century, *natura* held both for St. Augustine and for himself. On the other hand, seeing that the Gentiles of ver. 14 certainly do exhibit the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* and are, on that account, confronted by St. Paul with the Jews in the passage of the four *γὰρ*, and seeing that the argument of the two verses hinges on the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* through the *γὰρ* of ver. 14,—it *cannot* be that by the *φύσει* the Apostle

means *viribus naturæ, h.e.* natural light and natural strength; for in Galatians he says of adults: ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοὶ εἰδότες δὲ ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος . . . . ἐὰν μὴ (here is the point) διὰ πίστεως, κ.τ.λ. Moreover these Gentiles are (1) justified with God; (2) being justified they can only be so by the possession of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as St. Paul is engaged in showing throughout these very chapters. Therefore (3) they are not justified as virtual doers of the νόμος by 'nature'. Therefore (4) φύσει cannot be taken and interpreted in Pelagius' way. For so to interpret it would be to derive justice and the fulfilment of the νόμος from *within* and not from *without,* from below and not from above, from man to himself and not from God to man.

Secondly, as to the interpretation of St. Augustine, that φύσει means *naturâ gratiâ sanatâ:* it has been allowed by Prosper, Fulgentius, Aquinas, and many others, ancient and modern. By Suarez, who rejects it, it is nevertheless called 'valde probabilis'.* But surely if φύσει is to be rendered—as it must be rendered—by nature, that must mean by the powers of nature,—*viribus naturæ.* For by this interpretation no distinction is made between the light and the strength of nature, but it is viewed as one agent. But the result expressed by the three phrases (1) τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, (2) ἑαυτοῖς

* Suarez. Vol. I, chap. 8, n. 37.

εἰσιν νόμος, (3) *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου* is not due, and cannot be ascribed, to natural powers but principally and *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* to the presence and force of an inherent supernatural power. For the *νόμος* is *πνευματικός*.* We confidently submit therefore that for the thing intended by St. Augustine *φύσει* is no proper connoting term. And we contend that here the heresiarch has a clear lexical advantage both over St. Augustine and his followers. The advantage, moreover, which Pelagius had then he will ever have (1) so long as the *φύσει* be joined with the *ποιῶσιν*, and (2) so long as the three phrases given above are understood—as they ought to be understood—*in sensu integro*. The discovery of the *Argumentum Velatum* establishes the fact that these Gentiles (*οὗτοι*) adequately fulfil the Law and are just with God. This fact is confirmed by the natural or unrestricted sense of the three phrases: much by the *τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν*, more by the *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*, and still more again by the *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*; which last equals the *τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα* of ver. 27.—Bengel's 'grande verbum.' We decline, therefore, the Augustinian explanation both because it is manifestly subjective, and also because, being subjective, it leaves the lexis too surely in the hands of Pelagius and so the door open to a doctrinal result altogether contrariant to the fundamental doctrine of the Apostle: as also of St. Augustine him-

* Scimus quia Lex spiritualis est. Rom. vii. 19 Vulg.

self, whose teaching on Faith, Grace, and Justification is one with that of St. Paul.*

As to the third and last interpretation of the φύσει,—which explains it to mean the light or teaching of 'nature'—this yields indeed an exact opposition to the μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα, but on the other hand does not agree with the ποιῶσιν, which would seem to require from the φύσει the endowment of natural strength as well as that of light or teaching. But the decisive objection to this explanation consists in this: that if these Gentiles are in the supernatural sphere of the δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ, *h.e.* are in a state of justification 'before God,' then the notion of their being directed by the light of nature (φύσει) *conflicts* altogether with the presence of the divine πίστις which (with adults) both (1) necessarily precedes and (2) essentially enters into the δικαιοσύνη and δικαίωσις ζωῆς. For the Gentile righteousness which is presented to us in ver. 19, a higher than the light of nature is required. These Gentiles are justified before God, and we know that *no man* is justified ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως I.X.† Therefore these do not the things of the Law (so as to be justified with God) by the light of nature, but by the

* The acute and learned Morison looking (Rom. iii. 20, Monog.) from a different point of view says of the Tridentine doctrine, Session vi. c. 10: "This is substantially the doctrine of St. Augustine." This Expositor (whose dissertation on the δικαιοῦν is perhaps the most elaborate extant) is we believe the only British exegete noticed by Meyer, who refers to him repeatedly and with commendation (Meyer Rom. iii. and *alibi.*)

† Implicit or explicit πίστις, I. X.

light of Faith—that faith which *first* precedes* and leads to the bestowal of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and *afterwards* forms part of that Justice. *First*, we say, precedes and leads to it by believing in the Gospel. *Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ* (sc. *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον του* X.) *ἀποκαλύπτεται* (1) *ἐκ πίστεως* (2) *εἰς πίστιν*. These are the three interpretations which are applications of the 'naturalist' principle; that is which take the *φύσει* to signify the natural endowments of man. But the true apprehension of the aim and argument of our passage involves the rejection of the 'naturalist' interpretation of the word, and also of its connexion with the *ποιῶσιν*. Instead of the 'naturalist' we maintain the 'economic' interpretation of the *φύσει*, and instead of joining it with the *ποιῶσιν*, we follow Smalcius, Bengel, Usteri Rückert (1st. Ed. Comm. Rom.) and join it to *ἔχοντα*.† *Ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμου ἔχοντα φύσει, τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν οὗτοι κ.τ.λ.* 'For when the Gentiles, who have not the *νόμος* in, or by, their *constitution*, do the justices (or things) of the *νόμος*

* In the case of adults.

† Jowett countenances either connexion. "*Φύσει*," he says "may either be taken with *ποιῶσιν*, as in the English Version, or with *νόμου ἔχοντα*: 'When the Gentiles who have not the Law by nature or originally.' The latter mode of construing the passage is in some degree confirmed by Gal. ii. 15, *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι*, Eph. ii. 3. *τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς*: and Rom. ii. 27, *ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία*." Meyer is certainly against joining the *φύσει* with the *ἔχοντα*, but is not, we think, so decidedly opposed to it as Fritzsche. He says: "Most expositors" adopt the *φύσει ποιῶσιν*. But (1) neither Fritzsche nor Meyer have perceived the real argument of the passage, and so (2) both take the *φύσει* in the 'naturalist' way without a qualm.

these,' &c. To explain our view we would here present Bengel's comment, changing, however, 'nascuntur,' &c. for 'constituuntur.' "Gentes sunt *naturâ* (*i.e.* per se ut constituuntur (*not* 'nascuntur') non ut homines sed ut gentes) Legis expertes: cum Judæi sint *naturâ* Judæi, Gal. ii. 15 —*ἡμεῖς φύσει* Ἰουδαῖοι—adeoque Legem habeant *naturâ*"* (*h.e.* ut constituuntur non ut homines sed ut Judæi).

Φύσει we say here denotes 'constitution' in its 'economic' aspect. It means the state or condition to which one is formed:† *Formed,* not by God's appointment through the 'laws of nature,' but by God's ordinance of supervening economy: *Constitution* not the result of natural ordinance but of other divine dispensation. There are, on the one hand, the *φύσις ἐθνικὴ*, and the *φύσις* Ἰουδαϊκὴ, ('economic'): on the other there are the *θεία φύσις* and the *φύσις ἀνθρώπινη* and the *θήρεια φύσις* (naturalist). Again the word does not here signify 'by birth' or 'by origin'—*ἐκ γένους, ex natalibus,*—but expresses a *result,* a complexion or sum total of condition; no retrospective reference whatever being had to origin or *process* of formation; nor, as to the derivation of the term itself, any regard being paid to etymological considerations. And thus we find the Latin 'natura' used and the German 'natur' and the English 'nature.' In all four languages the word admits of modification

* Bengel, Gnomon. Rom. ii. 14.

† See Passow: *φύσις*. Div. 4. and Stephanus (ed. Hase and Dindorf).

resting on the basis *formation*,—as could easily be shown.* And this 'formation' can be the result either of 'natural' or of 'economic' order. 'When the Gentiles who have not the *νόμος* in, or by, their constitutional state,' &c.,—in that state or condition which it has pleased God to bestow upon them in this world. Classical comparisons are, beyond a certain point, of no help here or next to none; seeing that *φύσει* has with St. Paul associations very different from those which it would have with Demosthenes or Aristotle. In our passage, as well as in ver. 27, *ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία*, and in Galatians ii. 15, *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι* we find the word associated with *six* things about which the Greek writers knew nothing; (1) the *νόμος*, (2) *δίκαιος*, (3) *ἁμαρτία*, (4) *Ἰουδαῖος*, (5) Gentile, (6) *θεὸς*. As to the *φύσει* being placed after the *ἔχοντα* instead of before the *μὴ νόμον* (*τὰ φύσει μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα*), it would seem that the writer does not design to assert that the Gentiles had *not* the *νόμος* as against some one alleging that they *had* (comp. *τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὖσι θεοῖς*, Gal. iv. 8), nor to indicate their state even negatively, but rather to bring out the full nature of the *ἔχειν* in order that when repeated it may contrast all the

* Thus (1) Cicero says, '*Natura Deorum*,' meaning the sum of their attributes or qualities. (2) Cæsar says, '*natura fluminis*' though part of its channel might have been a *canal*. (3) We speak of the 'nature' of an argument, the 'nature' of a piece of machinery, the 'nature' of the *Argumentum Velatum* and we say that it turns on the 'nature' of the *νόμος*. &c., &c.

more forcibly with the ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν. οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος. The φύσει is an amplification or explanation or development of the ἔχοντα,—preparing the ἔχοντες for its full antithesis. St. Paul indicates what it is to 'have' the νόμος—the mode in which the Gentiles would 'have' it *if* they had it. Therefore the φύσει should be kept closely with the ἔχοντα. The Apostle, we submit, like any other Hellenist writer, was quite at liberty to place the φύσει according to the light which had to be thrown on some particular aspect of the predicate in which it occurs and which is here introduced by the τὰ. At the same time, if it can be better proved that φύσει means 'by birth,' 'by origin,' ἐκ γένους, by all means let it be so proved. But 'nature' in the sense of natural endowment, 'naturâ' in the sense proper to the Augustinian-Pelagian controversy it cannot and does not mean. For the reason that the ἔθνη here adduced are presented to us in the sphere of Faith and Grace, in the supernatural and not in the natural sphere. With such a meaning the word would become in this passage, as it were, 'the Fleece of Gideon,'—dry when all around was saturated.

But apart from all such considerations as recommend the 'economic' interpretation of the word and its union with the ἔχοντα,—so that instead of being opposed to the νόμος it actually *combines* with it,—we must ever keep clearly before the mind the fact of the *Argumentum*

Velatum, the argument which turns on the reciprocal relations of Justice and the *νόμος*; the argument which designs to bring home to the mind of the Jew and the Judaiser the profound but to him startling truth: 'Lex non trahit Justitiam sed Justitia Legem;' the argument which fills the whole of the chapter from this passage onward to the end; and leads to the question *τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου ἢ τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς;* It is in contemplating and comprehending this reasoning that we become aware of the necessity of reconsidering the meaning and connexion of the *φύσει* and then of rejecting what has been so long and so widely —we should rather say so constantly and universally— accepted about the words in these two respects.

The main reason then for adopting, with a slight modification, the Bengelian instead of the common construction is to be found in the discovery of the true argument of the Apostle in this famous passage. An argument which receives confirmatory evidence both from the three phrases: (1) *τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν*, (2) *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος*, (3) *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν κ.τ.γ.*, and also from the remainder of the chapter where St. Paul *presses home* the same principle with the Jew. For in fact the rest of the chapter from ver. 17 (the *oratio splendida ac vehemens* of Estius), is an application of two things— (1) a principle and (2) a fact. The principle: *Lex non trahit Justitiam sed Justitia Legem.* The fact: that the

Gentiles who have not the *νόμος* do nevertheless virtually fulfil it to the point or being *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ*. Why the Apostle takes this course we shall clearly see when we come to the *πάντες ἥμαρτον* of the following chapter.

Further the true nature (hitherto unperceived) of St. Paul's reasoning affords a solid answer to a very strong objection. The objection, namely, of the formidable, nay at first sight overwhelming, combination of exegetical testimony and authority adverse to our explanation of the *φύσει*. It is a consensus extending from Tertullian and Origen down to Beelen and Franzelin among Intrinsicists,—from Calvin and Melancthon down to Meyer and De Wette, Vaughan and Alford among Extrinsicists. For we are not to except even St. Augustine and his followers ancient and modern. The *νόμος* ten times repeated all have understood in relation (1) to authoritative teaching and (2) to the party instructed. All, but a few, have opposed it to the *φύσει*. All but a few have joined the *φύσει* to the *ποιῶσιν*. And even those few have been led to combine the *νόμος* with the *φύσει* from a consideration of the *ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία*, ver. 27, and the *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι* of Gal. ii. 15, and another passage or so, and not from any knowledge whatever or even glimpse of the *Argumentum Velatum*. But now if no expositor ancient or modern ever entertained the conception of the real argument here, much less grasped it either in itself or in its connexion

with what precedes and what follows it in this chapter, then the construction of former exegetes cannot be recognized either as conclusive or even as a final decision on their part. The full state of the case was not before them. Had they known all that could be said for the new explanation many, or even all, might have altered their mind. In the face of new evidence judgments formed without such evidence lose the weight naturally attaching to unanimity. To the objection therefore of adverse 'consensus' we oppose the answer of 'discovery'. If that answer be true in fact it is clearly valid in argument. The truth is, the Passage of the four *γὰρ*, so variously explained hitherto, has never yet been satisfactorily explained. Expositors never went below the surface of the text, never *questioned* the successive propositions of vv. 12, 13, 14, so as to enter into the nature and relation of things and see below or behind the surface of those propositions in which the reasoning lies wrapt. Let questions be put. Why should the *ἀκροαταὶ νόμου not* be justified 'with God'? Because of the *nature* of the *νόμος* and its relation to the *δικαιοσύνη*. Justice is the end and content of the *νόμος*. The *νόμος* is the depository and standard of justice, the manifestation and ordinance of justice, the *documentum justitiæ* authoritatively setting it forth. The *νόμος* is the Letter and Tables of the Law—which is the Will of God which, as St. Augustine says, is Justice. Understand the

νόμος, here, primarily or merely as a regula *dirigens, jubens et judicans* and (1) the force of the δικαιωθήσονται (with its δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ) will never be fully comprehended, and (2) the ὅταν γὰρ, will never be properly adjusted. For either it will be joined to a proposition with which it has no sort of connexion, or it will be wrongly and unscientifically 'fitted on' to the proposition with which it *is* connected,—being in fact, by means of a fabricated object, made to depend upon, or rather *from* a verse which it is intended by the writer to *sustain*. He introducing it for the benefit of the Jews rather than for the sake of the Gentiles. The heavy objection, therefore, of *adverse consensus* (for let the combination be taken for a consensus of expositors or commentators from Tertullian and Origen to those of the present time) we meet with the force of discovery—the greatest force of all.*

We will conclude on this point with the following observations.

1. If the φύσει be taken with the ποιῶσιν we should thereby introduce a thought foreign to the connexion,—foreign to the Apostle's purpose. He would in that case be deviating from the simple direct line of his argument. He means: 'When the Gentiles do the things of the νόμος (never mind *how*; that is not the point) they are

* In a word; the more the Argument of the Passage is understood, the more our explanation, &c., of the φύσει will be appreciated.

themselves the *νόμος*.' His argument turns on the present result of justice, not on the means of its attainment. To turn aside from his path to name *how* they attained to actual righteousness would be worse than superfluous or irrelevant, it would be positively misleading,—inasmuch as he would thus draw off the attention from the real point of the argument to a point which has nothing to do with it. The simplicity therefore and directness of the reasoning is a distinct ground for joining the *φύσει* with the *ἔχοντα* and combining it with the *νόμος*. *Then* St. Paul severely presents an argument of the greatest importance to his case without any such deviation, or rather 'extravagance,' as would distract his reader, and by needlessly embarrassing his reasoning weaken its purity and force.

2. The *φύσει* joined with the *ἔχοντα* not indistinctly indicates a certain kind of *δικαιοσύνη* pertaining to the *νόμος* and enjoyed by those who had the *περιτομὴ* and the *νομοθεσία*. A sort of initiatory justice; a preliminary and a preparatory, yet (if the *νόμος* were not fulfilled) an evanescent righteousness. The Jews were a consecrated race—a holy people. Circumcision was a seal of justice. Abraham *σημεῖον ἔλαβε περιτομῆς σφραγῖδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ* (iv. 11). Those who bore that seal were in a manner consecrated to begin with. 'But,' says St. Paul in effect, 'the Gentiles, who do not share this privileged *φύσις* Ἰου

δαϊκὴ, when they fulfil the justices of the *νόμος* are just with God, and are themselves the '*νόμος*'. While the chosen people, if not fulfilling the *νόμος*, are, in spite of their *φύσις*, *not* just with God;—if *παραβαταὶ νόμου*, they are in spite of their consecrated position and condition, nevertheless *ἁμαρτωλοὶ*. And is there not a striking affinity of thought and reasoning between this passage and that other famous passage commencing with: *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι*, and ending with: *εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν*? As then on the one hand joining the *φύσει* with the *ποιῶσιν* only tends to embarrass the Apostle, so, on the other, to join it with the *ἔχοντα* and combine it with the *νόμος*, enlarges him. And is there not yet again an affinity between our passage and the words: *καὶ κρινεῖ ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν νόμου τελοῦσα σὲ τὸν διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς παραβάτην νόμου* (ver. 27). *ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία*: 'He who is *of the state of* the Uncircumcision,' *not* 'the Uncircumcision by nature.' 'The Uncircumcision' (*ἡ ἀκροβυστία*) does not come from *nature*. St. Paul is not speaking here of a physical fact, but as it were of a 'people'. What brings into existence 'the Uncircumcision'? Not the physical fact but plainly 'the Circumcision'. Take away 'the Circumcision', and what becomes of 'the Uncircumcision'? They cease to exist. For they came into existence only by the divinely-ordered existence of the *other* People. So that the determining

principle of the two classes is 'economic' not 'natural'. It is the ordinance of God to the Jews, not natural formation. It cannot be well shown that the *ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία* is antithetical to the *ἡ περιτομὴ σοῦ ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν*. For that would present us with 'the Uncircumcision' by nature and 'the Uncircumcision' by sin. A false classification. For let the Jew sin ever so much he is still of 'the Circumcision'. Let a Gentile be never so just with God yet he is still of 'the Uncircumcision'.*

(3) If the *φῦσει* be joined to the *ποιῶσιν*, and so opposed to the *νόμος*, and if the *νόμος* be, as in fact it is, the Mosaic Law (here looked at especially in its moral aspect), and if by *φύσει* be understood natural endowments or, at all events, the light and teaching of nature, then, from the juxtaposition of the words, it would strongly seem to follow that, to remove the *νόμος* from man, was to throw him back upon bare nature. As if those who had not the *νόμος* had only *nature* to sustain them! Yet down to the time of Moses the *νόμος* was *'not': ἁμαρτία*, says St. Paul speaking of the period between the fall of Adam and the Sinaitic Institute, *οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*. But the Patriarchs were not in a state of nature in respect of God and justification of life. *ἀνομοὶ* they certainly were if the Jews were the

* And, to the blind eyes of the *Ἰουδαῖος*, still *ἁμαρτωλὸς*. Comp. *καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί*. Gal. ii. 15.

ἔννομοὶ. But they were within the supernatural sphere both as to Faith and justifying grace. Otherwise they could never have been justified and saved. Comp. Gal. ii. 16. οὐ δικαιοῦται, ἄνθρωπος. . . ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως I. X. Witness Abel, Enoch, Noah, Job, Melchisedic and Abraham,—who was justified not being in circumcision but uncircumcision,—and all others. It is plain then that, (unless the ἔθνη of ver. 14 be supposed *heathen* which in fact they are *not*) to remove the νόμος does not throw man back upon *nature*. But the opposition of the φύσει to the νόμος leads naturally and cogently to this very conclusion. Therefore the former is not opposed to but combines with the latter. And this consideration hits Pelagius who certainly regarded the νόμος of St. Paul's Epistles as meaning the Mosaic Law. In order to avail himself of a favourite passage and of a,—to him,—all-important word he ascribes to the Apostle an alternative which is not an alternative.

(4) The 'economic' construction of φύσει in our passage is suggested and supported by the ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοὶ of Gal. ii. 15, a passage which no less an exegete than Ellicott considers "important as serving to fix the meaning of φύσει in 'loci dogmatici'." But if so it will especially help us in the 'locus dogmaticus' before us. Both are connected with (1) Jew, (2) Gentile, (3) sin, (4) justice, (5) the νόμος, and (6) God. Now if the φύσει of Galatians ii. 15,

meant by 'nature' or 'origin,' then the Ἰουδαῖοι would seem to be contrasted by the Apostle with 'proselytes:' ἐκ γένους Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐ προσήλυτοι. Accordingly Theodore of Mopsuesta, Ellicott and Lightfoot do so contrast them. But in fact St. Paul opposes them, not to proselytes, but to Gentiles—*sinners*. The antithesis of the Apostle should be taken as it stands, and not be overlaid with another. In the next place, in order, as it were, to *match* the φύσει, the words ἐξ ἐθνῶν have been taken by Meyer and others to mean 'descended from the Gentiles'. But the ἐξ ἐθνῶν does not mean 'of Gentile descent',—as Lightfoot has rightly pointed out,—but means 'belonging to' or 'taken from among'—the Gentiles. Like the τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν and the τινὲς ἐξ ἡμῶν of Acts xv. 23, 24, or the σὺ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἶ of Matt. xxvi. 73, or the ἑβραῖος ἐξ ἑβραίων of Phil. iii. 5. ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί. The opposition we submit is not 'ethnical';—what have ἁμαρτωλοί, which is the pointed opposite of Ἰουδαῖοι, to do with *race?*—but, as being closely connected with the question of justification, 'economic'. The term Ἰουδαῖοι comprehends within itself the 'constitution' or resultant condition of the περιτομὴ and the νόμος and intimates a consecrated state,—a kind of inchoate δικαιοσύνη which the Gentiles (τὰ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει) were without, and being without were regarded by those Jews, who were ignorant of true righteousness, as ἁμαρτωλοί. What was

their φύσις? To be Ἰουδαῖοι. The emphasis therefore falls, not on φύσει where Theodore, Ellicott and Lightfoot would place it, but upon Ἰουδαῖοι. While the corresponding emphasis is on ἁμαρτωλοί. And the ἡμεῖς is not simply 'we' *as men*, nor merely 'we' *nationally*, but 'we' in the religious aspect, in relation to God and Salvation.

5. Lastly, as on the one hand the Passage of the Four γὰρ, rightly understood, does not serve the purpose either of Suarez or of Franzelin, so, on the other hand, it serves not the purpose of Pelagius. (1) Not of Suarez; because he applies it to sustain his 'position' that fallen man can, without special help, sometimes do good moral works. 'Potest homo lapsus sine auxilio speciali aliquando bene moraliter operari.'* But (1) the Gentiles of ver. 14 are within the sphere of Grace and Faith, are just before God, being justified by the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ; and (2) it is because they are so that they are here introduced. (2) Not of Franzelin; because he applies it to sustain *his* 'position'; 'Paulus Apostolus disserte docet legem moralem absolute obligantem esse *cognascibilem* et *cognitam* a gentibus per vires rationis citra positivam ejusdem legis revelationem,' &c.† But (1) the Apostle is not here speaking *de notitiâ—de cognitione veritatûm* —but *de justitiâ*. The νόμος under which the Jews

* Suarez de necessitate gratiæ ad opera naturalia. Lib. i. c. 8. n. 4.

† Cardinal Franzelin De Deo Uno secundum naturam. Cap. i. Thesis 3.

claimed δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ is here presented in relation to δικαιοσύνη π. θ. and not as a *regula dirigens*, &c. And the Gentiles here are not in a state of nature and living by the light of natural endowment, but within the sphere of Justifying Grace and living by the light of Faith. There is not one single 'infidelis' among them. (See Franzelin and Estius.) Moreover, the Gentiles of these verses are one with the ἀκροβυστία of ver. 26.* The connexion of thought is the same, and the fact and the principle established in ver. 14 are argumentatively, and with great rhetorical force, pressed home in vv. 26, 27, 28, and 29. 'Lex non trahit justitiam sed justitia legem.'

(3) Not of Pelagius; because, if the Gentiles could by the sole powers and force of nature so fulfil the νόμος (virtually) as to be just with God in its fulfilment, then must they possess of themselves and from themselves and in themselves the sources of true justice; *h.e.* of righteousness before God. But the δικαιοσύνη by which man (1) possesses the Grace of Justice and (2) is made capable of so fulfilling the νόμος, as, in its fulfilment, to be δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ, is a *gift* of justice coming down from heaven. It is a δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ freely bestowed upon man, who lacking it is necessarily ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν and ἁμαρτωλὸς: as can be clearly gathered from what the Apostle says in the two following chapters. The φύσει therefore cannot mean *viribus naturæ*. Man cannot

* *Opp.* Franzelin, who separates them with a 'plurimum differt.'

become just, without the gift of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, either by the teaching of nature or by that of the νόμος.* The argument demonstrates this point; and the evidence of the argument overpowers the evidence pretended from a single word. The *logical* conclusion is most strong—nay, irresistible. But the *lexical* conclusion brought forward to cancel it, weak and quite inconclusive. The word φύσει *could* mean 'by nature,' but it *need* not mean it, and here it does not. And the same reasoning applies to the καὶ κρινεῖ ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία, τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα σὲ. κ.τ.λ. of ver. 27. But though the passage does not serve the purposes of Suarez or of Franzelin on the right hand, nor of Pelagius on the left, it *does* establish the Intrinsic and exclude the Extrinsic system of Justification by Faith: it and the remainder of the chapter along with it. It shows what the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως is in its *nature*. For here we have a veritable actual δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ laid down both for Jew and Gentile, —a justice 'of life', a justice εἰς σωτηρίαν. For Salvation or Reprobation is the background of the Argument (ver. 5, ff.). Now there is but one such, namely the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. Therefore *this* δικαιοσύνη (of the νόμος) must be *that* δικαιοσύνη. "Hæc descriptio," says Melancthon, "est justitia legis qui nihil impedit—nihil

* Comp. Conc. Trid. Sess. VI, Canon 1, which contains the *true* key of Romans and Galatians on Justification, as, on the other hand, Luther's 'Argumentum' of the Epistle to the Galatians (Comm. Gal.) is his own and a *false* key.

prorsus impedit,—alia dicta de justitiâ fidei." Whose 'justitia fidei'? Whose 'alia dicta'? St. Paul's or Melancthon's? Certainly the Apostle's 'justitia legis' nothing hinders the Apostle's 'justitia fidei', for they are one and the same thing looked at in a different connexion and from a different point of view. But Melancthon's! Is it not plain that St. Paul's 'justitia legis' effaces the Reformer's very conception of the 'justitia fidei'? St. Paul's 'justitia legis' here is not the *ἔργα νόμου* of Romans and Galatians. But Melancthon's 'justitia legis' *is*.

6. Comparing Pelagius with Luther for a moment, in connexion with this passage, we see that the former erred as to the source and nature of the *δικαιοσύνη*, holding that it could arise from nature, and so be natural and not supernatural in its formation; while he was right in his conception of it in its relation to man, *namely* in his conception of it as *intrinsic* as being *within* and not *without* the soul. In this he was right, and in this St. Augustine and he agreed,—and agreed as a matter of course. It was never questioned between them. They entertained no other conception. As far as we know, no other conception of the *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς** (than that it was simply intrinsic) ever occurred to them; notwithstanding all their erudition and their intimate

* Or *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*—which, in the case of the Justification of adults, is *ἐκ πίστεως*.

knowledge of the Pauline Epistles. But, on the other hand, as to Luther, we see plainly both from this passage and from this argument of the four γὰρ, that he erred as to his conception of the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς in its relation to man, namely, in his conception of it as being purely *extrinsic*, as being not *within* but *without* the soul; not within—as the ἀδικία and the ἀσέβεια, and the χρηστότης, and the ἀγαθόσυνη would be,—but, ascriptive, imputative, existing for man only in a divine λογισμὸς—*not* intrinsic as to man and objective as to God, *but* extrinsic as to man and subjective with God. A δικαιοσύνη arising from a divine decision or regard or view. By this view man is placed in the state or relation of δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ for Christ's sake—upon the exercise however, on his part, of the πίστις I. X. Yet Luther was right as to the source and origin of the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς or θεοῦ. He brought the gift of righteousness down to man from God through Christ. Where Pelagius was wrong; *sc.* in deriving the δικ. from natural sources Luther was right,—in deriving it from the free gift of God. Where the British monk was right, *sc.* in his intrinsic conception of the δικ. the German monk was wrong,—in his extrinsic conception of it. Moreover, Luther was the first to form this extrinsic conception of 'the righteousness by Faith', from the Epistles of St. Paul. Having formed it he opposed it to the intrinsic Justice taught by the monks and schoolmen of his day—

who drew theirs, as from other sources so from the Fathers of the Church, and notably from St. Augustine, himself,—the weightiest and most conspicuous of them all inasmuch as he was esteemed, *par excellence*, the Doctor of Grace and Justification.

Point 4.—(1) *πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι.* Rom. iii. 9.

(2) *πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον.* iii. 23.

(3) *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον.* v. 12.

(4) *συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφὴ τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν.* Gal. iii. 22.

The fact of Intrinsic justice before God, in the case both of Jew and Gentile, the Circumcision and the Uncircumcision, being established in the Second Chapter of Romans from end to end, and the great principle 'Lex non trahit Justitiam sed Justitia Legem', (which is argumentatively produced in our passage and argumentatively employed through the remainder of the chapter), being also established: two very important consequences follow,—consequences which are inevitable and which vitally affect the meaning of the succeeding chapters. The *first* of these is that (1) the *πάντας* of chap. iii. 9 (*πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι*), and (2) the *πάντες* of ver. 23 (*πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον*) with (3) the other forms of *πᾶς* in the verses intervening between

these two phrases, cannot possibly comprehend *all men*, that is to say, all *moral adults :* [for that St. Paul is speaking throughout of adults is plain both from the connexion of the πίστις and of the νόμος with his subject and from the continuous text of the entire four chapters.] The *second* is that the ἔργα νόμου of chapter iii. cannot mean a fulfilment of the νόμος, or works fulfilling the νόμος—"deeds by which the requisitions of the Law are fulfilled" (Ellicott); *eorum præstationem quæ lex præcipit* (Beza): 'works by which the precepts of the Law are fulfilled'.* The νόμος thus being in the Genitive *objecti* and the ἔργα purely hypothetical.

As to the former point: First the phrases πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν and πάντες ἥμαρτον cannot mean that all men (*h.e.* moral adults) are sinners, being in a state of pravity or sinfulness, and more or less *legirupes* all their lives,—a principle which lies at the bottom of Luther's teaching and at the basis of the Extrincist system of Justification. For that excludes the very idea of intrinsic righteousness or of the fulfilment of the νόμος to the point of the δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ. But this very intrinsic justice and fulfilment of the νόμος is applied by St. Paul as constituting in its final phase the δικαιοσύνη, θεοῦ. And *six times over* in the second chapter does he affirm, in one form or another, that Jew and Gentile can

* Werke durch welche die Vorschriften des Gesetzes erfüllt werden. (Meyer. Gal.)

(formally or virtually) fulfil the *νόμος*, and not only that they *can* but that they *must*. This is clear from the example of *ἔννομοι* and from the nexus of ver. 13 with ver. 12 and what precedes it. If he loses his possession of intrinsic justice and his position of *ποιητὴς νόμου* (or *τῶν τοῦ νόμου*) he must recover them again ere death arrives, be it only for a few brief moments, or else—he will infallibly exemplify the truth of the *ὅσοι ἥμαρτον ἀπολοῦνται*. The word *ἥμαρτον* then being equivalent to 'the being devoid or destitute of true intrinsic justice', to maintain that all men are thus destitute,—and that of necessity inasmuch as no man is legally just before God, —is to say what is contradicted by our passage both in its text and argument; where we find that, so far from this being the case, on the contrary every one *can*, and *must*, possess this intrinsic justice and be through divine inherent Charity a *ποιητὴς νόμου* before he dies or else be lost. Luther's normal state of sinfulness, his assumption of the universal absence of intrinsic justice before God—the position so necessary to *his* system of 'righteousness by Faith'—is absolutely condemned by the course of the Apostle's reasoning with the Jews. Had that assumption of Luther's been tenable and that ground legitimate, his position would have been, as far as we can see, simply impregnable. For if justice with God cannot be found *in* man, it must needs be sought for elsewhere and it will be found in an *ascriptive* righteous-

ness (1) extended by the benevolence of God for the sake of the Merits of Christ, (2) consisting, according to most Extrinsicists, in absolution and clearance from guilt, and (3) placing man in the state or relation of 'just with God'. But with the *proved* presence and necessity of Intrinsic Righteousness *alone valid* in God's sight,—all this theory and plan of Extrinsic Justification vanishes. In it we see Lutheran not Pauline 'justification'—a new and strange and heretofore unheard of καταλλαγή.

Secondly, neither can the πάντες ἥμαρτον mean that *all* men (adults) have 'sinned', *h.e.* have committed sins —sins that is in the sense of the ἥμαρτον of these four chapters, sins which are opposed to and exclude the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ. For this reason; that of those who in infancy had received the intrinsic justice, the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (which in Romans and Galatians is mostly considered in connexion with the πίστις and adult moral life)—*some*—no one knows who, no one knows how many—might have *preserved* it through childhood, youth, and age in its habitual and actual form (*sc.* (1) πνευμα (2) Habit (3) Action—all) unto death and rendered up their souls to God 'just' with that δικαιοσύνη, which they had received in infancy. Which they had received by the Laver of Regeneration, (the λουτρὸν παλιγγενεσίας) or otherwise as the case might be. We have no more right to say that that gift of justice which coustitutes justification *must* at some point or

other be *necessarily* lost by the person on whom it has been bestowed, so that he falls from the state of righteousness in which he had been constituted, than we have a right to say that it will be *necessarily* preserved so that he will necessarily continue in that state. Let us take the instance,—not of Abel or of Enoch or of Samuel but,—of Methuselah. Justified by the divine grace of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in the very beginning of his infancy, he may, for all we know, have remained just before God —intrinsically just, habitually and actually just,—unto death. During all those 969 years he may never have known nor been under the ἥμαρτον of chap. ii. 12, and of chap. iii. 23. What ground have we for saying that this Patriarch ever fell from the state of righteousness after he had been once placed in it? What sort of Justification would that be which must *certainly* be lost? A gift to no final purpose. If from the hour that he could first morally live and act at all he was ἑαυτῷ νόμος and the work of the νόμος was written 'in his heart' what was *certainly* to have prevented him from continuing in the same state of justice until his death? We can say the same of every one of the Gentiles whom the Apostle presents in ver. 14. They *may* have lost the justice in which they were first constituted in infancy, or afterwards: And they may *not*. Some of them may, others not. We cannot tell. And if any of them were justified in infancy these may have remained righteous to the last.

We can say the same of thousands upon thousands from the days of Abel down to this hour. He who justified them could keep them just if they were "men of good will". And men of good will they might have been.

To proceed: as on the one hand the *πάντες* of chap. iii. is not universal in its range, (although it includes every individual without exception that falls within its range); so on the other the *ἥμαρτον* of chapters ii. and iii. comprehends not within its range every kind of fault or imperfection. 'For' says St. James 'in many things we all offend': *πολλὰ πταίομεν ἅπαντες*. And the Psalmist, speaking in a sense corresponding to the mind of the Apostle, exclaims: "Enter not into judgment with thy servant, oh Lord, for in Thy sight shall no living man be justified:"* where the *δικαιωθήσεται*, '*justus* or *insons* erit,'—the Hebrew verb being in the *kal*—has a higher and a wider range than the *δικ.* of Romans ii. 13, and the *δικ.* of Rom. iii. 20. The Davidical *δικαιωθήσεται* taking account of *all* offences grave and light, but the Pauline *δικαιωθήσεται*, on the other hand, taking no account of the latter. But our *ἥμαρτον* is an *ἥμαρτον* which is opposed to the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* of chap. ii. 13, and to the *δίκαιος* of chap. iii. 10, and to the *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν* of iii. 24.† It is an *ἥμαρτον* which excludes the

* Compare the Psalm De Profundis. 129 (130 A.V.): *ἐὰν ἀνομίας παρατηρήσῃ κύριε, κύριε τίς ὑποστήσεται*; ver. 3.

† Also to the *δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* of iii. 20.

δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ and is in turn excluded by this. And in the case both of the Jews and the Gentiles of our passage (vv. 13, 14) it *is as a matter of fact* excluded. And those from whom it is excluded are not hypothetical persons but *realities*. Real persons in ver. 13 and real persons in ver. 14. This the whole argument demonstrates. But since none are free from offences therefore the ἥμαρτον of the two chapters does not comprehend *all* offences,—light as well as grave. Taking, however, the ἥμαρτον in its widest and what is in itself lexically a legitimate application, we have undoubtedly the basis of the Lutheran (or Extrinsicist) position as to Justification additionally strengthened, so as to render that position, if only the basis be tenable, to us seemingly impregnable. For in addition to the word πάντες we are thus confronted with an ἥμαρτον which is indisputably universal. Thus that universality of 'sinning' which is the foundation required for the Reformer's δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως is proclaimed (1) by the πάντες and is proclaimed (2) by the ἥμαρτον. This basis, however, must be rejected at the outset. For the Lutheran πάντες is not the Pauline πάντες nor the Lutheran ἥμαρτον the Pauline ἥμαρτον. That the latter (the Pauline) ἥμαρτον does not comprehend all offences is plainly shown from the fact that (1) the ποιηταὶ νόμου of ver. 13 and (2) the ἔθνη of ver. 14, who are both alike just or justified before God and so free of the ἥμαρτον (ver. 12) and heirs of salvation,

are not and cannot be free from light offences.* The Pauline *ἥμαρτον* connotes grave offences—means only such transgression of the *νόμος*, or such offence against the law of God however manifested as is fatal to the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* and destroys the integrity of that *ποίησις νόμου* (or *τῶν τοῦ νόμου*) which constitutes that *δικαιοσύνη*.

What then is the exact range of (1) the *πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι* (iii. 9); of (2) the *πάντες ἥμαρτον* (iii. 23); of (3) the *τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν* (Gal. iii. 22); of (4) the *πᾶν στόμα* (iii. 19); of (5) the *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος* (*ib.*); and of (6) the *πᾶσα σὰρξ* (iii. 20)? Premising the lexical point (not always sufficiently adverted to) that *πάντες* never of itself determines the *extent of the range* of that objective mass which it indicates (an extent which can only be determined by external evidence), but only bears witness to the *nemine excepto* within that range, whatever its extent may happen to be,—we answer that the exact range of the *πάντες* in these passages is the mass of the *ἀσεβεῖς* and *ἄδικοι*, that is to say of those who are *devoid of that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ which the Apostle is exerting himself to bring in*—and *that* in the case of adults and therefore in connexion with the *πίστις*. The

* Comp. Conc. Trid. Session VI, chap. xi. "For although during this mortal life men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, not therefore do they cease to be just. For that cry of the just, *Forgive us our trespasses*, is both humble and true."

term,—used as it here is of moral adults—is, as to adults not 'universaliter' universal, but (to coin an expression), it is 'categoricè' universal. The *πάντες*, &c. signifies all, without one single exception, who are in a certain *category*. What is that category? It is the category of those who are devoid of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. The objective mass before the Apostle's mind is the mass of the unregenerate and *therefore* unjust or unrighteous: of the unrighteous *because* unregenerate. The mass of the unjustified. Those adults to whom the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* has not arrived; upon whom it has not descended, or else from whom it has departed if they ever enjoyed it.

The category may be conveniently expressed in the words (Rom. i. 18) *ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων;* even should these words—which is not clear nor even most probable—refer only to the Gentiles. At all events they are words to which the *προῃτιασάμεθα πάντας* of chap. iii. 9, naturally, nay almost necessarily, refer us back. The *πάντες*, we repeat, signifies every single individual of those in the category of 'the destitute of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*'—apart from which there is no *δικ. παρὰ θεῷ* possible. It signifies the mass of the evil *because* unregenerate or unjustified—of the unregenerate and unjustified and *therefore* evil. As in the case of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* itself, so here in the case of the *ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων*, the Apostle sees cause in effect and effect in cause. The

objective mass before his mind which he indicates by the *πάντες*, and of which he predicates the *ἥμαρτον* of chap. iii. includes *not one* of the regenerate or justified and therefore righteous. He by no means at all intends to say that all adults, justified or unjustified, *have sinned* or *are sinning*. For many and many an adult there might be who (justified in infancy) never 'sinned' all his life long.* And of none when in a state of justice can it be said that they 'are sinning'; for the *δικαιοσύνη* which they exhibit, plainly, according to our passage, and decisively excludes the alleged *ἥμαρτον*. No; the Apostle presents us with *two* categories and *one* objective mass of adults.† The *first* of these categories is of the unregenerate and therefore unrighteous, the unrighteous because unregenerate—in one word, 'the unregenerate'; *h.e.* those devoid of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. The second category is that of 'sinners' (*ἁμαρτωλοὶ*)—of those who are under the power of sin (*ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν*) and are sinners and guilty before God—of those who morally 'live out' the privation of justice, that is to say, who 'sin'. And St. Paul, as it were, *pours* the whole of the mass who are in the *first* category,—all of them without exception (*πάντας*) into the *second*. *προῃτιασάμεθα γὰρ*

* Comp. Baptismal service for infants: "Accipe vestem candidam quam *immaculatam perferas* ante tribunal D.N.J.C. ut habeas vitam eternam." (2) "Accipe lampadem ardentem et *irreprehensibilis custodi* baptismum tuum."

† The mass, that is, of the unjustified or 'impious'.

Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι. . . . οὐ γὰρ ἐστι διαστολή, πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον. κ.τ.λ.* And to explain still further: What is the special significance, the precise argumentative force of the πάντες and the πάντας thus circumscribed in its range, thus 'categoricè universal'? It is aimed intently at the Jew, or rather at the Judaiser,—at him who seeks the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεοῦ through the νόμος, thus turning his back on the πίστις I. X. The ἥμαρτον and the ἁμαρτωλὸς conveyed the one 'charge'—the one αἰτία—which he could not and would not endure. That αἰτία pulled his δίκαιος down. He was Ἰουδαῖος (φύσει Ἰουδαῖος), and through the περιτομὴ and the νόμος and the ἔργα νόμου, he was, he considered, δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ. It was the Gentiles who were under the ἥμαρτον—who were ἁμαρτωλοί. He rejoiced and he boasted in his δικαιοσύνη διὰ νόμου. He had been incorporated into the Divine Institute of the Law and was one of the Children of the Kingdom (ὕιος τῆς βασιλείας). Now St. Paul is engaged throughout the whole of the second chapter of Romans in 'taking' or 'dislodging' the Judaiser. The Apostle of the

* St. Paul's position in these chapters is this: the ἄδικοι and ἀσεβεῖς, (*such* because devoid of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,—which in the case of the Justification of adults is δικ. ἐκ πίστεως), are *all alike, nemine excepto* ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν and ἁμαρτωλοί—Jew as well as Greek: or (2) those destitute of the δικ. θεοῦ and *therefore* ἄδικοι and ἀσεβεῖς are all alike devoid of the δίκ. παρά θεῷ, *h.e.* are ἁμαρτωλοί. For ἁμαρτωλὸς is the precise opposite of δίκαιος. He says: προῃτιασάμεθα γὰρ Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ. Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι. Where? Essentially in the Passage of the Four γὰρ. *Vid. inf.*

Gentiles appears before us in these opening chapters as one who is *negotiating for God* in the matter of true Justice and Justification. He sets forth,—he, as it were, *lays out* before Jew and Gentile the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ with reference to the moral adult. He unfolds it, he recommends it, he enforces its acceptance as bringing with it the only δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ, and thus as the sole means of Salvation. He moreover proposes it to the adult by the only principle or way by which he can attain to it—the way of Faith in Jesus Christ. This δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is (1) the *only* δικαιοσύνη; it is ἡ δικαιοσύνη (*the* justice, Gal. iii. 21, Rom. iv. 11). It is (2) a δικαιοσύνη ἐκ (διὰ) πίστεως—πίστεως I. X. But to the successful issue of this negotiation, and to the acceptance of this divine Justice through faith in Christ an obstacle presented itself: a great obstacle, an immediate obstacle, and an obstacle opposed from a most powerful and interested and important quarter. What was it? Nothing less than the δικαιοσύνη διὰ νόμου of the Judaiser: the righteousness of the νόμος according to the religious conception of the Judaising Jew. Of one who would be sure to reject and resist a δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ which came, *not* through the περιτομὴ and the νόμος *but*, by another means;—a means which gave it to the Gentile as well as to himself, and to both independently of the περιτομὴ and the νόμος. He would be sure to reject and to resist; *because* of the περιτομὴ

and the *νόμος;* because to the *Ἰουδαῖος* had been entrusted the *λογία τοῦ θεοῦ*; because to him pertained the *υἱοθεσία* and the *δόξα* and the *διαθῆκαι* and the *νομοθεσία* and the *λατρεία* and the *ἐπαγγελίαι.* Evildoer, therefore, *ἄδικος* and *ασεβὴς* though he be (and such he must be in a greater or less degree, if devoid of that Justice of God by which alone he can become just with God) he will nevertheless oppose to the Apostle his possession, profession and (partial) fulfilment of the *νόμος* and present himself *δίκαιος* with this his *δικαιοσύνη ἐν νόμῳ* and free of the *ἥμαρτον* in spite of his iniquity and oftentimes flagrant transgressions. And he will repel the ambassador of Christ. 'Take your *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* (if *δικ.* indeed there be, apart from the *νόμος*) to those who need it, to the Gentiles: for ourselves we need it not: *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί.*'

On the other hand it is the Apostle's task to clear his path of this obstruction; to address himself to the Judaiser and bring to naught his hollow and pretended justice, and place him in the predicament of the *ἥμαρτον* and the *ὑφ ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι—him* no less than unjustified and evil Gentile. So that *all,* Jew as well as Greek, who have not received the gift of righteousness which is 'of Faith'—and all *without exception*—may be together in the same odious predicament. All who are devoid or destitute of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ,* all the evil because unregenerate, *ἔννομοι* as well as *ἄνομοι,* Jew as well as

Gentile—*all, nemine excepto,* 'are under sin,' 'have sinned,' 'are sinning'. Τί οὖν; προχόμεθα; (iii. 9) "What then? do we (we Jews) put forward any valid plea of Justice? By no means. For we have already by judicial process brought both Jews and Greeks alike without exception (πάντας) 'under sin'—under the power and under the guilt of sin." καθὼς γέγραπται. And in like manner David when he says: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος (ποιῶν χρμστότητα. Ps.) οὐδὲ εἷς κ.τ.λ. For the Davidical πάντες is the same as the Pauline. It is not 'universaliter' but 'categoricè universal'. Neither the Psalmist nor the Apostle are thinking of the 'Just' but only of the mass of the unregenerate and evil, of those who are devoid of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.* It is of these and these alone that the former declares that there is not to be found *even one* δίκαιος. 'If only one would content you, not even that one should you find' (Fritzsche). He is not speaking of a Moses or a Samuel or an Elias and telling what they *would have been* without the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. Such an hypothetical interpretation

* The υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων of whom the Psalmist (Ps. xiii.) says the things quoted by the Apostle in vv. 10-19 are the 'sons of men' as opposed to the υἱοὶ θεοῦ—the 'children of light' and justice. He means, like the Apostle, unaided human nature, *not* in the abstract but in the concrete; *all* the actual concrete instances of human nature devoid of divine grace. He indicates the evil and unregenerate,—the mass of the ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων—a category in which the δίκαιοι π. θ. through fulfilment of the νόμος *can never be placed.* The υἱοὶ ἀνθρώπων do not include, but are opposed to, the γενεὰ δικαία of ver. 5 of the same Psalm. And no attentive reader can fail to see the antithesis.

(see Estius, Alapide*) is artificial and strained to the point of being intolerable: true though it be that destitute of the divine Gift these and all other just souls *would have been* ἄδικοι and ἀσεβεῖς. No, the Psalmist is speaking of the entire mass of those who, whether Jews or Gentiles, are destitute of the Faith and Grace of God through Christ. Moreover these Davidical passages are the γραφὴ of Galatians iii. 22: συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφὴ τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν. For the τὰ πάντα of Galatians is the same as the πάντας and πάντες of Romans. And the connexion of thought and the argument are the same in both Epistles. The τὰ πάντα of Galatians indicates all who are devoid of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, and these alone, but these without exception. Where now, in the second chapter of Romans, does the Apostle bring to naught the spurious and pretended justice of the Judaising Jew, and place him,—ἔννομος as he is,—in the category of ἁμαρτωλός? In this very Passage of the Four γὰρ: where the ἥμαρτον and the δίκαιος and the δικαιοῦσθαι appear for the first time. He addresses himself to the opposed plea of the νόμος from ver. 11. The οὐ γὰρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία, connected as it is by a γὰρ, with the νόμος recurring ten times immediately after, has evidently pointed reference to the Jew. For it introduces (through ver. 12 B.) the bearing of the νόμος upon Sin, Justice,

* We follow Ambrosiaster (Comm Rom.) whom Alapide rejects on incorrect grounds. (Comm. Rom. chap. iii.)

Judgment, and Salvation. 'For,' says the Apostle, 'there is no respect of persons with God: none, for instance, on the ground of the *νόμος*: For, while on the one hand as many as have sinned without the Law shall perish also without the Law, so, on the other, as many as have sinned *in* the Law shall be judged, (and condemned), *by* the Law—and so perish.' Now observe that, whereas he lets the *first* *ἥμαρτον* go without further word, he on the contrary, *dwells* upon the second *ἥμαρτον*. This was the great *ἥμαρτον*. If this *ἥμαρτον* could be brought home to the Jew,—fixed upon him, then his *δικαιοσύνη* is gone for ever. For, within the sphere of the *νόμος*, the *ἥμαρτον* and the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* cannot coexist. Legal righteousness cannot coexist with legal sin, that is, legal transgression:—the *ποίησις* with the *παράβασις νόμου*. Now St. Paul brings it home to him by means of the very *νόμος* in which he boasted and trusted both for righteousness and salvation. And how? By going to the root of the matter; by unfolding, through the medium of personal agency, the *relations* which exist between the *νόμος* and the *δικαιοσύνη*; by showing the nature and end of the Law on the one hand and the nature and end of the *δικαιοσύνη* on the other. He says: 'For not the non-fulfillers of the *νόμος* are just with God, but *only* the fulfillers shall be justified.' Now if the *νόμος* be such in relation to the *δικαιοσύνη* that only its fulfillers are *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* and *if* the Jew whom

St. Paul is addressing be, as he certainly is, (see ver. 1, ff.), but an *ἀκροατὴς νόμου as a whole* even though he may observe it in some respects, *then* he is not *δίκαιος* according to his own cherished Law. But, if he is not *δίκαιος* according to his Law, he is under the *ἥμαρτον* according to his Law. And so he comes out *ἁμαρτωλὸς* by the working of that very *νόμος* in which he trusted. 'As many as have sinned in the Law, (*h.e.* as are devoid of justice in the *νόμος*) shall be judged by the *νόμος* which sets forth justice both positively and negatively, and being confronted with this justice 'in the letter' shall be condemned and shall perish.' Here the Apostle passes from justice to the *νόμος*. 'For not the hearers of the Law are just with God but the doers shall be justified.' Here he passes from the *νόμος* to the *δικαιοσύνη*, and, by showing the relation of the former to the latter, he convinces the Jew of sin, fixing him under the *ἥμαρτον*. Nor does he make an end here; but rather, by throwing additional light on the reciprocal relations of the two, he still further strengthens both the statements and the reasoning of the preceding verses, vv. 12 B. and 13. Still further to strengthen ver. 13 (and through it ver. 12B.) he turns to the Gentiles ver. 14. And he turns to them not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the Jews (the *ἔννομοι*), and in behalf of the double proposition of the preceding verse and to make good the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* as affirmed of the doers

in opposition to the hearers of the Law. And in so doing he passes from the δικαιοσύνη *back again* to the νόμος, unfolding, through personal agency, the relation of the former to the latter; just as he had previously unfolded the relation of the latter to the former. He who without the Law virtually fulfils it is *himself* the νόμος, manifesting true justice of life as the Law manifests 'justice of life'. Thus the pretended δικαιοσύνη of the Jew is still more exploded and he is still more effectually locked down under the ἥμαρτον. In this passage, and thenceforward to the close of the chapter, the νόμος without the δικαιοσύνη in the person of the unrighteous Jew is contrasted with the δικ. without the νόμος in the person of the righteous Gentile. St. Paul mounts up to our passage by the preceding verses of this chapter and descends from it by the remainder. It forms the basis of that attack which commences with: εἰ δὲ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ and concludes with the οὗ ὁ ἔπαινος κ.τ.λ. of ver. 29. Indeed, the ἐὰν οὖν of ver. 26 might refer, (with a backward glance), to our passage as well as to the text immediately preceding it. St. Paul is harping on the same string in both places: 'Lex sine Justitiâ; Justitia sine Lege'. Compare also the κρινεῖ σὲ of ver. 27 with the κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον of ver. 1. There we see a contrast of the sharpest edge. In ver. 1 we have the νόμος without justice in the person of the Jew judging the evil Gentile: but in ver. 27 justice without the νόμος

in the person of the just Gentile judging the evil Jew. The latter *κρίνει* being just and reasonable,—the former simply self-destruction. Thus does St. Paul clear away from his path the obstacle of the Judaiser's *δικαιοσύνη ἐν νομῷ* (*διὰ νόμου*). And, after a digression guarding against any imputed disparagement of the divine *νόμος*, he concludes: *προῃτιασάμεθα . . . Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι.* The unregenerate and evil Jew as well as the unregenerate and evil Gentile both alike (or all alike) are 'sinners'. There is no exemption* for the former; he possesses no true *δικαιοσύνη* any more than the latter. The Apostle, as we said before, *pours* them all alike *out* of the category of the unregenerate, the unjustified, and the evil *into* the category of the *ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι.* All who are *ἀσεβεῖς* being devoid of the *δικ. θεοῦ*,—all, without exception, are 'under sin' and 'have sinned', and are 'sinners'. Far, indeed, are the first and second chapters of Romans from meaning to place all adults, *nemine excepto* 'under sin'. Far, indeed, from asserting that no man can fulfil the *νόμος* and so be just 'with God';—just with a *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς*. On the contrary, *six times over* does the Apostle present the fulfilment of the Law, (according to the mind of the Law), as a duty, a reality and a matter of fact. First in the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* of ver. 13; (2) in the *τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν* of ver. 14; (3) in the *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νομοῦ*

* *εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας . . . οὐ γὰρ ἐστι διαστολή.* iii. 22.

γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις; (4) in the ἐὰν νόμον πράσσῃς; (5) in the τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου φυλάσσῃ;* and (6) in the τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα. But what fulfilment? Not a perfect fulfilment such as Luther and Calvin and all the other Extrinsicists contemplate and require, artificially and arbitrarily laying it down as the firm foundation of their extrinsic δικαιοσύνη,—not a *perfect*, but an *adequate* fulfilment of the νόμος. Adequate to what? Adequate to the δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ; adequate to the ζήσεται in the legal aphorism (ὁ ποίησας αὐτα ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς); adequate to the ἔπαινος θεοῦ of ver. 29; adequate to the satisfaction of the Legislator and the requirements of the Law up to the point of the δίκαιος. As before to the theory of Imputative Justice as 'the righteousness by Faith' we opposed the *identification* of 'the justice by Faith' with legal righteousness,—so *now* to the argument of Perfection, upon which the Reformers and their followers rest their (thenceforward) impregnable position, we oppose the stronger argument of *adequation*. And, for its indestructible foundation, we point to the second chapter of Romans and herein especially to our passage. In fact the fulfilment of the νόμος contemplated and required by the Apostle both in the passage and in the chapter, and which he sets forth as a δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ, is no other than the fulfilment contemplated and

* This is the *last word* of St. Stephen's speech: ἐλάβετε τὸν νόμον . . . καὶ οὐκ ἐφυλάξατε. Acts vii. 53. He never could have said that to Moses and Elias!

required by Luther himself, when in his Comm. Gal. iii. 12, he speaks of the "true doers of the Law justified by Faith," and of "those that are justified by Faith and are true doers of the Law." It is no other than that contemplated and required by Meyer where he says (Rom. ii. 13) that man, by means of the καινότης ζωῆς (vi. 4) attained through faith, *must and can* fulfil (*erfüllen müsse und könne*, viii. 4)* the Law completed by Christ." This fulfilment, however, Luther and Meyer (building both of them, together with all other Extrinsicists, upon the notion of *perfect* fulfilment) maintain to be *no* justice 'before God'—no 'justice of life'. For, according to their system, such a divine intrinsic justice would take away 'the righteousness by Faith'.† St. Paul, on the contrary, maintains that it *is* such justice. And this intrinsicist position of the Apostle both underlies and enters into the whole argument of the second and third chapters from end to end.

The πάντες then of Rom. iii., with the other forms of the πᾶς (vv. 9, 19) in that chapter, and the τὰ πάντα of Gal. iii. 22, are not *universaliter* universal, but *catagoricé* universal in their range; and the πᾶς does not determine its own range but only speaks to the *nemine excepto* within that range. Thus (1) the πᾶν στόμα means *every* mouth of the evildoer and unregenerate;—Jew as well

* Ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν (grande verbum!) τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα. Rom. viii. 4.

† Comp: Pfleiderer. Paulinism. Vol. i. p. 77. 'The Law.'

as Gentile, in spite of his *νόμος*: (2) *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος* the whole mass of unregenerate men without exception. *ὁ κοσμος* is the 'wicked world'. Comp. the word in its connexion with *ὀργὴ*, vv. 5, 6: (3) *πᾶσα σὰρξ*, every single individual of the unregenerate mass *σὰρξ*—Gentile as well as Jew; for the Gentile is here warned from the *νόμος*, and from seeking, as a proselyte, the *δικαιοσύνη* of justification *διὰ νόμου*,—equally with the Jew.

As to the *ἔργα νόμου*, Rom. iii. 20, and other verses in both Epistles, it is plain from chap. ii. v. 13, that they do not signify fulfilment of the Law; nor do they represent an unattainable obedience, under a hypothetical form. The *νόμου* here is the genitive of the *subject* or the *gen. originis*, not the genitive of the *object*. Grammatically either construction is equally admissible. See Winer N.T. Grammar (Gen. case). In the Scriptures the phrase is purely Pauline.* The *ἔργα νόμου* meant by him are not works which, (if we may so express it) 'lift the Law,' but works which 'the Law,' whether moral or ceremonial, 'lifts.' They are works which the authoritative teaching of the *νόμος elicits* from the *ἔννομος*, apart from the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*—the grace of God through Christ.† They are the *fruits* of the *νόμος* and are traced to its

* The corresponding phrase of the Rabbinical writers מעשים התורים can mean alike either (1) works which are the fulfilment of the Law; or (2) works, few or many, which are fulfilments of the Law; or (3) works which are the fruits of, which spring from obedience to, the teaching of the Law. Like the Latin *Opera Legis*.

† Com Conc. Trid. Sess. vi. Canon. 1.

parentage. They are the *ἡ ἐμὴ δικαιοσύνη* of St. Paul himself before his conversion, when he was not 'just' but *ἄδικος* and *ἀσεβὴς*—and that through his own fault. For in his infancy he had received the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and been justified and had lost it. Comp. Rom. vii. 9. *ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ. κ.τ.λ.* They are an intrinsic righteousness but they are *inadequate*—inadequate to the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ*, to the *ζήσεται* of the Legal Aphorism and to the *ἔπαινος θεοῦ*. Rom. ii. 29. Christ means the *ἔργα νόμου* when he says "unless your justice abound more than, (*περισσεύσῃ πλεῖον* = surpass both in kind and in amount), that of the Scribes and Pharisees you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Matt. v. 20. In support of the *objective* genitive Meyer points to the *ἁμαρτήματα νόμου*, once occurring in the LXX, and to the *πίστις* I. X. where the genitive is certainly the *objective* genitive. But in vain. The proof of the *subjective* genitive in the case of the *ἔργα νόμου*, derived from our passage is decisive; and had Meyer perceived the argument of that passage he would have allowed it to be decisive. The Apostle is contrasting the *δικαιοσύνη νόμου* with the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*,—the justice derived from the *νόμος*,—attained through the *νόμος*,* (comp. Gal. ii. 21), with the justice which comes down from God. In either case the question is of the *origin* from which the

* The justice produced by the *ἔνδειξις* and the *δύναμις* of the Law when applied to the intellect and will, respectively, of the *ἔννομος*.

δικαιοσύνη is traced. The one means what a man can *get out of* the Law (comp. Phil. iii. 6): the other what a man receives from God. At the same time the δικ. θεοῦ includes the true δικ. νόμου (genitive *objecti* = τὰ τοῦ νόμου: το ἔργον τοῦ νόμου ii. 14, 15)—that justice which the Law prescribes and which is the fulfilment of the Law, and to which he refers when he says: ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ. viii. 4. There is legal justice and legal justice. In the matter of Justification 'of life' Luther and the Extrinsicists cast to the winds *all* legal righteousness. But the Apostle only that which is spurious and inadequate. The true and genuine justice of the νόμος—τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου (x. 5)—which the Law itself and Christ also declare to be a Justice of Life, and *which casts out* the ἥμαρτον, he labours with all his soul and with all his strength to establish,—by placing it (χωρὶς νόμου), on its only true foundation,—the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. It is one and the same with the δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ πίστεως and the δικαιοσύνη παρα θεῷ. It is that triune charity which he himself tells us both in Galatians and in Romans is the fulfilment of the Law.*

Point V.—Jowett's Explanation of Rom. ii. 13, and iii. 20.

Of the three points which remain for consideration one

* ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον νόμον πεπλήρωκε. Rom. xiii. 8. πλήρωμα οὖν νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη, ver. 10. Comp. Gal. v. 14. For the quite different ἥμαρτον of the 'ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον of v. 12, see Appendix.

is the explanation by which Jowett seeks to reconcile our passage with his Lutheran or Extrinsicist interpretation of the succeeding chapter,—an explanation which demands notice rather from the reputation of him who proposes it than from any merit of its own. He sees a contradiction between our passage and ver. 20 of the following chapter. According to him the Apostle contradicts himself "a few verses afterwards." In our passage St. Paul declares (1) that as regards the Jews, 'not the hearers but the fulfillers of the Law shall be just with God', and (2) that in their fulfilment of the things of the Law the Gentiles are justified and just with God. Thirty-nine verses afterwards he declares that *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* shall no flesh whatever (*οὐ πᾶσα σὰρξ* —a strong Hebrew form borrowed apparently from Ps. clxii. 2)* be justified before God. That is to say, of the *ἔννομοι*, only the fulfillers of the *νόμος* are justified and saved and then shortly afterwards, the fulfillers of the *νόμος* are *never* in a single instance justified. Observing this quick and complete contradiction, Jowett,—instead of rejecting the Extrinsicist construction of the *ἔργα νόμου* and the *πάντες ἥμαρτον* and sweeping away the entire Extrinsicist interpretation of the third chapter,—*faces* it. And he accounts for it by saying in effect that the *πᾶς* of the Apostle is after all only a *general* statement

* The whole clause is, we submit, not borrowed, but only the *οὐ πᾶσα*, designedly. The two sentences essentially differ from each other. *Vid. inf.*

and that exceptions to it both among Jews and Gentiles must be allowed. In support of this view he points to the *οὐ γὰρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ* as not precluding instances of partiality in certain cases. But the truth is that the *ἀπροσωπολημψία* implied in this verse is a divine attribute within the *judicial* sphere and is by no means to be confounded with that divine and sovereign "predilection" of which we have instances (1) in Jacob: "Jacob have I loved and Esau I have not loved," and (2) in the Apostles: "You have not chosen me but I have chosen you." To the inviolable operation of this *ἀπροσωπολημψία* there never was in all the past, nor at the day of judgment will there be,—nor could there be,—a single exception. The justice and truth of God are involved in its exercise. Looking at the whole argument of the verses preceding ver. 11 we see that the *ἀπροσωπολημψία lies behind* and *protects* the *δικαιοκρισία* of ver. 6,—that judicial retribution which at the last day will recompense every man according to his works, repaying good with good and evil with evil. There will be no loop-hole through which the Jew may escape the judgment (*τὸ κρῖμα*) of God—a 'judgment which is according to truth' upon those that do evil. And the Apostle brings in ver. 11 at the very point at which he wishes to make good the judicial impartiality of retribution at the judgment day *in the direction of* the *νόμος*—where, if anywhere, 'the children of the kingdom' might

fondly look for favour and rescue. Let the γὰρ which connects ver. 11 with the preceding verse and, (through it argumentatively), with all the preceding verses as far back at least as vv. 5, 6,—for these intervening verses are but an exhibition of the ἀποδώσει ἑκαστῷ ;—and let the γὰρ which connects ver. 12 with ver. 11 and introduces the bearing of the νόμος on the subject handled, and continues the argument in that direction and connexion,—be both carefully considered. Let them be weighed with reference to the entire chain of reasoning from the λογίζῃ δὲ τοῦτο down to the εἰ δὲ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος επονομάζῃ. All is one logical organism. And the force of it is directed against the false position of the Judaiser: the νόμος being viewed in relation to the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ, the presence or absence of which in man determines his relation to God here and his fate hereafter. As to Jowett's other remark about the heathen,* we answer that the heathen are by no means "without the pale of salvation." And he who acknowledges that some heathen are saved acknowledges that all might be saved; that is to say, acknowledges that they are *not* out of the pale of salvation.

In the next place as the support upon which this commentator rests is too *weak*, so the adverse language of

* "Again this contradiction may be illustrated by an analogous way of speaking among ourselves. The heathen, we say, are without the pale of salvation, and yet we acknowledge that individual heathens are nevertheless saved." Jowett, Comm. Rom. ii. 13.

St. Paul in chap. iii. is too *strong* for the validity of his explanation. The *πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι* of ver. 9, the *οὐδὲ εἷς* of ver. 10, the *οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ συνιῶν* of ver. 11, the *οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ἑνός* of ver. 12, the *πᾶν στόμα* and the *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος* of ver. 19, and lastly the Hebraist *οὐ πᾶσα σὰρξ* of ver. 20, surround the objective mass to which they refer with a ring through which there is no breaking away. This embrace is the very antithesis of a 'general statement'. It secures every single individual of the mass which it comprehends. The Apostle could not possibly have forbidden the idea of even a solitary exception in stronger language.* Further, a crowning objection to Jowett's explanation is that it excludes the *ἥμαρτον*, from the just Jews and Gentiles. Now with the Apostle the *ἥμαρτον* is certainly cast out by ver. 13, for the argument and the *δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ* combine to cast it out. It is cast out argumentatively by the *οὐ γὰρ*, and lexically by the *δίκαιος*, for this is the complete and proper opposite of the *ἥμαρτον*. But with Jowett this cannot happen without utter extravagance. For, whereas the Pauline *ἥμαρτον* does not mean or include *every* offence,—but only such as destroys† the *δίκαιος π. θ*;—with Jowett, on the contrary, it *does*. Nowhere in his Commentary Essays does he even hint a *division* of sin.

* See Morison, Rom. iii. 9, ff. (Monograph), on the stringency of these verses.

† That is to say 'mortal' sin.

With him all sin, light as well as grave, is fatally opposed to the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ. Thus, his explanation perforce presents the just Gentiles and the just Jews as *sinless beings*. Where are such exceptions as these to be found? Again, his explanation, on the one hand, arbitrarily *restricts* our passage; and, on the other hand, arbitrarily, or worse than arbitrarily, *relaxes*, vv. 9, ff. of chap. iii. As to the first point, there may, for anything in the text to the contrary, be hundreds and thousands of these 'exceptions'. As to the second, we cannot, without the clearest exegetical violence, allow of the exception of a solitary individual from the range of the πάντες ἥμαρτον enforced as that πάντες is by both the words of the Apostle and the words of the Psalmist. But lastly, if no contradiction exist, there is no need of explanation. But there exists no contradiction between the two chapters if only the extrinsic or Lutheran explanation of the third chapter be rejected,—be swept clean away from the πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι, the πάντες ἥμαρτον and the ἔργα νόμου. There is no contradiction if (1) the πάντας, &c. simply mean all the ἄδικοι and ἀσεβεῖς whether Jew or Gentile without exception; all that is to whom the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ has not arrived, and who therefore must be all alike *poured* into the category of ἁμαρτωλοί; and if (2) the ἔργα νόμου represent *not* the legal fulfilment the legal righteousness of the ποιηταὶ νόμου, *but* the works (moral and ceremonial) of the

ἀκροαταὶ νομου,—that is inadequate, law-begotten righteousness,—justice opposed to the justice 'of faith' and placed in the opposite scale. Then there remains no contradiction between the *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται* of chapter ii. and the *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* of chapter iii.

Point 6.—A Comparison of Rom. iii. 20 with Psalm cxliii. 2.

Our penultimate point is a comparison of the Pauline words *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου . . . . . ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* Rom. iii. 20, with the Davidical verse *οὐ δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώπιον σοῦ πᾶς ζῶν*. Ps. 143, 2. These two passages are naturally associated; and the former is by Extrinsicists almost invariably represented to be a 'quotation' of the latter by St. Paul, a quotation by which he intends to convey in the most forcible manner, the universal absence from man of intrinsic justice 'in the sight' of God. Now the simple truth is that whatever the Apostle borrowed he did *not* borrow,—*h.e.* repeat,—the sentiment,—the declaration of the Psalmist. He did *not*, because it can be certainly demonstrated from St. Paul's own teaching, not only that both Jews and Gentiles are justified before God with intrinsic justice, but also that the bestowal and possession of this intrinsic justice constitutes their Justification; being indeed the very *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and, (in the case of adults), the very *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*, which

he is preaching to Gentile and to Jew. Of this double fact the second chapter of Romans, and especially our passage, when scientifically investigated, furnishes conclusive evidence. In the next place the two passages by no means resemble each other so well as many would have it thought they do. There is a dissimilarity between them, (1) as to words, (2) as to order of words, (3) as to general character. St. Paul says *πᾶσα σὰρξ* and is speaking of the unregenerate and therefore evil, the evil because unregenerate and devoid of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* which springs from the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*. David, on the other hand, says *πᾶς ζῶν* and is speaking of the 'servant' —*δοῦλος*—of God,—"Enter not into judgment with thy servant, oh Lord"—the *ζῶν* signifying not every man who ever lived, but either every man 'living to God', *or* every man to whom the *ζήσεται* of the Legal aphorism appertains. The Psalmist meaning that, if God should institute a strict *κρίσιν* between himself and man and thus be "extreme to mark what is done amiss," not even the just man (who *is* just before him) will endure the trial and come forth just in his sight. Again, St. Paul adopts a different order of words which somewhat weakens the supposition of a quotation. Can any exegete feel satisfied that the Apostle intends to quote the sentiment of the Psalmist when, in one short sentence, he gives neither his words nor his order? Further; which is of greater importance, St. Paul says *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου;*

whereas David says absolutely *οὐ δικαιωθήσεται*. David affirms that no servant of God shall be, (in *his* sense of the word *δικ.*), justified before him, (with intrinsic justice) *anyhow*. But St. Paul, that no 'flesh' shall be justified before him by the 'works' of the *νόμος*,—by which he cannot possibly mean the fulfilment of the *νόμος*. Besides; the Extrinsicist reads the *ἔργα νόμου hypothetically:* with him they present a fulfilment which, as a *matter of fact,* is impossible. Whereas the life and conduct in respect of which David deprecates the scrutiny of God is evidently real or actual. Here is a serious discrepancy. We conclude then that St. Paul is not quoting the sentiment of David. The latter is speaking of an *extraordinary* justice and justification which can never be: but the latter of that ordinary justice of justification which must necessarily be,—if man is to be saved. The two *δικαιωθήσονται* quite differ from each other, the Davidical *δικ.* indicating *perfect δικαιοσύνη*; the Pauline merely saving righteousness by virtue of which, imperfect though it be, man 'lives' to God here and inherits eternal life hereafter. If the Apostle borrows from the Psalmist at all it is merely the Hebraist *οὐ πᾶς* and the *ἐνώπιον* which he appropriates.

Point 7.—The Details of Rom. ii. 15 are no Argument against the True Justice of the Gentile.

The last point which remains to be considered is the bearing of the latter part of ver. 15 (*συμμαρτυρούσης*

. . . . ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων) upon the *Argumentum Velatum* and the true justice of the Gentile therein established. Is there in the exercise either of the συνείδησις or of the interior reflective λογισμοὶ anything incompatible with the state of true intrinsic righteousness before God? We answer: certainly not. That obedience to the divine Will which is indicated by the ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις cannot be inconsistent with Conscience and right Reason, and if so then neither with their exercise. Else what would become of Moral Theology? Nay, it cannot be severed from the energy of these agents either among the ἄνομοι or among the ἔννομοι. But it may be asked; is there not at least something in the κατηγορούντων incompatible with the true intrinsic justice of the Gentile? We answer, no: for why should there be? Why any more than in the 'Dimitte nobis debita nostra,' &c.? Is not the Book of Job a record of such λογισμοὶ on the part of Job himself? Yet where in all Scripture shall we find a description so vivid and so detailed of the excellence of a servant of God as the divine description of Job's character to Satan? According to the witness of God himself Job is: ἄνθρωπος ἄμεμπτος, ἀληθινὸς, θεοσεβὴς, ἀπεχόμενος ἀπὸ παντὸς πονηροῦ πράγματος. Where is the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ (*deo judice*) if not here? Yet throughout Job's speeches there are abundant illustrations of the workings of the συνείδησις and the λογισμοὶ. Again, in

the 'Si iniquitates observaveris, Domine, Domine quis sustenebit'? of David deprecating the παρατήρησις, or severe scrutiny, of God, we have another illustration of the same processes. On the other hand, if the κατηγορούντων be interpreted to hint offences *mortally* opposed to the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ, how can such offences,—say frequently committed and in more directions than one,—be possibly held compatible with the ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις? The natural and obvious construction to put upon these words is, as we have before said, that which interprets them *in sensu integro*. But what a strange description to present of a grievous transgressor of God's Law to speak of him as 'showing forth the work of the νόμος written in his heart.' And what a still stranger proceeding to confront the evil Jew with a life no better than his own, by way of convincing him that 'not the hearers but the doers of the νόμος are just before God'! Showing him this by holding up righteousness, without the νόμος, in the person of the Gentile!

In a word, if the *Argumentum Velatum* be understood and accepted, then there is nothing in the κατηγορεῖν of ver. 15 to shake it. "For although," says the Council of Trent, session VI, chap. xi., "during this mortal life men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at least light and daily sins which are also called venial, not therefore do they cease to be just. For that cry of the

just: 'Forgive us our trespasses' is both humble and true." Now the whole of this passage and the whole of the Pauline verse (ii. 15) is, we submit, neither more nor less than the simple and natural account of things as they *are*. And, as they are in themselves, so they are in the Day of Judgment.

Having thus brought to a close our discussion of these seven material points we may here conveniently subjoin a parting observation respecting the *Argumentum Velatum* with which they are connected. It is in the past exegetical history of the Passage of the four γὰρ that our explanation will find one of its most powerful recommendations. A recommendation sufficient of itself to warrant good hopes of its ultimate general acceptance. The solution which makes the γὰρ of ver. 14, and the verse itself sustain the double proposition of the text of ver. 13,—giving the 'how' and the 'why' of that double proposition on the basis of the *Argumentum Velatum*, (the νόμος *means* δικαιοσύνη, the δικαιοσύνη *draws* the νόμος),—this solution entirely does away with the perpetual duel which is going on between the two principal rival interpretations,—a duel maintained through exegetical considerations which are solid and just on either side. Of these rival interpretations the more widely approved one adopts the natural and obvious connexion which joins ver. 14 with ver. 13, and, whether by a

comprehension *under,* (Meyer, Fritzsche *al*),—or association *with,*—the ποιηταὶ νόμου (De Wette *al*), includes the Gentiles within the range of the proposition: οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται. The other, advocated by Calvin,* Alapide, Menochius, Tirinus, Suarez, Mehring, Franzelin, and others, refuses to include the Gentiles of ver. 14 within the range of the preceding proposition, ver. 13 B. and rejecting the natural, obvious and generally-received connexion makes ver. 14 ff. revert to the ὅσοι ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον, ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται of ver. 12, and employs it, through the conjured-up medium of an interposed objection, to sustain that proposition. With reason, now, do the framers of the *first* explanation object to the divorcing of ver. 14 from ver. 13 when their alliance is recommended and enforced by divers weighty considerations, not the least of which would be the suffrages of the great majority of expositors both ancient and modern. In fact they can plead that the exegete never lived who would not prefer to ally them if he saw the way to doing so,—who would not, at the first approach, suppose them to be argumentatively connected with each other. But this is not all. They object that not only is the natural and probable rejected but also that the strained and improbable is substituted. They

* Calvin himself, as also emphatically Meyer, allows (1) that the fulfilment of the νόμος, if it could be attained to, would be justice of 'life'; and (2) that the δικ. of ver. 13 if, in like manner, attainable, is the same. Calvin. *Institutes. The Law.* Meyer, Comm. Rom. iii. 20.

object that the reasoning which would make ver. 14 sustain the far-fetched ver. 12A. is a reasoning replete with fallacy,—a result indeed only to be looked for if the Apostle never designed the one to support the other. In a word, it is objected that the two verses (14 and 12A.) do not fit, were never meant to fit, and cannot be made to fit, each other in the way proposed. This and more than this the greater number of expositors perpetually object to the construction of the less. On the other hand, with at least equal reason do the latter resolutely object to the intrusion of the Gentiles into ver. 13 in order to find employment for ver. 14. Any one, it is urged, who carefully considers the three propositions (1) 12B. (2) 13A. (3) 13B. and grasps and weighs their argument will be convinced that all the three are governed by the *νόμος* and *turn* upon the *νόμος*, and that ver. 13 is adduced to make good the *διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται* as affirmed of the *ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον*, in contrast to the *ἀνόμως ἀπολοῦνται* as affirmed of the *ὅσοι ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον* : that they deal with the nature, end and use of the *νόμος* as contrasted with any other economy : that they thus relate solely to the *ἔννομοι*, (that is the Jews), and cannot therefore be referred any one of them to the Gentiles ;—so as to enable the commentator to use ver. 14 to make good a reference and an inclusion which is only his own *subjective* construction. These objectors one and all affirm and insist in the words

of Franzelin: "Sermonem esse unice de Judæis qui acceperunt Legem (*τὸν νόμον*)."

Now the *Argumentum Velatum*,—developing as it does and completing Jowett's original construction,—does away with the objections of either party, presents no fresh ones of its own, (for the *φύσει* well admits of (lexically) two meanings and of (grammatically) two adjustments), and at the same time opens up the strong profound and skilful reasoning of the Apostle against the Judaiser, *h.e.* against those who would oppose the spurious *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* to his sole *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*.

Note.—The close of this Section affords us an opportunity of remarking that, according to St. Paul, *Christ himself* is the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* in us (Gal. ii. 20), and we are the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* in him (2 Cor. v. 21)—whether as to *ζωὴ* or as to *δικαιοσύνη*. We are in him and he in us, and this through, in and with the *πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης*. So that the whole gift and possession is purely intrinsic; whether we view that whole under the aspect (1) of the *Χριστὸς*, or (2) of the *πνεῦμα* Χρ., or (3) of the *δικ. θεοῦ*, or (4) of the *δικαιοσύνη* (*absol.*). The whole, moreover, resolves itself, ultimately and *ethically*, into habitual and actual Justice or Righteousness. Lastly in the Justification of the adult, (whether *before* or *after* the reception of the *δικ. θεοῦ*), the *πίστις* is by no means *ζωοποιοῦσα* but rather *ἐνεργουμένη*, by virtue of the *πνεῦμα Χρ. ζωοποιοῦν*, which is its Source and Giver (comp. Gal. ii. 20).

SECTION II.

CHAPTER VI.

The Eight Chapters. Romans i. ii. iii. iv.; Galatians ii. iii. iv. v.

The bold outlines, and something more, of Justification by Faith are plainly and solidly given by St. Paul in the eight direct chapters on Justification in the two Epistles; to wit, the first four of Romans and the central four of Galatians. To these we may add the close of Romans ix. and the opening of x.; besides a few passages here and there of less importance. It surely cannot be that the scientific knowledge and critical skill of all our present non-Catholic exegetes, if concentrated upon these eight chapters, &c. should be ultimately baffled in their endeavours to find in them the firm foundation of results in which all, or nearly all, shall be agreed. The justice and accuracy of the Apostle's reasoning, inspired as it is with the full and clear light behind it which possessed his mind,—the admirable fitness of the Hellenic Greek as a medium and instrument of argument and demonstration,

—these are helps which will surely meet half way, and more than half way, the endeavour to ascertain the Apostle's real mind and meaning, on the part of such as appreciate and know how to use them. Of those that is who, once for all, cast away the artificial, subjective, and (from a fallible basis) *dogmatic* method for the natural, objective, and scientific method of exegesis; and, looking neither to the right nor to the left, exhaustively and keenly collect and resolve the logical, lexical, and grammatical conditions of the Pauline text;—working in the Greek and through the Greek alone. In letters of gold should those admirable words of Alexander Knox be inscribed above the Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians: "It would be easy to show that no writer in the world has attended more to accuracy of composition or *has laid greater stress on its effect.*"*

We proceed to give a rough and brief explanation of the eight chapters, &c.; with an eye especially to the three words, δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοῦν taken in connexion with one another or with the πίστις I. X. and the νόμος.

Romans i. 16. The Apostle commences by saying that he is not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ: *for* (γὰρ) it is the power of God unto Salvation to every one who believes,—both Jew and Gentile. By this introduction of the πίστις at the outset and on the very threshold of his

* Knox's Remains: Letter on Justification.

address St. Paul clearly intimates that it is of adults that he both is speaking and is about to speak. It is to adults, and not to infants, that the Gospel of Christ is preached. '*For*,' he continues, 'in it (the Gospel) the Justice of God is revealed from faith to faith,'* *h.e.* is shown to become the possession of a man through (his) faith, and when possessed by the infusion of the *πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης* is more and more developed and sustained by that *πίστις* which the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* brings along with it until it becomes that mystic union with Christ which the Apostle, speaking of himself, presents in ver. 20 of chap. ii. of Galatians (*ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*). The *πνεῦμα* holding the *πίστις* and not (*opp.* Baur and Pfleiderer) the *πίστις* the *πνεῦμα*.

Now, with regard to this *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, is it not manifestly the more sound and reasonable exegesis to give to the word *δικ.*, in this the first instance of its occurrence, that natural and proper meaning of intrinsic justice which, (apart from the *πίστις* and setting for the moment *that* connexion aside), it confessedly bears everywhere else, both in the Old and New Testaments, in the Septuagint and the Greek Testament, when found, (as it almost always is found), in a *personal* and *ethical* connexion? Being, on the one hand, perpetually associated with *ἀγαθωσύνη, ὁσιότης, χρηστότης*, and, on the other hand opposed to *ἀσέβεια, ἀδικία, πονηρία*. Is it not more

* Comp. Pfleiderer, Paulinism, 'Justification', p. 175.

scientific to give the term, when we first meet with it, its obvious and usual meaning, and *wait to see* whether that construction is confirmed or condemned in a subsequent page, than to determine it off-hand with a quite new meaning, merely because the Apostle derives our possession of it from the πίστις—that is through a process which has the πίστις as its commencement? We shall not have to wait long. Twenty-seven verses hence we shall meet with it again, not *patent* in the text, as here (ver. 17), but *latent* in the argument of the text and under the form of the δικ. παρὰ θεῷ (ii. 13.) We shall meet with it moreover in such connexion with the νόμος as to leave us in no doubt whatever as to its intrinsic import. Further, in order to explain this δικαιοσύνη, St. Paul subjoins (what is to us) the great Evangelic Aphorism: ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. Here we would apply the same considerations to the δίκαιος as to the δικαιοσύνη which it repeats,—to the adjective as to the substantive. And the fact that these considerations naturally recur multiplies their cogency. Why should not the δίκαιος of the Evangelic Aphorism mean that which it is found to mean every where else in Scripture, when occurring in a personal and ethical connexion? Literally every where else: for it is only in the Evangelic Aphorism, occurring once in Romans and once in Galatians (iii. 11, the solitary instance of the word in that Epistle), that the extrinsic import is claimed for it. In all other places all

commentators, (or, say, nearly all), give the δίκαιος its natural, usual, and proper meaning, (yes, even in Rom. ver. 19),—recognizing its intrinsic import as objectively as they recognize the intrinsic import of the ἀγαθός, the ἀσεβὴς, and the ἄδικος. So that both the δίκαιος and the δικαιοσύνη signify under different forms and aspects the same thing; to wit, habitual and actual conformity of the soul of man with the Law of God, which is a manifestation of the Will of God, which Will proceeds from the nature and justice of God. Of this conformity God is the judge. When the soul has it, the person is δίκαιος παρὰ θεῳ;—Deo judice. The judgment is of two things, the intrinsic and objective state of the person on the one hand and, (in the case of the ἔννομος), the standard of the νόμος on the other. If the former *agree* with the latter according to the divine judgment, then the person is intrinsically and objectively δίκαιος παρὰ θεῳ *h.e.* ethically 'right' or 'even' in respect of the Law. There are therefore *two* standards (1) the νόμος and (2) the Judicium Dei. And the result of the application of the first to the person is determined by the application of the second.

In passing, we submit that the meaning of this much-discussed aphorism (ὁ δικ. ἐκ πιστ. ζησ.) which is, as it were the 'text' of the Apostolic discourse is—if we substitute *thing* for *person*—as follows. 'The justice in and through which a man lives to God, and lives for

ever, springs from faith,—is ἐκ πίστεως. Thus the ἐκ πίστεως is not combined with the δίκαιος but forms the predicate of the aphorism. The ζήσεται seems connected with both subject and predicate ἡ δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς—ἐκ πίστεως (sub. ἐστιν). 'The Justice of Life is—of Faith.' This, thrown into a personal form, would run: ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

Now all this,—from the δύναμος γὰρ to the ζήσεται, is sustained by ver. 18. '*For*,' continues the Apostle 'the anger of God is shown forth from heaven upon all impiety and iniquity of the men who hold down the truth in iniquity.' All depends here on the relation between God and sin. That relation is one of infinite opposition. But for that relation what would become of the εὐαγγέλιον or the δύναμις εἰς σωτηρίαν or the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ or the πίστις or the ζωὴ αἰώνιος. This relation supports a main argument of chap. ii. Moreover, though the ἀποκαλύπτεται ὀργὴ θεοῦ of ver. 18 *may* be designedly antithetical to the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἀποκαλύπτεται of the preceding verse, yet still the ὀργὴ is not to be set against the δικαιοσύνη but against the σωτηρία; but the δικ. against the ἀσέβεια and the ἀδικία. The relation to God intimated by the σωτηρία and the ζήσεται is one of εἰρήνη, (chap. v. 1), φιλία, υἱότης, ἔπαινος, τιμὴ, δόξα, and ζωὴ and is set against the ὀργὴ θεοῦ which means alienation, vengeance, destruction and irremediable woe.* Here again is a fresh proof of the import of the

* We have here three oppositions, (1) the δίκαιος and the ἀδικία;

words δικαιοσύνη and δίκαιος. They are opposite to ἀσέβεια and ἀδικία both lexically and argumentatively. The Gospel is the power of God to salvation; for in it is revealed the justice of God,—the justice of God from faith to faith; as it is written: 'The just from faith shall live.' *For* the impiety and iniquity of faithless man draws down the anger and curse of God. Is not St. Paul, through his εὐαγγέλιον, clearly introducing the acquisition of a δικαιοσύνη which shall cast out the ἀσέβεια and the ἀδικία and substituting a relation of εἰρήνη and ζωὴ for one of ὀργὴ and ἀπολεία? Again, who ever doubted that ἀσέβεια and ἀδικία are words of intrinsic import? And why should there be entertained any doubt as to the equally intrinsic meaning of δικαιοσύνη and δίκαιος words repeatedly opposed to these in the LXX, and the N. T. and even within the narrow bounds of these opening chapters? As to the πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν, it seems exegetically better to include both Jew and Gentile within the range of the πᾶσαν and to interpret the Apostle as parting off to the latter at ver. 20. (See Vaughan.)

Lastly it is to be observed that it is *not* of the just that he is speaking in the ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων.* Not of those who having

(2) the ζήσεται and the ὀργὴ; (3) the πίστις and the τὴν ἀλήθειαν κατεχόντων.

* There are those mentioned again and again in Chap. ii. who never can, by any satisfactory process of exegesis, be placed in the category of chap. i. 18. '*Naturam expellas*,' &c.

received the justice of God in infancy have retained, as Abel, Joseph, Samuel might have done, that justice into the adult or moral state and so been just with God in childhood, youth, manhood, age, and death. Not of the righteous but of the unrighteous is he here speaking. Therefore not of all men. For (1) he is speaking of adults, (2) of adults to whom the δικ. θεοῦ which he is enforcing has not arrived. And the very force of the πᾶς throughout these chapters is to the effect that *he*, *e.g.* the adult Jew, who is ἄδικος and therefore, in spite of his νόμος, ἁμαρτωλὸς, needs to be rendered δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ by the divine justification through faith no less than the Gentile needs it. προῃτιασάμεθα γὰρ (all through the preceding chapters) Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι. There can be no inclusion here either (1) of the δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ of our passage, for that δικ. excludes the ἥμαρτον, as the reasoning demonstrates, or (2) of those who had been just from early childhood and unintermittently onward.

The Apostle proceeds to unfold the iniquity of the unjustified Gentile, vv. 20-32 : an iniquity under which they could not defend themselves on the plea of *darkness;* for God had made manifestations to them. These were not, originally, ignorant of the truth of God or the will of God, but were men enlightened,—(1) γνόντες τὸν θεὸν ver. 19, (2) τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγνόντες ver. 32.

He then turns to the Jew: he is going ultimately to place the impious and evil Jew,—the Jew devoid of the δικ. θεοῦ, (which he is enforcing), in the dreadful category of ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν along with the wicked Gentile in iii. 9. But in order to this, turning to him he first places him with the Gentile (or Greek) in the category of ἄδικος ἀσεβὴς and τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχων. He urges on him, chap. ii. 1 ff, that he also as being evil, is like the Gentile 'without defence' (ἀναπολόγητος) against the ὀργὴ θεοῦ. For first, *he*, no less than the *other*, is an evil doer. Secondly the day of final Retribution, which is for him as well as for 'the other', will arrive at last. He will not escape: for in that day God, by an Act of judicial retribution (*h.e.* a recompense of *bonum propter bonum*,—*malum propter malum*) will render back to every man according to his works—*secundum opera* because *propter opera*.* Thirdly he is exposed without defence to the divine wrath, because,—and here he approaches the stronghold of the Judaiser,—this judicial retribution will be conducted to its end with strict impartiality, an impartiality absolutely indispensible to the δικαιοκρισία θεοῦ, and will turn strictly on the *presence* or the *absence* of intrinsic justice. No προσωπολημψία will enter in with the νόμος, (as the Jew may fondly persuade himself), to disturb the uniformity of the divine act. The οὐ γὰρ ἐστι προσωπολημψία introduces the

* *Opp.* Meyer and Calovius. Comm. Rom. ii. 6.

νόμος and is *intended* to introduce it. The question as to the bearing of the νόμος on the δικαιοσύνη and of the δικαιοσύνη on the νόμος must now be fully settled, settled once for all, or the Judaiser will never be reduced and will continue to block the Apostle's path. 'Evil,' he says in effect, 'shall bring down evil at the day of judgment and good good.' '*For*,—mark here the first of the four γὰρ,—there is no respect of persons with God.' *For all* who are found devoid of intrinsic justice at death, will in the day of judgment perish,—the ἄνομοι *without* the application of the νόμος and the ἔννομοι, (the Jews), *through* the application of the νόμος. *Their* fate turns not on the possession and profession of the νόμος but upon their intrinsic state. All devoid of righteousness, (in that day,) that is all sinners, will perish, Jew as well as Gentile, as certainly as God will render to every man according to his works,—as surely as God is God.

There is nothing 'hypothetical' in the Apostle's reasoning; all is pure matter of fact. The end turns neither on the presence nor on the absence of the νόμος but solely on intrinsic righteousness,—that intrinsic justice which comes 'by' Faith and not 'by' the Law. That is the point. St. Paul insists on that justice. He *will* have it. No other so-called δικαιοσύνη will avail. That alone will avail for salvation. All else is counterfeit. 'As many as have sinned in the νόμος shall be judged by the νόμος and be condemned and perish.' Why so?

Because the *νόμος* itself *bears witness* to this very *δικαιοσύνη*. It exhibits the *δικ. ζωῆς* and maintains it to be such. For, with the *ἔννομος* the fulfilment of the Law, which is legal righteousness, is the justice of life,—in which a man shall be 'rendered just' (*δικαιωθήσεται*) with God here and saved hereafter. *For*, when the Gentiles, who by 'economy' (*φύσει*) *have* no *νόμος*, fulfil the things of the *νόμος*, they *are* themselves the *νόμος*, exhibiting and maintaining as they do the *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς*.

The possession of this is the all-in-all. He who has the shell without the kernel, he, even though he have it, has nothing to the purpose. He who has the kernel *is himself* the shell. For, if you look to the nature and end of things, what, taken by itself alone, is the possession of the *νόμος* after all? Nothing; nay worse than nothing. It is for the unrighteous the sword of the executioner and not, by any means, the shield of the culprit. By this argument of the four *γὰρ* does the Apostle dislodge the Judaiser and explode the false justice of the *νόμος* and clear the way for the subsequent establishment of the true justice,—'the Justice of God'. He does it by bearing down upon him with (1) Sin, (2) Judgment, (3) the Mosaic aphorism and (4) the reciprocal relations of Justice and the *νόμος*. And let us mark, in passing, what emerges from this Pauline argument with respect to the Intrinsic and Extrinsic systems

of Justice and Justification. We see that Intrinsic justice of life, (for the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ is the δικ. ζωῆς), is as much an objective fact as the νόμος itself,—as much 'a matter of fact' as the Law of Moses or the judgment day. But, if this be so, what becomes of the δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως of Luther and the Reformation,—the Justitia Fidei of Melancthon? Is it not a perfectly gratuitous invention? What is the use of contriving a δικαιοσύνη outside of or *without* the soul when the δικ. which St. Paul requires and insists upon is *within* the soul? To what purpose does the Apostle drive the Judaisers out of the front door, if the Reformers, with a still worse proposition, come in at the back? If intrinsic righteousness, and that alone, is the true gold of that Gospel which St. Paul preaches, is the counterfeit coin of the Judaiser, stamped with νόμος on the one side and περιτομὴ on the other, a worse counterfeit than Luther's coin which is stamped with πίστις on this side and I. X. on that? Both counterfeits alike supplant the Justice of God. That of the Judaiser, by the wretched ἔργα νόμου which only place him under a curse:—ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσί. That of the Reformers by an ascriptive righteousness,—or a state or relation of justice which is constituted by imputation,—which will only 'land' every soul of man in the fires of hell! For so surely as men die unjustified with intrinsic justice so surely will they perish eternally. That is the Apostle's

argument against the Judaiser founded upon what will certainly take place at the day of final retribution: and it is equally his argument against Luther and the Extrinsicists.

In connexion with the foregoing considerations we would point out that chap. ii., and especially the passage of the four *γὰρ*, form part of one long chain of reasoning which connects the *ὁ δὲ δικ. ἐκ πίστ. ζήσ.* of i. 17, with the *πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι* and the *πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον* of chap. iii. 9, 23. The Apostle wants the *ἥμαρτον* and the *δικαιοσύνη* of this passage very particularly for the purpose of his whole argument. When engaged with them in chap. ii. he is *looking forward* to the *ἥμαρτον* and the *δικαιοσύνη* of chap. iii. 9, 23. And, when he has at length arrived at these, he is *looking back* to the argument of the *νόμος* and the *ἥμαρτον* and the *δίκαιος* which had been prepared in the middle of chap. ii. For by means of this he has fixed the evil Jew under the *ἥμαρτον** in spite of his Law, and by the very means of his Law. This apprehension of the aim and drift of the Pauline reasoning through these chapters entirely does away with the explanations of Baur, Pfleiderer, Farrar and others as to the *character* of the second chapter. For in fact *by it* the Apostle connects

* 'Υφ' *ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι* is, it must be observed, the predicament of those who are 'under' the *ἁμαρτία*. It therefore *includes* the actual *ἥμαρτον*. It is the condition of those who are devoid of the *δικ. θεοῦ*; *i.e.* the *πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης*.

the Evangelic aphorism of chap. i. with the *πάντες ἥμαρτον, δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι* of chap. iii.

Before proceeding to the second half of this chapter we will add the following remarks on ver. 13. Here we find, incidentally established, the first of what we have before called the four *principia* of the Apostle. In this verse and its content is to be found the Pauline *foundation* of Justification,—as the first stage of his unfolding and enforcing the Evangelic aphorism *ὁ δικ. ἐκ πίστ. ζήσ.* The *δικαιωθήσονται* is *not* to be referred to the judgment day but belongs to this life; as also do the other forms of the *δικαιοῦν* which occur in the following chapters. It is in effect the same as the preceding *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* which it substantially reproduces and for which it is substituted only for linguistic reasons. And it means shall *be,* or shall *become* or shall be *rendered,* actually just *in* the *ποίησις νόμου.* The 'future' is intended to intimate a fixed perpetual law or principle. (See Winer, N. T. Grammar, and Ellicott, Com. Gal. ii. 16.) Neither the adjective nor the verb signify 'are' or 'shall be accounted just'; but both point to the preceding *ἥμαρτον,* their true and precise opposite. Comp. iii. 9 and 10, 23 and 24; v. 19. And, like the *ἥμαρτον,* they both belong to the sphere of this life; though *argumentatively* they are both to be carried onward to the future judgment as the *ἥμαρτον* is. The two words, we repeat, point to the *ἥμαρτον.* For, if the *ἀκρόασις νόμου*

were δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ, what would become of the ἥμαρτον of ver. 13 and the proposition to which it belongs?

Again, this fulfilment of the νόμος is, (with the ἔννομοι), the consummation the final form of Intrinsic Justice. The πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης and the Habit must precede and underlie. But since this 'final' or actual justice is justice with God and receives, as is evident it will, the reward of eternal life,—for the δικ. παρὰ θεῷ and the δικ. ζωῆς are one and the same (Gal. iii. 11),—then must this intrinsic justice (*taken in one view*, the implicit with the explicit,) be the very δικ. θεοῦ which the Apostle has set forth from the beginning and is establishing in these opening chapters. Then must the δικαίωσις of iv. 25, and the δικαίωσις ζωῆς of v. 19, be intrinsic justification and nothing besides. But this δικαίωσις is simply Justification by Faith: the acquisition of the δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ πίστεως. Such is the Pauline *foundation* and the first of the four 'principia'.

With ver. 17 the Apostle continues his argument with the evil and unjustified Jew, (as the δὲ in εἰδὲ σὺ shows), and addresses him openly and not, as before, in a veiled manner, ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων, ii. 1. This unveiled attack upon the Judaiser, in which he presses home, through ten vehement verses, the argument of the preceding passage: 'Lex non trahit justitiam sed justitia legem,'—is made to spring from a supposition of fact,—

h.e. from the presentation of fact in the form of supposition. 'But if thou bearest, *as thou dost bear*, the honoured name of Ἰουδαῖος and makest,—as thou dost make,—thy boast in the νόμος, &c. *Not:* 'if you whom I have been addressing happen to be a Jew,' &c. Ver. 17 presents a steady continuation of the Apostle's personal address and argument, not the abrupt and dramatic turning of his adversary *into* a Jew. After assailing him thus for some lines he then,—in order to sustain both the ἀτιμάζεις and the βλασφημεῖται, (for both, though the latter makes good the former, merge in one object), and to remove the objection of the circumcision which, if valid, would nullify both, says to him: περιτομὴ μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ ἐὰν νόμον πράσσῃς. '*For* circumcision indeed advantageth if thou keep the νόμος. But thou transgressest the νόμος, and therefore this plea availeth thee nothing. So that what I say stands good. Thou art a source of dishonour *to* God and of blasphemy *against* him.' "*Stat sententia;* in spite of thy circumcision." (Meyer.)

Now the ἐὰν here most certainly introduces what is objectively possible as Meyer, Fritzsche, De Wette, Winer, and others lay down. The fulfilment of the νόμος is here regarded to be as truly, (if not as easily), within the reach of every individual Jew as to be a παραβάτης νόμου. So in like manner the next ἐὰν and the next ver. 26. This last ἐὰν quite seems to gather up,

—logically with the *οὖν*,—not merely the preceding nine verses, but the three preceding *these*, of which vv. 26 ff. present a highly argumentative application. These three verses therefore, (14, 15, 16), are no digression, but the prepared basis for an argument and an instruction which end only with the chapter.

Ἐὰν *νόμου πράσσῃς*, we repeat, most certainly attests the possibility of keeping the *νόμος* in the case of every Jew. For if not, then the Gentile *without* circumcision would be able to attain a point which the Jew *with* circumcision was *not* able to attain. See vv. 26, 27. But how could that be? That the Gentile *could* attain that point is plain both from the evident reflexion here of vv. 14, 15, (see Vaughan, Meyer, *al.*), and also from the *κρινεῖ σὲ*. Where would be the moral and rhetorical force of the *κρινεῖ σὲ*, if the Gentile were here merely 'hypothetical'? A hypothetical Gentile would make the Apostle's argument simply ridiculous. The *τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα* set against the *παραβάτην νόμου* confirm the point still more; and still more again the closing verses of the chapter which no one ever yet pretended to be hypothetical in character. Very strongly and forcibly do these closing verses (28, 29), connected as they are by the *γὰρ* with those which precede them, evince the point that all throughout deals with *reality*. But the *πράσσῃς* being possible, what difference is there, we ask, between it and the *ποιεῖν* of ver. 13? There is none. And so of the

other expressions vv. 25, 26. Where, then, is extrinsic righteousness? Where is Luther's *δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ πίστεως*? *Ἐξεκλείσθη*. It has been *shut out*. By what law? By the law of works? No; but by the law of Faith,—*ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*. That true intrinsic justification by which alone man lives to God and lives for ever, springs from Faith—has, in the case of adults, its beginning, its root and foundation in Faith. What Faith? The Faith of Jesus Christ. It comes not through the Law. For if justice be through the Law, then Christ died in vain. Gal. ii. 21. For justice could never come by the Law, seeing that the Law given was never designed to give life (*ζωοποιῆσαι*, Gal. iii. 21).

In leaving this great and fundamental chapter on the Justice of life, we insist that the writer of it never so much as 'dreamed' of the impossibility of fulfilling the *νόμος*,*—up to the point of the *δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ* and the *ζήσεται*: never so much as once contemplated that 'non-existence of true intrinsic righteousness' on which the extrinsic and subjective system of justification turns; but, on the contrary, meant by justice and justification 'of life' a purely intrinsic thing, and was, to use Luther's *own word*, a 'Justiciary' in the fullest sense, and in the highest degree. The *πίστις* and the *δικαιοσύνη πίστεως*

* In Acts xv. 10, St. Peter means the same with regard to the *νόμος* that Christ means Matt. xxxiii. 4. The *νόμος* when with additions was *δυσβάστακτος*. Our Lord says: *hard to keep*; St. Peter, *grievously* hard.

of the Reformation never even entered into his head. Nay, more,—and most confidently do we say it,—the impossibility of duly keeping the *νόμος* before God never entered into the head of any Jew from Moses to St. Paul. Such a notion is forbidden by the language itself of the Mosaic Law throughout the legal Books of the O. T., where, according to all appearance, the 'blessings' are as truly attainable as the 'cursings'. This is the inference which is naturally derived alike from the last words of David to Solomon and from the last words of St. Stephen to the evil Jews,—and to St. Paul himself. "Who have received the Law by the disposition of angels and *have not kept it.*" If those who heard these words *could not* duly keep the Law according to the mind of the Law, what meant that flourish—"by the disposition of angels"? He is most evidently reproaching them for not having done that which they could have done and which they ought to have done,—nay which they were bound to do. Nor, lastly, did the notion or principle of the impossibility of keeping the commandments of God, whether *ὑπὸ νόμον* or *χωρὶς νόμου*, nor of the non-existence of true intrinsic justice, ever enter into the mind of a single Doctor, Divine or Commentator from Clement the cotemporary and friend of St. Paul to Cajetan the cotemporary and acquaintance of Luther. All,—be it Origen in the 3rd, or Arius and Athanasius, or St. Ambrose and St. Jerome and St. Chrysostom in the

4th, or Pelagius and St. Augustine in the 5th, or Photius in the 9th, or Wycliffe in the 14th*—all understood by the Pauline δικαιοσύνη δίκαιος, an intrinsic justice, and understood δικαιοῦν to mean 'to render just' (the word 'just' in the verb holding its proper and invariable meaning), and would, one and all, have referred to our passage and to the latter half of chap. ii. as supplying decisive evidence on the point.†

Chapter iii. Upon the opening verses of Chapter iii. 1-8, we will merely observe (1) that they are somewhat digressory; (2) that the δικαιωθῇς occurs in a quotation from the LXX. (Ps. 50), and is therefore Davidical, and not the δικαιοῦν of the Pauline argument and connexion; and (3) that it means,—if we follow the original Hebrew where the word is in the *Kal*;—'That thou mayest *be just* in thy words and be just (or right and so prevail) when thou judgest.' *Ut justus sis in sermonibus tuis et insons sis cum judicas.*‡ What then does the δικαιωθῇς import, if it properly represents the Hebrew original? It would mean 'That thou mayest be rendered just in thy words':—'That thou mayest be *made out* just.' How rendered or made out just? Rendered *objectively*, (*h.e.* apparently or evidently), just. 'That the justice of thy

* See Neander's statement of Wycliffe's Intrinsicism in his Church History, 14th Century.

† See Morison's valuable dissertation on the δικαιοῦν (praised by Meyer), Monogram, Rom. iii. 20.

‡ See Meyer's and Fritzsche's Commentaries on this verse, Rom. iii. 4.

words may be made appear.' Here we have, not the intrinsic justice of God, *but* the *objectivity*, to men's judicial eye, of that intrinsic righteousness,—*produced* by David's guilt. The meaning of the word is not: That thou mayest be *attested* or *accounted* just (Meyer, *al.*) but in the Hebrew;—'that thou mayest be *objectively* just before man in thy words and *objectively* right when thou judgest'. And in the Greek: 'that thou mayest be rendered objectively just (mayest 'appear just' with a sense, thrown in, of *attainment*) in thy words,' &c. The *transit* of thought here is from the party rendered just to the judgment of the party judging; *not* from the judgment to the party judged. The thing indicated is not the mental action of the judge, but the attained state of the party judged as confronting the eye of the judge. 'That thou mayest be *made-manifest* just.' The predicate δίκαιος has two distinct forces. It (1) denotes *intrinsic* justice and (2) it denotes *objective* justice. It expresses both what *is* and what *appears*. It signifies both intrinsically just and objectively just. Corresponding to these two forces, the verb δικαιοῦν has two distinct meanings, which spring from the common root,—'to render δίκαιος'. The first of these is to render *intrinsically* just (to 'make' just as we usually say): The second to render *objectively* just—*h.e.* to *manifest* just or to 'make out' just. One way, but by no means the only way of manifesting, or being manifested,—of making out or being made out,—

just is by judicial 'finding',—by judicial attestation or declaration. This, together with 'demonstration' by an advocate, or otherwise, is 'forensic' justification where corresponding, intrinsic, antecedent justice in the person justified is necessarily supposed. Without such intrinsic justice, forensic or judicial justification cannot at all take place; that is cannot take place in accordance with the profession or rather the *logic* of the act and the term. To 'justify' judicially is to *find just*. It is not barely to 'account' 'just,' but 'to account (a man) what *he is*, namely, just'—or 'to account and declare him just *because* he is so'. The act and the term according to the *logic* of the one and the other is purely *manifestatory*. To account and declare the impious just is not a judicial act, not an act which issues from a court of *justice* (and to such an act the term 'forensic' only applies), but it is an act issuing from a court of *grace*. It is a supreme act of power and good will, a sovereign *bene placitum*. The *logic* of it essentially differs from that of the forensic or judicial act. And with the meaning of the act goes the meaning of the term. Now the system of extrinsic justification, having placed the justice of God outside man, —*without* instead of *within* the soul, has been driven to usurp the Scriptural term δικαιοῦν to denote an act which it never anywhere denotes from the first time it occurs in the LXX. (Genesis), to the last time it appears in the N.T. (Revelation). It has been usurped to express an act of

imputation,—of gracious imputation. What has the forensic or judicial act to do with imputation? The judicial act *manifests*. And the character of the justified person consists in, at once, and arises out of that act of manifestation. Every single instance therefore, which Extrinsicists have brought forward from the Old and New Testaments, (from the Hebrew and from the Greek), in corroboration of the meaning they put upon the Pauline δικαιοῦν and δικαιοῦσθαι is in fact so much evidence, so much strong argument *against* that meaning. They would have their meaning to be the *normal* meaning. Now it is most abnormal and indeed worse than abnormal. It reflects an act essentially opposed to the forensic act. The character of the forensic act is altogether 'objective,' *h.e.* is governed and determined by the objective fact. Whereas the character of the act in the extrinsic system of Justification is altogether 'subjective'; *h.e.* is governed and determined by the dispositions of the Justifier. According to the extrinsic system of reconciliation God chooses to regard his divine Son, (whom he knows to be perfectly innocent and just), as 'wrapped'—Luther would say—'wrapped in our iniquities': man, on the other hand, whom he knows to be guilty, he chooses to regard as 'clothed' in his Son's justice. Now what can be more intensely subjective than this sort of judgment,—if 'judgment' it can indeed be called? What, (looking from the Judgment seat), more completely, *ex-arbitrio*

either as regards the Redeemer or ourselves? And what then can be more remote from forensic justification, where the objective fact informs and determines the act (or decision) of the judge? What is the 'wrapped'; what is the 'clothed' but the purest subjective application of a character in direct contradiction to the objective fact in either case? And this, forsooth, is to be a 'judicial' judgment,—a 'forensic'* act! To return to the δικαιοῦν. It has in fact only two meanings, the primary and the secondary, (which is quite the more common one in the LXX). The former is to 'make' just, the latter to 'manifest' just. And these two meanings spring as two branches from one root. That root is 'to render δίκαιος': *reddere justum: reddere probum* (not *probatum* as H. A. Schott and Ellicott will have it). Both meanings are *factitive*, and both logically involve in their application the presence of intrinsic justice: the *antecedent* presence in the case of judicial justification, the *concomitant* presence in the case of intrinsic justification. Where the person to whom the δικαιοῦν is applied is impious (ἀσεβὴς) the verb means to 'make' him just,—to change his inherent unrighteousness for inherent righteousness. Where, however, as in the passage before us, (ὅπως ἂν κ.τ.λ. ver. 4), the being is just it means to 'make him out' just,—to render him objectively just,—to manifest his inherent justice. Never can the verb *cast* the adjective

* "Justification is simply imputative (*lediglich imputativ*), an *actus forensis*." Meyer, Rom. i. 17, *note*.

which 'informs' it. δίκαιος, in its proper signification, (which *ethically* is intrinsically just), is ever as truly in the δικαιοῦν as it is in its own acc: plural δίκαιους. And this is equally true of the two words in the Hebrew and in the Latin and also in the four great modern languages of Italian, German, French and English.

Moreover, to pass from a merely lexical to an exegetical consideration of the Pauline δικαιοῦν, we submit that in the eight chapters it must ever be taken in connexion with the δίκαιος and δικαιοσύνη. These three words advance together in the Pauline discourse. They act on each other and explain each other. To analyse and explain the verb as Calvin, Bull, Morison, Pfleiderer and so many others do, by taking it alone and matching it against κρινεῖν, or κατακρινεῖν, or ἐγκαλεῖν,* &c. is clearly weak collection. In order to determine its import we must compare and combine it with the cognate adjective and substantive. The Apostle employs and directs the three words to one point. They are *three forms of the same thing.* The adjective connotes that thing in its *personal* connexion, the substantive the thing in *itself*, the verb the thing under the form of *application.* Now if into that thing the νόμος enters,—as in the οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται we see that it does,—

* When opposed to these words the meaning would be—*not* 'when God accounts just who can condemn or call in question? *but*—when God renders just, who can condemn? (or) when God has *made just*, who can find fault, who can bring a charge, or condemn? St. Paul's δικαιοῦν (*re hominis*) is always 'intrinsic'. His *conception* of it is intrinsic.

can there be a doubt that it is intrinsic and therefore that the three words are of intrinsic import? If, in the matter of Justification, the *νόμος* enters in, Luther and the Reformers must depart,—taking away with them their 'righteousness by Faith.' For to Luther and the Reformers the *νόμος* represented, not merely the agency or 'means' or instrumentality of the Law, which St. Paul himself casts out (see Gal. ii., iii., iv., v.), but also, and quite principally, (for what had the Church in the sixteenth century to do with the Mosaic Law and Circumcision?), the moral and spiritual justice or righteousness which the Law both exhibited and enjoined. In a word *intrinsic* Justice; *justitia activa*, as Luther,—'obedience' as Vaughan and others would call it. If, however, the *νόμος* enters, as in this our passage, into divine justification, the *δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ πίστεως* of the Reformation vanishes.

Ver. 9. *τί οὖν; προεχόμεθα;** 'What then? Do we put forward ought in our defence?' or, according to Vaughan and others, 'are we preferred? Do we excel?' That is; 'Do we Jews?' 'By no means at all,' answers the Apostle for himself and for them. Apart from the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* we Jews can prefer no *δικ. παρα θεῷ* through our *νόμος*. 'By no means.' *For*† we have already judicially determined on conclusive grounds, (see

* For the language, &c., of the whole of this chapter, see Morison's 'Monograph.'

† *προῃτιασάμεθα γὰρ . . . πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι.*

chap. ii. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and *passim*), both Jews and Greeks to be *all alike*, Jews no less than Greeks, *under sin*. The especial and argumentative force of the πάντας is here, as afterwards, vv. 19, 20, directed against the Jew, as the προεχόμεθα shows. And the πάντας means, not all adults but, all adults who are ἄδικοι and ἀσεβεῖς because devoid of the δικ. θεοῦ. All these, *nemine excepto*, are ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν and are 'sinners.' St. Paul has shown and proved it in the former chapters. The unrighteous Jew is not δίκαιος by virtue of his νόμος. For Justice is the end and 'meaning' of the νόμος. And those who have not the Law and yet are just with God are themselves the Law. ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος. This truth, that all these are 'under sin,' St. Paul proceeds to enforce by twelve passages presented as citations from the νόμος taken in its widest sense, (comp. ver. 19): concerning which passages we will here say no more than that (1) that their import is, throughout, intrinsic and objective; that (2) they refer to the *moral* Law; and that (3) they present an 'universal' to which there exists not one single exception.* The Psalmist speaks of all who are in a certain category.† In what category? Devoid of that δικ. θεοῦ which St. Paul is preaching, and without which,—as the πν. δικαιοσύνης,—no man can either be habitually just or able to be actually

* *Opp.* Aquinas and Grotius.

† The Psalm (xiii.) begins: 'The fool hath said in his heart,' &c.

just before God. For it is only by receiving this gift in the *πνεῦμα* that man can receive *habitual*, and be enabled, to *actual*, righteousness. It is given,—*ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα.*—Rom. viii. 4.

Ver. 19. *Οἴδαμεν δὲ. κ.τ.λ.* 'Now we know that whatsoever things the *νόμος* says, it speaks to those who are in the *νόμος*; that *every* mouth, (the Jew's mouth as well as the Gentile's), may be stopped and all the world may become 'guilty towards' God.*' The *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος* indicates the same mass as the *πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι.* The *evil* mass of men,—not the *γενεὰ δικαία.*

Ver. 20. *Διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. κ.τ.λ.* 'Because that through the works of the *νόμος*, *h.e.* by such works, moral or ceremonial, as the men devoid of the *δικ. θεοῦ* can, of themselves through the teaching of the *νόμος*, accomplish no 'flesh',—be it the Jew (born under the *νόμος*) or be it the Gentile (proselyte to the *νόμος*),—the term *σὰρξ* here is expressively used to designate exactly the same objective mass as the *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος*, inasmuch as that mass is devoid of the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* and therefore of the *δικ. θεοῦ*,—shall be justified in his sight.' Not—'shall be *accounted* just before him'; but 'shall be *rendered* just before him'. The justice attainable through the *νόμος* is not 'justice before God'. Lying as the *δικ.* does between the *ἐξ ἔργων* and the *ἐνώπιον*

* *Ὑπόδικος τῷ θεῷ.* See Morison, Vaughan, Meyer. Rom. iii. 19.

αὐτοῦ,—and the transit of thought being so evidently from the *ἔργα* to the presence of God,—it is most unsuitable to construe the *δικ.* 'accounted righteous.' Observe here that as the *δικαιωθήσονται* of chap. ii. ver. 13 follows in the wake of the *δικ. παρὰ θεῷ*, *ib.*; so does the *δικαιωθήσεται* here follow in the wake of the *δίκαιος* of ver. 9.

Ver. 20. *διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας.* '*For* through the *νόμος* is the full knowledge of sin.' What is the argument here? It turns upon the fact of the *ἁμαρτία* which is set against the *δικαιωθήσεται.* It turns upon the presence of sin with those who are destitute of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ.*

If that mass which the Apostle calls *σὰρξ*, (because devoid of the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*), were to be justified *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* then it would not be true that through the *νόμος* came the *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας.* For there would in that case be no sin, but if no *ἁμαρτία* then, of course, no *ἐπίγνωσις.* Sin is there: even with those (of the mass contemplated) who are under the *νόμος.* Sin is there in every instance. Nay that *νόμος* itself in each case of the *ἔννομος* brings out the fact. *Therefore* no one is rendered just before God by the works of the *νόμος.* The *ἁμαρτία* proves the *οὐ δικ.*; the *οὐ δικ.* follows from the fact of the *ἁμαρτία.* For the Apostle,—concluding the argument, to say;—*διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας* is as good as to say that the *νόμος* does not produce

δικαιοσύνη. For, if it did in any instances, then, in those cases, there would be no ἁμαρτία. What then are the ἔργα νόμου? Are they the fulfilment of the νόμος merely hypothetically presented, because in fact unattainable? Impossible; because the fulfillers of the νόμος are rendered just in their fulfilment and the ἥμαρτον is cast out, ii. 13. The Gentiles who have received no νόμος are just and the ἥμαρτον is cast out, ver. 14. But if the ἔργα νόμου are not presented hypothetically they must be presented actually. They must necessarily mean the *fruits* of the νόμος. Such works as a man devoid of the δικ. θεοῦ and *of his own fund alone* can yield under the δύναμις and ἐνδείξις of the νόμος. There is nothing else left. These works are in the opposite scale to the πίστις I. X. and the ποίησις νόμου.

The critic will observe that we see here for the first time the νόμος clearly put forward, under the διὰ, as the 'means' or the 'agent' or the 'instrument' of justice and justification. St. Paul places it under the same aspect in the famous verse, εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν. Gal. ii. 21. He presents it again under the same aspect in the verse εἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη νόμος ὁ δυνάμενος ζωοποιῆσαι ὄντως ἂν ἐκ νόμου ἦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη. iii. 21.

This was the Judaiser's view and use of the νόμος with regard to Justification. He looked to the νόμος for justice with God. He betook himself to it; he clung to

it, turning his back on the *πίστις* I. X. For he who turns his face to the *νόμος* turns his back on the *πίστις*, and he who turns his face to the *πίστις* turns his back on the *νόμος*. His *ζήτησις* was directed immediately to the *νόμος* alone, and aimed at a fulfilment of the Law through the Law itself. So it issued and resulted, not in the true *δικαιοσύνη*, but in the *ἔργα νόμου*, which were *no δικ. παρὰ θεῷ*. For the *νόμος* cannot of itself get itself fulfilled. In order to that fulfilment the *δικ. θεοῦ* is absolutely necessary. 'Israel,' says the Apostle, Rom. ix. 31, 'pursuing after the law of justice, to the law of justice did not attain. Why? because they sought it not of faith but as to come from the works of the Law. For they stumbled at that stumbling-stone'. And again: 'Being ignorant of the justice of God, (*h.e.* the justice which comes from God), and seeking to establish their own justice, (*τὴν ἰδιαν δικ.* that is, *not* intrinsic justice instead of extrinsic, *but* intrinsic justice of *their own* instead of intrinsic justice of which the (1) power and the presence (2) habitual and (3) actual were to come from God), they have not submitted themselves to the justice of God:' x. 3. This was 'Judaising:' clinging to the *νόμος* and making it the divinely-appointed 'means' of the *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς*. But this St. Paul will by no means allow. Against this he perpetually fights. Justification of life was before the *νόμος*, during the period of the *νόμος*, (among those who were not *ἔννομοι*), and was

after the *νόμος* was done away. Its scope and office were not *to justify*, but were something essentially different. To assign *that* as its scope and office was to make justification of life impossible. To assign *that* as its scope and office even along with the *πίστις* I. X., —that is to say, to assign that as its scope and office *at all*, let alone instituting it as the *sole* means of justification,—is shown in Galatians to be destructive both of Faith and Justification. What then was the great controversy between the Judaiser and the Apostle of the Gentiles? Was it between 'inherent' and 'imputative' justice, between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Justification: a *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* in the sense of Luther and the Reformation and a *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* in the same sense? No such thing! It was no contest between the Intrinsicist and the Extrinsicist, but between Intrinsicist and Intrinsicist, as to the means whereby to attain to intrinsic justice and so eternal life. That is to say, between the Intrinsicist who would *set up* the *νόμος*, —*εἰς δικαιοσύνην*; and the Intrinsicist who *pulled down* and cast aside the *νόμος* as such a means,—either as the sole means, or as a conjoint means to that end. The contest was Intrinsic Righteousness, *διὰ νόμου versus* Intrinsic Righteousness *διὰ πίστεως* I. X. To associate the great controversy of the sixteenth century,—the contest between the Reformers and the Church,—with that between the Judaisers and St. Paul, is to violate historical criticism and misrepresent historical relations.

Truly, no two antagonisms could more essentially differ from each other. In the Apostolic and Post-Apostolic contest the intrinsic conception of the δικαιοσύνη and the δικαίωσις ζωῆς was *common* to both the combatant parties. The battle was between Grace and the Law,—the Grace of God, through Faith of Christ, *and* the Law of Moses,—εἰς δικαιοσύνην. Neither Pharisee nor Ebionite ever conceived of any other than intrinsic justice, as the terms νόμος and ἔργα νόμου themselves plainly show. That the Apostle, on the other hand, contemplated any other than an intrinsic δικαιοσύνη and an intrinsic δικαίωσις the second chapter of Romans, scientifically investigated and compared with the preceding and following chapters, forbids us to conclude. His 'foundation' is the intrinsic nature of justice and justification. In fact the controversy between the Church and the Reformers never had a precursor. No such contest ever existed previous to the kindling of it by Luther. There is not a trace of it to be found during fifteen centuries. If there be any evidence of a similar contest previous to the Reformation, let it be produced. *It will never be produced.* For no one will be content to produce a few lines from St. Clement or the fragmentary epistle of a pseudo-Justin to Diognetus,* only to draw forth the exclamation, 'Is that all'? In what relation then does Luther *really* stand to St. Paul? In the relation of the Founder of Extrinsicism to the

* On this Fragment and the first Epistle of St. Clement, see Cotterill's *Peregrinus Proteus.* A degree of suspicion attaches to the Fragment.

greatest and most ardent Teacher, (save One), of Intrinsic Justification that the world has ever seen! Of this, however, we will speak somewhat more fully in a later page. Here we will only observe that the *true* historical relation between St. Paul and the Judaisers,—the antagonism in the first century between Intrinsicist and Intrinsicist,—has a most direct and important bearing on the views and conclusions of the 'Tübingen' critics, *e.g.* Baur, Schwegler, Hilgenfeld, Holsten, Renan, and Pfleiderer. These critics have, in the main, accepted Luther's exposition of the two Epistles in the matter of 'the righteousness by Faith,' and his system as the Pauline system of justification,—and have built upon them. Undoubtedly Wittemburg has paved the way to Tübingen. With these divines as with the Reformers,—as with Fritzsche, Meyer, De Wette, Tholuck, Morison, Ellicott, Vaughan, Lightfoot, &c.,—the non-existence of intrinsic justice, and allied to this, the impossibility of fulfilling the Law to the point of the ζήσεται and the δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ are a fixed, unquestioned foundation. But this basis is a false foundation. It is the ψεῦδος πρῶτον whether of the Reformation or of modern Evangelicalism. To it is owing the complete misconception which prevails of the historical-theological relations of St. Paul to the Judaisers and of the real question between them in the Apostolic age. A misconception which prevails, as with the Reformers and Evangelicals, so with the Rationalists of

our own time. When the Apostle used the Three Words in his Epistles, all men formed the same conception of their import. His hearers knew of no other *δίκαιος*, of no other *δικαιοσύνη* than the intrinsic. The verb *δικαιοῦσθαι* followed as a matter of course. He *intended* them to understand him in the way in which every one in chamber, or in catacomb, would be sure to understand him. He gives no explanation of them but throws them out to receive their usual acceptation,—not addressing men in unknown terms. Evangelicalism, on the other hand, whether at the epoch of the Reformation or now, in order to maintain its great controversy with the Church, 'drags'—so to speak—'the first century down into the sixteenth'. It is unhistorical and uncritical to do so. With the Reformers the great confronting object and obstacle was the Church: but with the Apostle of the Gentiles the *νόμος*,—the Mosaic Law which, misunderstood and misapplied in relation to Justification and Salvation, formed 'Judaism.' The weight and attraction of the *νόμος* presented the first great difficulty and danger to the infant Church and new-born Gospel of Christ. The Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline Epistles abundantly show this. For the Apostle of the Gentiles seems to have been the great champion of the Faith and Church of Christ during this its earliest trial. And what Judaism with the Law of Moses was to St. Paul that the Church was to the Reformers. Namely their chief

antagonist. The two contests, however, essentially differed from each other. And in the *second*, Luther, with his counterfeit Justification by Faith, occupies the place of the Judaisers, while the Church, with the true Justification by Faith, holds that of the Apostle.

Rom. iii. 21. At this point there may be said to be a sort of pause in the argument. For in ver. 20 St. Paul sets forth,—not this time incidentally but directly and expressly,—the *second* of the four 'principia' which occupy the opening chapters of the Epistle.

The first, as we have seen, is the *οἱ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ. . . . δικαιωθήσονται.* But now having, by means of the second chapter in general and the Passage of the four *γὰρ* in particular, forced the evil unregenerate Jew under the *ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι*, placing him in that category,—the category of *ἁμαρτωλὸς*,—along with the impious Gentile, despite his possession and profession of the *νόμος*, he forthwith dislodges him and removes him and, with him, his spurious *δικαιοσύνη διὰ νόμου*, (whether for Jew or Gentile),—from his path. *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ.* Justification does not come by the *νόμος*, nor, which is the same thing, by the *ἔργα νόμου*. The former, instead of being dependent on the latter, is wholly independent of it. And, so far from the *νόμος* and the *δικαιοσύνη* being inseparable, the fact is that no two things can be more distinct and separate. Why so? Because the *νόμος* is not *ζωοποιῶν*, and there-

fore is not the source or means of the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ. The Judaiser, as it were, 'tied up' the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς with the Law, both for himself and for the Gentiles. 'Except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses ye cannot be saved.' 'They must be circumcised and commanded to obey the Law of Moses.' (Acts xv. 1, 24.) So, in another way and from another point of view, Luther, on his part, 'ties up' intrinsic justice with the νόμος and sees the one in the other, and in the one sets aside the other, —in the matter of justification of life. In his Commentary on Galatians he is really aiming *not* at the Mosaic Law (for what had the Church in his age to do with that?) *but* at intrinsic righteousness, and this, (following quite the Apostle's method of proceeding), in order to *clear the way* for *his own* system of Extrinsic Justification. His 'Argumentum' as well as the Commentary itself plainly show this. But we may say of *him* with respect to this verse, διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου κ.τ.λ., what he himself says of St. Jerome about Gal. ii. 12:—that "he neither understood this place nor the whole Epistle besides." No. St. Paul certainly does set aside the νόμος in respect of Justification and Salvation,—and that both during the sway of the Law and after it was abrogated at the Death of Christ. But *not* intrinsic justice with it. So far from this being the case, the truth is that he sets the former aside (and condemns all seeking (ζήτησις) of justification through it whether by Jew or Gentile 'coming in') *for the sake of and*

in behalf of intrinsic justice. He sets it aside because it cannot produce but, if used as the Judaiser used it, can only prevent the attainment of that true intrinsic righteousness. The depth and intensity of the Apostle's determination to secure intrinsic justice in order to salvation,—the ardour of his efforts in its behalf, are exactly measured by the unremitting energy of his rejection and condemnation of the *νόμος* when urged as the means to that end. For, in exact proportion to our deep appreciation of the value of an 'end' will be our denunciation of a foisted-in 'mean' which will not merely jeopardise but destroy that end. "Behold I, Paul, tell you that if ye be circumcised Christ shall profit you nothing." "Ye are nothing as regards Christ and have fallen from his grace as many of you as are for being justified by the Law" (Gal. v. 2, 4). As though he should say: 'Justice with God, justice of the soul, is a matter of eternal life and death. Senseless Galatians, you will never attain to it by turning to Circumcision and the Law of Moses! Cast therefore the Law behind you and seek the 'justice of God' by the faith of Jesus Christ.' But if now the Apostle is denouncing the *νόμος* in behalf of and *for the sake of* intrinsic justice, and that justice be no other than the *δικ. θεοῦ*, which is his theme throughout, what words of man can adequately convey the deep antagonism between St. Paul and Luther? It is the collision between the greatest Teacher of intrinsic

Justice and the Founder of the system of extrinsic Justification!

Ver. 21. *νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου, κ.τ.λ.* We now arrive at the *third* of the four 'principia' of Justification. Justification is not to be sought from the *νόμος*. Having told us that man is *not* rendered just by the 'works of the Law,' St. Paul will now tell us how he *is* rendered just. He will tell us that man is justified by receiving the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*;—by the gift of the Spirit of Justice descending from heaven into the soul and there (1) producing habitual and (2) enabling to actual justice. Whether the *νυνὶ δὲ* is of temporal import and refers to the Advent, &c. of Christ ('nostris temporibus hâc in parte felicissimis,' Grotius), or is a logical alternative and expresses a form of reasoning, is a question we shall pass over here. (See Morison, Rom. iii. Monog.) 'But now without the *νόμος* the Justice of God is (or has been) manifested'. That is to say, 'apart from the *νόμος*,' the *νόμος* having no part in the formation of the *δικαιοσύνη*,*—if we take the *νυνὶ δὲ* in a logical sense: Or (2) 'without the *νόμος*,' it having come to an end in Christ,—if we take the *νυνὶ δὲ* in a temporal sense; "But now in these days of Christ and his Gospel." (Vaughan.) Here is the Apostle's third point. The justification of man unattainable by the 'works of the Law' is effected by the

* Compare Luther's construing: 'Without the accessory aid of the Law.'

divine gift of justice coming down to (and upon) all who *believe*. From this gift of righteousness results our justification. It is witnessed by the Law. For the legal aphorism ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς* points to an actual δικ. ζωῆς which can only spring from the δικ. θεοῦ.

Ver. 22. δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως I. X. κ.τ.λ. Moreover, it is a divine gift of righteousness which is by faith of Jesus Christ. The πίστις is the means in the way of a *condition*, as the πιστεύοντας partly shows, and as the fourth chapter fully demonstrates: the connexion between the πιστεύειν and the Gift of God being one purely of *inducement*, and not one of *instrumentality*. We receive the infusion† of Grace and of the Gifts if we believe, (and upon believing), on Jesus Christ. Thus Faith takes us to God through Christ for justification and Salvation. Compare the words of Christ: "Go and preach the Gospel, &c.: he that believeth and *is baptised* shall be saved."

Ver. 22. εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. κ.τ.λ. It is a gift of righteousness coming down upon *all*, Jew no less than Gentile, who believes; for there is no distinction nor difference: οὐ γὰρ ἐστι διαστολη. It is not for the Gentile only, leaving the Jew on *this* side, nor for the

* Ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ. That is, *any man*, either Jew or Gentile, 'coming in.' See Wetstein. Rom. ii. and x.

† Compare the :—ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν. "It is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit *which is given us*." Rom. v. 5.

Jew only, leaving the Gentile on *that*. It is bestowed indiscriminately and *therefore* upon *all*. *πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον, κ.τ.λ.* For *all* (Jew no less than Gentile) devoid of this Gift of Justice, have 'sinned' and have come short, (with their law begotten or else natural justice), of the divine approbation. As men in a race; 'They have fallen short.' *ὑστεροῦνται.* (See Morison.)

Ver. 24. *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι. κ.τ.λ.* 'For all have sinned, being rendered just by free gift, out of his grace.' *δικαιούμενοι not καὶ δικαιοῦνται.** The use of the participle should be carefully considered. This passage conveys a forcible testimony against Pelagius as well as against Extrinsicism. The logical emphasis is on the *δωρεὰν*. 'For all have sinned, *being* justified by the way of a gift,—and a gracious or free gift.' That is to say: 'All have sinned, *inasmuch as*† the only righteousness by which they can become just with God,—the righteousness without which all *nemine excepto*, are 'sinners,' —is a gift from God, a free gift flowing from his *χάρις*. The *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν* clearly renders a reason for the *πάντες ἥμαρτον*. Not however, of course, as if the *πάντες ἥμ.* were the *consequence* of the *δικαιούμενοι*—as though one should say: 'All perished being slain by the sword'. But as though one should say: 'All are penniless *being* enriched by his bounty'. Their riches come from it alone: *Therefore* they were *of themselves* penniless.

* *Opp.* Fritzsche, comp. Meyer and Morison. † Or *seeing that*, &c.

Here too we see plainly the impropriety of determining justification to be a forensic act,—a judicial decision and declaration. For, what have δωρεὰν and χάρις to do with a judgment or decision which is wholly informed by its object and governed by fact and is determined, *not* κατὰ χάριν but κατὰ τὸ ὀφείλημα? Grace and favour have no more to do with judicial justification than malevolence or vindictiveness with judicial condemnation. Either the δικαιούμενοι of this verse means 'rendered intrinsically just,'—*h.e. made* just,—or else, now for the first time, a meaning must be forged for it: a meaning for which there is no precedent either in the LXX. or the N.T. There is no other alternative. It must be understood to mean a *sovereign* act of mercy and good will, not merely overlooking, but positively contrariant to, the objective fact of the ἥμαρτον: a sovereign act indistinguishable, or, at least, scarcely distinguishable, from absolution and condonation. But now the δικαιοῦν of the LXX. and of the N.T. ever signifies either (1) to *make* just, or (2) to *manifest* just, (either by judicial declaration or otherwise). Consequently, it always implies the presence of intrinsic and objective justice,—pre-existent or co-existent with its application to the person. The instances of its scriptural occurrence, in either the active or the passive form, are, after all, not so numerous. They can be, severally, carefully examined without much labour. Morison makes them all judicial save one,—which he

maintains to be of direct intrinsic import, but it is not applied to a *person* but by the Psalmist to his 'hands' and 'heart.' (Ps. lxxii. 13.)* Now, whether they are or are not all judicial, one thing is plain; namely, that they do not *even once* present the meaning that he is inquiring after, in order that he may affix it to the Pauline δικαιοῦν and support it by all the cases which he arrays in its behalf. The 'logic' of a *sovereign* act of 'accounting just' essentially differs from that of the *judicial* act of justification. Therefore the logic of the Biblical forensic δικαιοῦν, (act and term), essentially differs from the logic of the Extrinsicist δικαιοῦν.†

Ver. 24. διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως κ.τ.λ. St. Paul then proceeds to derive this intrinsic gift from its source: from the redemption of man through the blood of Christ the meritorious cause of our Justification and Salvation. And, ere the passage ends, we have δίκαιον and δικαιοῦντα so placed in juxtaposition as plainly to intimate the intrinsic import of the latter: 'That he might be just (*h.e.* the Depository and source of righteousness) and the justifier of him (*h.e.* the Bestower of justice on him), who is of the faith of Jesus;'—bestowing on him freely the divine gift of justice, *on his believing* in Jesus. Compare the δικαιῶσαι δίκαιον εὖδουλεύοντα πολλοῖς of Isaiah

* In LXX and Vulgate: but Ps. lxxiii. 13 in Eng. Bible.

† As regards the Divine Judge, see the words: οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ κρῖμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἔστι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν. Judicially, He *cannot but* justify the just and condemn the wicked.

(liii. 11): 'By his knowledge shall this my just servant *justify* many'.

Ver. 28. *Λογιζόμεθα οὖν πίστει δικαιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου.* Thus St. Paul arrives at the third of his 'principia'. Our justice and justification come from God through Jesus Christ by faith in him and not from the *νόμος*, nor from the works which we, of ourselves, do in our obedience, (such as it may be), to the *νόμος*,—a law-produced justice. In a word, not from ourselves are we justified. For what could the *νόμος* do for us supposing that we were under it,—for St. Paul is here taking the case of the *ἔννομος* or Jew? It can *give* us nothing; it can but *draw upon* that which we possess within us. If the *ἔννομος* has, comparatively speaking, much, it will draw much, if he has, comparatively speaking, little, it will draw little. The precept of the Law only *taxes*, it *gives* nothing. And again, what it elicits is only natural righteousness: the justice of one devoid of the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*. In this famous passage the Apostle shows himself the antagonist, at once, of Pelagius and Luther. Of Pelagius, because he shows that the sources of justice and justification are not in man himself: *πάντες ἥμαρτον δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*. Their justice 'with God' they receive as a gift from God and have it not *in* themselves *as of* themselves. Of Luther, because the *δικ. θεοῦ* is the gift of intrinsic justice. The Apostle has no other conception of justice.

With him to be 'just' is to be intrinsically just. He knows but of one *δίκαιος*,—but of one *δικαιοσύνη*—*παρὰ θεῷ*,—the *δίκαιος* and the *δικαιοσύνη* of the second chapter. *The Lutheran chapter** (iii) *breaks Pelagius: the Pelagian chapter* (ii.) *breaks Luther.*

Ver. 30. *ὃς δικαιώσει περιτομὴν κ.τ.λ.* The Apostle speaks here as throughout of adults. Because he says *ἐκ πίστεως* or *διὰ τῆς πίστεως*. God shall make the unregenerate Jew and the unregenerate Gentile alike just by the gift of inherent righteousness.

Ver. 31. *Νόμον οὖν καταργοῦμεν κ.τ.λ.* 'Do we then, by putting aside the *νόμος* from being the 'means,' or instrument of Justification,—do we deprive it of sphere and office in the divine economy of the Jews?' Deprive it, that is, *retrospectively*, and while that economy was in force? This is mainly argumentative and retrospective. For, at the time when St. Paul was writing this, the Law of Moses had already come to an end in Christ. 'Do we assign it no place and throw it away? God forbid! We establish the *νόμος*.' We keep it to its own sphere and office, and thereby 'sustain' it.† We sustain it by establishing that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* by the inward power of which the *νόμος* can alone be fulfilled, and so the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* exist. Place two things having profound relations

* Romans iii. was the Reformer's favourite chapter: as Galatians was his favourite Epistle. See Bleek and Morison on Galatians and Romans.

† For *ἱστῶμεν* or *ἱστάνομεν*, as also for *καταργοῦμεν*, see Morison.

with one another each in its *right* place,—assigning to each its proper sphere and office,—and each in its turn will sustain and explain the other. Place one of them,—looking to the end,—in its *wrong* place, and *both* are destroyed and the end is lost. The only way of rightly understanding and applying the *νόμος* is by rightly understanding and applying that true means of Justification which had continued sole and sovereign from the fall of Adam. The sphere and office of Divine Grace is comprehended more fully by a right understanding of the true sphere and office of the *νόμος*; and the sphere and office of the *νόμος* obtains its recognition and ratification from a clear knowledge of the *ἐπαγγελία*. The ordinances of God can never clash; each has its own path and object. What the *νόμος* was sent to do is explained in Galatians. *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη, ἄχρις οὗ ἐλθῃ τὸ σπέρμα* (iii. 19). And again: *ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστὸν* (24). Now the 'Judaiser' ruined all by thrusting the *νόμος* into the sphere and path of the *επαγγελία*, and thereby supplanting the latter. What was the consequence? He never attained to the "law of Justice" because he sought it not 'by Faith' in Christ, but as from the *νόμος* and the *ἔργα νόμου*. For the Judaism of the Jew who substituted the letter (*γράμμα*) of the Law for the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*, and for the Biblicism of the Protestant who substitutes the Bible as the primary, supreme and final Teacher in the

place of the Church, the moral is one. And it is this. *Not to put things in their wrong places.* The former persisted in his Judaism, and never attained to the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. The latter persists in his Biblicism, and will never attain to the ἀλήθεια θεοῦ. This very question of man's Justification and Salvation is a most conspicuous proof of his failure.* Did not Extrinsicism and Biblicism emerge together? And the greater the learning and critical acumen of the Biblicist in the past, the more decisive the proof,—at the present.

Chap. iv. 1. Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν Ἀβραὰμ, κ.τ.λ. We have now arrived at the fourth of the 'principia'. First; Justification is intrinsic in its nature. Secondly; it is unattainable through the νόμος and by law-produced justice. Thirdly; it is only to be attained through Faith in Christ,—in the case of adults. Fourthly and lastly; it is not only a thing *given*, but it is a *free* gift, a gift freely awarded to him, who, turning himself to God, 'believes God' (ver. 5)—Faith being the *condition* of its bestowal and reception. By these four principles the Epistle to the Galatians will have to be construed. Only in Galatians St. Paul is earnestly, and at some length, insisting on the entire exclusion of the νόμος either as

* To say nothing of the two other great questions, of the Divinity of Christ and the Freedom of the Will. Or to say no more than this: that, as to the first, Baur, Fritzsche, Meyer, Ewald and Winer all deny the Divinity: and as to the second Luther and Calvin and the Jansenists the Free Will of man. And each of these names is 'a noun of multitude'!

the means, or as *any* means to man's Justification and Salvation, and the stern and final rejection of the Mosaic economy as a thing of the past. Here seems to be another pause, for the Apostle now leaves the *νόμος* and recalls the justification of Abraham, (which took place long before the period of the Law), as a case calculated to make the deepest impression on the Israelite.

Ver. 1. Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν, κ.τ.λ. We offer the following as an *approximation* to the reasoning of the Apostle. "Nothing then did our father Abraham find according to the flesh.* *For* Abraham was *not* rendered just from works,—so as to have glory in himself and not in God (or, to-God-ward). *For* what says the Scripture: 'Abraham *believed God* and it was reckoned to him unto justice.'" *Believed God.* Words which *of themselves*† show that the δικαιοσύνη, beside being awarded, was *freely* awarded to him. For, to receive ἐκ πίστεως, and to receive κατὰ χάριν, are one and the same thing, compare ver. 16. Moreover, *as* the ἐπίστευσε shows that the δικαιοσύνη was a *free* gift to Abraham, *so* the ἐλογίσθη, through the επιστεύσε, shows that it was a thing *bestowed,—given* to Abraham, not *formed by him out of his own fund or strength.* ἔργα = his own attainments.

* The γὰρ of ver. 3 sustains ver. 2, εἰ γὰρ. κ.τ.λ. and through it, and with it, ver. 1, τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν. The question 'What did he find'? amounts, we submit, to:—'He found nothing'. And again the εἰ γὰρ—'for *if* he were justified', &c. amounts to 'for he was *not* justified'.

† That is; if spoken of a justified person as they are here.

Ver. 4. Τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ, κ.τ.λ. But to the 'worker' the recompense (*i.e.*, his wages) is not reckoned (with a reckoning that is of 'award,' *imputation* being here of course out of the question) on the principle of 'grace,' but on the principle of 'debt.' His wages are *paid* him. But, on the other hand, 'to him that 'worketh' not, but believeth on him who renders the impious just,—to him his faith is reckoned unto justice' (ver. 5). Now as to these words λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, we submit the following points. First, the λογισμὸς here meant is a *reckoning of award,* as is seen (1) from the τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς* οὐ λογίζεται κ.τ.λ, and (2) from the εἰς τὸ λογισθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῖς τὴν δικαιοσύνην (ver. 11). That in one place the πίστις is said to be reckoned (or counted); that in another the δικαιοσύνη; that in a third God is said to reckon the δικαιοσύνη to the person,—all this is simply due to the flexibility of the word itself. Secondly, it appears that there are three distinct uses of the λογιζεσθαὶ (τινὶ) τί εἰς τί.† Three

* Fritzsche joins the τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ to the μισθὸς: but it ought to be joined here, as elsewhere, with the λογιζεσθαὶ. He says nothing reliable for his construction and against it is (1) the strong affinity of the τῷ ἐργαζ. with the preceding αὐτῷ (ver. 3). (2) the invariable combination (in chap. iv.) of the act with the person, *i.e.* of the verb with the object. (3) the evident exact antithesis between the τῷ δὲ ἐργαζ. of ver. 4 and the τῳ δὲ μὴ ἐργαζ. of ver. 5. Besides, Fritzsche has an object in view. He is bent on getting rid of that use of the λογίζ. τινὶ τί εἰς τί acc. to which it means a reckoning of *award.* But the word μισθὸς proves (1) that the verb bears this meaning; (2) that this meaning is the meaning throughout. For it has but one sense throughout.

† Comp. Fritzsche, Comm. Rom. ii. iv.

different kinds of λογισμὸς can be found in the Greek Scriptures. To wit: (1) a reckoning or λογισμὸς of 'equation' (as we may term it); (2) a reckoning of 'equivalence'; and (3) a reckoning of 'award.' And of these three λογισμοὶ the last is, (except in the Davidical verse), the λογισμὸς of this chapter.

Of the first of these three we perhaps have an instance in the 115th Psalm: καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην. "And it (his act) was reckoned, or counted to him as (or for) a righteous deed,—as righteousness." Here is a λογισμὸς of equation. Of the second in Rom. ii. 26. οὐχὶ ἡ ἀκροβυστία αὐτοῦ εἰς περιτομὴν λογισθήσεται; 'shall not his uncircumcision be *reckoned* for circumcision'? The just Gentile here gains neither carnal circumcision nor the imputation of it—why should it be *imputed?*—but his spiritual is reckoned to be *as good as* the ceremonial. Here is a λογισμὸς of equivalence. Of the third in our words: λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην. Here is a λογισμὸς of 'award'. The gift of righteousness is *awarded* to the believer (*e.g.*, Abraham)* for his faith, and by that gift of righteousness he is rendered intrinsically just. His faith is reckoned to him *unto* justice. The εἰς δικαιοσύνην means;—*ut justitia habeatur.* In like manner in our own English language we find an equal flexibility in the word 'reckoned', or 'counted'. Faith,

* In Abraham's case, however, the gift must have been on *increase* (of justice) freely bestowed; for he certainly was justified *before* and 'the friend of God'. But the passage serves St. Paul's purpose.

we can say, 'is reckoned to such an one unto justice'; 'Justice is reckoned to him'; 'God reckons justice to him'. And further, as (by adoption) in the Greek, so also in the English there are found three different λογισμοὶ—that is, three sorts of 'counting'; three processes of reckoning. We also have (1) a λογισμὸς of equation, (2) a λογισμὸς of equivalence, and (3) a λογισμὸς of award. As to the first we say: 'Burglary is reckoned felony'. As to the second: 'Election by acclamation counts for (reckons for) canonical (or regular) election'. As to the third: 'A white ticket counts for a reserved seat'.

In the next place observe that the δικαιοσύνη of this chapter is the very δικ. which Abraham *obtains*. It is in this very justice that he is justified. It is manifestly the very δικ. ἐκ πίστεως which the Apostle is all along upholding and enforcing (compare vv. 6, 9, 11, 13, 23, 24) and which we know, from previous sources of information, to be intrinsic in its nature and therefore to be a thing of *infusion* not of *imputation*. Throughout the whole chapter we see that it *accrues* to the believer, (*e.g.* Abraham), and constitutes his state and character. The δικαιοσύνη here is as plainly the δικ. of St. Paul's Thesis as the πίστις is the πίστις of his Thesis. Moreover, *never* does he use the word δικαιοσύνη *absolutè* but he means δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς. Never once, either in Romans or in Galatians. Comp. Gal. ii. 21; iii. 2. Compare

also the τὴν δικ. of Rom. iv. 11, with the ἡ δικ. of Gal. iii. 21.

To refer us, therefore, as Vaughan and others do, to the λογίζεται of chap. ii. 26, *which has no* αὐτῷ, is quite incorrect. For the Gentile does *not* obtain the ceremonial περιτομὴ of the second chapter, whereas Abraham *does* obtain the δικαίοσύνη of the fourth, and in it he becomes δίκαιος παρὰ θεῷ. It is the Justice of his Justification. The words λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, then do not import either (1) that justice is imputed, or (2) that the πίστις is reputed in lieu of justice, or (3) that it is accepted *as* justice. They mean that the πίστις is reckoned to the believer *unto* justice—so that the gift of justice is *awarded* him. By Vaughan's explanation the Extrinsicist actually *dispenses with* the δικ. and thus strips Abraham of that very justice which it is the object of the Apostle to show that he obtained,—and but for which he would not have been justified at all. No. What St. Paul teaches us here is (1) that in divine justification the righteousness is *bestowed*,—bestowed from without not formed from within; (2) that this bestowal is a free gift not a thing awarded to *merit*, but freely awarded to the believer for his πίστις.* This is the last of the four 'Principia.'

* As regards the τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ κ.τ.λ. of ver. 4, we can as little accept the explanation of Jowett as the construction of Fritzsche. The former says there is "a slight inaccuracy" in the repetition (implicitly) of the λογίζεται before the κατὰ τὸ ὀφείλημα, and that the meaning of the

The δικαιοσύνη, then, is derived from the πίστις through the medium of a divine and gracious award,—a λογισμὸς κατὰ χάριν. This derivation is the process indicated by the ἐκ and the διὰ of Romans and Galatians. And this process *forms the connexion* between Faith and Justification. Now, in the passage which expressly unfolds this connexion (iv. 3), we discern a clear refutation of the 'instrumentality' of the πίστις, and of the instrumental διὰ in the matter of Justification. The instrumental apprehension ascribed to the πίστις by the Reformers and by the great, if not the entire, mass of their followers is one of the most prominent features of the system of Extrinsic Justification. It is the logical principle and the (all but) invariable concomitant of the

Apostle is as though ἔστι were there instead. But, in truth, there is no inaccuracy whatever. St. Paul refers both the κατὰ χάριν and the κατὰ τὸ ὀφ. back to the same λογίζεται. The antithesis is not between 'imputing freely' and 'paying a debt'; but between an 'accruing' on the principle of 'grace' or free favour, and an 'accruing' on the principle of debt or 'merit'. Had the λογίζεται been peculiar to the πιστεύοντι and the κατὰ χάριν and been purely characteristic of an accruing from 'faith' and by 'favour', St. Paul could not possibly, by inadvertence, have omitted to introduce a verb proper to the κατὰ τὸ ὀφ. and antithetical to the κατὰ χάριν,—and thus in the very core of his explanation destroyed the point of the argument. Yet, if neither Jowett's explanation nor Fritzche's construction be satisfactory and the Imputationist can find no better way of saving the λογίζεται,—and no better can be found than either of these ways except perhaps the other,—then chap. iv. ceases to be the great chapter of the 'Imputation' of the δικ. and becomes instead the great chapter of the 'Imparting' of the δικ. From this verse it appears that the Hebraism which is here adopted has also the meaning of 'a reckoning of award'. Lastly the λογίζεται κ.τ.λ. of ver. 5 is *explained* by the καθάπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. of ver. 6. Compare ver. 2 of Gal. ii. with ver. 6, καθὼς Ἀβραὰμ. κ.τ.λ.

'Sola Fides.' But now let the words: *ἐπίστευσε δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην* be attentively considered. What does the *καὶ lie between?* An act of Abraham and an act of God. The *ἐπιστεύσε* of the former and the *λογισμὸς* of the latter. What does the *καὶ cover?* Beyond all doubt the connexion of 'inducement' and not the connexion of 'instrumentality.' Without the intervention of God's free and gracious *λογισμὸς* no justification will accrue to the believer; because if we take away the *ἐλογίσθη* we take away the *δικαιοσύνη*. But, as we see most plainly in the instance of Abraham's justification, God is *moved* to the *λογισμὸς* by the 'faith' of Abraham. According to the Extrinsicist system Justification consists in the act of 'accounting' just or of 'accepting as just.' This act is not indeed the *λογισμὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην* which the Apostle means; (for the *λογισμὸς* here meant is a *λογ.* common to both the *ἐργαζομένῳ* and the *πιστεύοντι* and therefore cannot be 'imputation'), but supposing it *were*, still, as the passage itself proves, it must follow upon the *ἐπιστεύσε* by the connexion and force of 'inducement'. The *πίστις* moreover,—to turn from the language and reasoning of St. Paul to the nature and laws of things in themselves,—cannot possibly 'apprehend' the act of 'acceptance' or of 'accounting just' in which, according to the Lutheran or Extrinsicist system, Justification consists. That 'acceptance' or 'imputation', if analysed, is clearly seen to be

a divine sentiment *extended towards* the sinner. And though proposed or offered to him before, yet not actually *extended* to him before, believing on his part. Faith, then, may *induce* its extension but evidently can never grasp it or 'apprehend' it, for it is *in the mind* of God. The *offer* is the message, the *extension* is the mercy; the offer is the Gospel (το εὐαγγέλιον,) the extension is the gift. But the message is not the mercy, the Gospel is not the gift. Faith can embrace the former: it is to the 'hearing of Faith' indeed that the former is addressed. But the latter *never*. Thus, in even the Extrinsicist system itself, the instrumental διὰ πίστεως is condemned (1) by the account which the Apostle himself gives of the process of Abraham's (and our) justification, as well as (2) by the very nature of the realities involved in the process. Such justifying instrumentality, on the part of the πίστις, is contrariant to the laws of things. It seems to us right to ascribe it to the originality of Luther and no exaggeration to describe it as, at once, a needless, a plainly unscriptural and a wholly unscientific invention.

Bad philosophy is bad Theology.* Hence it follows that, (to turn to the Latin), 'per fidem' is in this connexion 'propter fidem.' The 'propter' is a kind of 'per'. Nor can it be replied to this that, (to revert to

* "It was a saying of Scotus Erigena that whatever is true Philosophy is also true Theology." Stanley's 'Jewish Church,' vol. iii. Pref.

the Greek), in that case the grammar would have been *δια πίστιν*. (Comp. Lightfoot, Comm. Gal. ii. 16.) For here no relation of any supreme cause or source is indicated but only that of a 'mean'—the 'mean' of a condition fulfilled.* This connexion is excellently expressed by the *διά* (or *ἐκ*) *πίστεως*.† Lastly the connexion of 'inducement' and the award of the *δικαιοσύνη*, (the *propter fidem*), is discernible throughout the whole of the fourth chapter but reveals itself most openly in ver. 22 : ΔΙΟ *καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. '*Wherefore*, or *therefore* also it was reckoned to him unto justice.'

On the other hand, the *διὰ* of the *συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον*,—is an 'instrumental' *διὰ*; baptism being the instrumental cause of Justification. From Intrinsic Justice and Justification,—the Justification which the Apostle unfolds in the Eight Chapters,—to Baptismal Regeneration is considerably less than a step. Remove the Extrinsic system from the Pauline Epistles and the Scriptures, and Intrinsic justification falls, as it were, by its own weight and tendency, (assisted, too, by the force of much strong and independent evidence both Scriptural and Post Apostolic), into the exact position of Sacramental Justification. Remove the Lutheran system of Justification

* We are speaking here of Justification in its first reception.

† Fritzsche's view quite confirms this. Comm. Rom. i. 17 *al.*

and there is nothing to show that Baptism held any different relation to the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*,—to Justification by Faith, in the mind and belief of St. Paul from that which it held in the minds and belief of St. Anselm, or St. Thomas, or Cajetan, or Lainez, or Salmaron, or St. Francis Xavier. Nay rather if, together with other things, we consider well the full intrinsic import of the above cited passage and also of that in Galatians iii. 27, *ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε*,—and these are the only places in which baptism occurs in Romans and Galatians,—we shall be led to the conclusion that, on this point, the mind and principles of the Apostle of the Gentiles were those of the above-named teachers of the Faith of Christ. He does not, indeed, introduce baptism throughout the eight chapters, because, as it seems to us, he is speaking of Justification from the beginning—and therefore *generally*. Abraham was justified *διὰ πίστεως* but not *διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος*. 'We', on the other hand, if adults (ver. 24) are justified 'by Faith', but by baptism, as the instrument of our justification. In both cases faith is the condition or rather the required 'disposition': and Abraham received the *πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης* in some other way than by baptism.

Ver. 6. *Καθάπερ καὶ Δαυεὶδ. κ.τ.λ.* This Davidical passage, which should be closely connected with the preceding as throwing light on the *λογισμὸς* or 'reckoning

of award,' is not adduced as showing in what Justification fully consists. For we know that the δικ. ἐκ πίστεως is intrinsic and threefold, (1) Virtue or πνεῦμα, (2) Habitual, (3) Actual;—effect, too, being seen in cause and cause in effect. So that the Davidical description, which seems to speak only of the remission of iniquities and sins, (which however is an *intrinsic* remission—a cleansing or washing from sin—comp. Acts xxii. 16, 'Rise up and be baptized and *wash away* thy sins'; also Ps. l. vv. 3, 8, 10), is partial and one-sided. The explanation of the argument here is that it turns on the μακαρισμὸς and the μακάριος twice repeated. The μακαρισμὸς here should rather signify 'blessedness' than 'felicitation', though the latter is, we admit, a very widely received construction. For with this latter meaning the τοῦ ἀνθρώπου would more naturally and suitably be the genitive of the 'subject' (*originis*). Compare the μακαρισμὸς ὑμῶν of Gal. iv. 15.* By 'blessedness' we understand the 'blessing' of a conferred boon. St. Paul is showing that the δικαιοσύνη, which is awarded to Faith, is a free gift,—a 'blessing.' This is his point: it is a boon and a blessing, a *merces gratiæ* and not a *merces debiti*. He is drawing attention, *not* to the precise nature of the gift, but to the fact that it is freely given,—awarded χωρὶς ἔργων. Observe here that the πιστεύειν,

* Moreover if St. Paul meant 'felicitation' why did he not say simply μακαρίζει? why the circuitous phrase and 'pompa verborum' (Fritzsche)?

being opposed to the ἔργα and the ἐργαζέσθαι, does not cast out intrinsic justice, but only (1) intrinsic justice of *our own* making or 'working' or formation and (2) *merit*,—the principle and notion of which is certainly connected with the ἔργα, &c.* The δικαιοσύνη of the gracious λογισμὸς is as *inherent* as the δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων *would have been* if Abraham had attained it. But it is *bestowed* and it is bestowed *freely*: 'works' have nothing to do with it. And, to him who receives it, it is a μακαρισμὸς—a 'blessing,' entitling its possessor to be called μακάριος or 'blessed.'

Ver. 7. μακάριος ὧν. κ.τ.λ. 'Blessed are they whose transgressions have been taken away and whose sins have been effaced' by the free gift of intrinsic justice which brings with it the remission of sins. 'Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin.' Why? Because where a man has received the μακαρισμὸς of intrinsic justice, there remains no sin to be imputed. This λογίσηται is (1) not the Pauline but the Davidical λογιζεσθαὶ and (2) indicates a non-imputation of that which has no existence.

Ver. 9. ὁ μακαρισμὸς οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'Cometh then this blessing', &c. St. Paul proceeds in the following ten verses, both by statement and by close reasoning, to *separate* the δικαιοσύνη (and with it the ἐπαγγελία and the

* The ἔργα of chap. iv. are the (hypothetical) 'works of a man devoid of the δικ. θεοῦ. The ἔργα of chap. ii. are those which spring from, and *are part of*, that δικ. θεοῦ. Both ἔργα carry the notion of merit.

κληρονομία) altogether both from circumcision and the νόμος. These things have their root not in the νόμος but in the πίστις. They are quite independent of the former and belong to the Gentiles, no less than to the Jews, from the faith of Abraham, which has an universal extension and by which he is the father of all those who believe.

If the Jews derive the δικαιοσύνη and its adjuncts from the νόμος they must of necessity set aside the πίστις. And if they set aside the πίστις, the δικ. ἐκ πίστεως departs with it. Man therefore devoid of the 'justice of Faith' is no longer 'heir according to the promise' but becomes a prey to the νόμος. On him devoid of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ the Law works wrath upon wrath. Without the νόμος the sinner would be under the wrath of God. But *with* the νόμος more so still, for, *given* the νόμος, sin acquires the additional enormity of παράβασις. Therefore the νόμος not merely ἐργάζεται but κατεργάζεται ὀργήν. If those who are of the νόμος are to be held the heirs, then all blessings and favours of the πίστις and of the connected ἐπαγγελία vanish. Faith has been made void and the promise of no effect. For, in the place of the fruitful πίστις, the barren νόμος has entered in; and with it,—instead of the κληρονομία,—*wrath*. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν, ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶν (Gal. iii. 10). Why so? Because being destitute of the δικ. ἐκ. πίστεως and looking to the νόμος, which is barren of life and justice, they cannot, of their own strength,

fulfil its precepts and become, *out of themselves*, just 'before God.' But, being endued within by the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* they *will* fulfil them and 'live' to God and 'live' for ever.

Ver. 16. *διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.* Therefore not through the Law was the *ἐπαγγέλια* to carry out its promise of the *κληρονόμια* but, (starting from the *πίστις*), through the 'justice of Faith.' And it was to embrace, not the Jews only but, all the children of the 'faith of Abraham.' Finally the process of Abraham's justification is the process of all justification. It was not solely with reference to *him* that the Scripture says *ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ.* but it represents the justification of every other adult;—to whom his faith shall be reckoned by God unto justice, and to him the *δικ. θεοῦ* shall be awarded, if he believes 'on him who raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead—who died for our offences and rose again for our justification.' Now what did Abraham believe? We answer: The revelation and promises of God: which *contained* the Messianic revelation and the Messianic promise. Upon this *πίστις* he received the *δικαιοσύνη*. Thus the Apostle presents the last of the four 'principia': the principle, namely, that the attainment of Justice,—which is an intrinsic acquisition (chap. ii.), is not through the *νόμος* nor the *ἔργα νόμου*, (chap. iii.) but by the bestowal, and the free bestowal, of the *δικ. θεοῦ* upon those who believe: comes therefore,—looking to man's

side,—by faith, only by the ζήτησις of faith and not by the works of the νόμος and *that* ζήτησις, (see chaps. ix. and x.) :—is brought about by a λογισμὸς κατὰ χάριν, a free and gracious award of the δικ. θεοῦ, to all those who embrace, (and on condition of their embracing), with faith the free επαγγέλια and the εὐαγγέλιον I. X.

Chapter v. 1. δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως κ.τ.λ. 'Being justified, therefore, by faith, *in the manner which has been unfolded*, we have peace towards God', &c. This εἰρήνη is not a *sentiment* but here expresses a *relation;* the relation arising between God and man on the attainment of justice. It is the reverse of the relation indicated by that ὀργὴ with which the Apostle sets out. (chap. i. 18.) As the intrinsic iniquity of the unregenerate brings down *wrath*, so the intrinsic justice of the justified brings in *peace*. Here we have fresh evidence of the intrinsic nature of justification. As the ὀργὴ of chapter i. is to the ἀδικία and ἀσέβεια there, so is the εἰρήνη of this passage to the intrinsic δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ which takes the place of the ἀδικία, &c. Moreover, in chapter ii. we see the same ὀργὴ set over against intrinsic iniquity (ver. 8), and the same εἰρήνη set over intrinsic righteousness (ver. 10).

The Epistle to the Galatians, ii. iii. iv. v.

We now turn to the Four Chapters of Galatians. Of these our explanation will be both brief and relative only to particular points. In entering upon it two things

must be borne in mind. First, that the Three Words, δίκαιος, δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοῦν, are all of *intrinsic* import, are all forms of one and the same thing, and that each of them exactly reflects and represents the burden of the other two. This fact comes clearly out on an attentive examination of the first four chapters of Romans with which we have been engaged. And this fact, if fact it be, destroys the whole of Luther's Commentary on Galatians from beginning to end;—a commentary of which so recent and eminent an authority as Lightfoot has declared that "it still remains and ever will remain a speaking monument of the mind of the Reformers and of the principles of the Reformation." Lightfoot, Comm. Gal. p. 68 (4th edition).

Secondly, the Apostle shows himself, in these four chapters, as the resolute maintainer of the true way of Justification by Faith in Jesus Christ in all its purity and integrity. Its purity being necessary to its integrity and its very existence. He will not allow the νόμος either to be substituted for the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ which is ἐκ πίστεως nor yet to be *foisted in* along with it. Either error would invade, and so evade, the sole source of Justice and Justification,—Jesus Christ. Men would then be turning their faces to the νόμος. But to turn the face to the νόμος as the means of Justification is to turn the back on Christ. St. Paul will not hear of any reintroduction of the νόμος or of any return to its covenant. He is resolute

against the application of a spurious means, or agent, or instrument to an end which (1) involves man's salvation and (2) which it is utterly beyond the δύναμις of the Law to secure,—the intrinsic δικ. ζωῆς. And, let it be added here,—for it is a point of no small importance,—that the νόμος had been hard and heavy: a hard yoke and a heavy burden, a system providing a very necessary discipline for a race naturally "stiffnecked and uncircumcised in heart and ears." Whereas, of the Gospel,—to which the Law gave place,—the 'yoke is easy and the burden light.' Yet, at the same time, the νόμος, in its day, *could* be kept and *had* to be kept. It was *not* impossible of fulfilment. But on the contrary the fulfilment of it was within the reach of all: it had been divinely imposed upon all. When we find St. Peter speaking of it as a yoke (ζυγὸν) "which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear," we must understand the ἰσχύσαμεν βαστάσαι, (Acts xv. 10), as meaning 'have been able to bear' with peace and comfort, *i.e.* due regard being had to our general welfare. We must not gather that its weight was so oppressive and insupportable that it was habitually transgressed by the good, the true servants of God. We know that Zacharias and Elizabeth kept the νόμος according to the mind of the νόμος, *h.e.* to the point of the δίκαιος ἐνώπιον θεοῦ and of the ζήσεται. We should rule the words of St. Peter by the corresponding words of Christ where he says of the

Pharisees: "They bind heavy burdens and hard to be borne" (*φορτία βαρέα καὶ δυσβάστακτα*) (Matt. xxiii. 4, Luke xi. 46.): not 'impossible to be borne', but rather such as, if imposed, had to be borne. In our hasty passage, therefore, through the four chapters of Galatians these two principles must be retained within the critical eye: (1) That the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and the *δικαιοῦσθαι* are intrinsic; (2) that the production of this intrinsic justice lies without the proper sphere and office of the *νόμος*, a fact summed up in the famous and pregnant words with which chap. ii. concludes: *εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν.*

Chapter ii. 15. *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι. κ.τ.λ.* 'We are by state or economy or constitution Jews and not of the Gentiles, sinners', &c. That is to say: The state to which we have been *formed* by divine dispensation is the state of being *Ἰουδαῖοι*, a sort of state of righteousness: for (1) in circumcision they bore the *σφραγῖδα δικαιοσύνης*, (comp. Rom. iv. 11), and (2) they were, as it were, instituted into and embraced by the *νόμος* which was, morally and ceremonially, *δίκαιος καὶ ὅσιος*. The *δικαιοσύνη*, (such as it was), implied in the *Ἰουδαῖοι* is revealed by the *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* set exactly over against it. The Gentiles are here termed, (and were by the Jews regarded), *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* from the 'standpoint' of the Jewish Law.

Ver. 16. *εἰδότες δὲ ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ.* Here the word *δικαιοῦν* appears for the first time. It

bursts abruptly from the narrative. The Apostle presents it suddenly before the hearer or reader without any explanation. He takes it for granted that its import will be at once understood. Now, we ask, what import would it naturally and obviously convey to the mind of a Hellenist, say St. Justin or Hegesippus? Would he not immediately connect it in his mind with *δίκαιος* and *δικαιοσύνη*? The *δικ.* with which St. Paul is himself so soon to wind up this long and earnest passage of argument? (15-21.) Had not his hearers heard the name of St. James the Just? In connexion with that great name what must their conception have been of the words *δίκαιος* and *δικαιοσύνη*? But if the words bear, as with St. Justin and Hegesippus they must have borne, their natural and obvious meaning, was the word *δικαιοσύνη* so far off that they could fail to see at once its close affinity and similar import? *The more so* since it comes in close connexion with the *νόμος*,—of which the 'justice,' (such as it was), would be necessarily intrinsic? Let us boldly turn to our own language in support of the conclusions to which these questions point. Suppose that our corresponding verb were not of Latin but of English formation; being not to 'justify' but to 'justen'.* If we found it associated by a writer or speaker with the

* Belonging thus to the following large family: To widen, heighten, sweeten, thicken, gladden, madden, straighten, harden, fatten, soften, tighten, &c. &c.

words 'just' and 'justice,' (righteous or righteousness), or at least supposed it to be so associated until, shortly after, we found that it *was,* and if we found it on another side associated with 'works', with 'sin' and with 'sinners', should we not naturally understand it and take it as a word of *intrinsic* import? And this, even though it had another very usual meaning which, however, a moment's reflection would show us to be inapplicable to the nature of the case under consideration? We submit that we should so understand it. Further let it be observed that the δικαιοσύνη of ver. 16 denotes one and the same thing, whether we look at it from the point of the ἔργα νόμου, or from the point of the πίστις. What is that one thing? 'To be accounted just' judicially? No: for this, though a true meaning of (1) the δικαιοῦσθαι, would never suit on the side of the πίστις. For then the 'accounting,' (if Justification *were* 'accounting' as the Extrinsicist maintains), would not be a *forensic,* but a *sovereign,* act. The *logic* of the act (and term) would be essentially different from the logic of the forensic act. There would be a concealed equivocation, a petty 'playing upon words,' in the application of the one δικαιοῦν to both cases. Would it therefore be 'to be accounted just' by an act of sovereign good will and power? But that would be unsuitable as regards the ἔργα which would demand a 'forensic' act of justification. And further, this last meaning, so suitable for the πίστις and so un-

suitable for the *ἔργα*, is no proper meaning of the word *δικαιοῦν*. It is a new meaning. Never, surely, would St. Paul introduce a well-known word, (with the abruptness with which he here introduces this), with a quite new meaning *known to no one but himself*, and with the air of a writer who supposes himself to be addressing those who will perfectly understand his terms.

Lastly, would it be 'to be rendered just'? This meaning is most suitable in both directions,—*ἔργα* and *πίστις*. Why should we reject it? But if we accept it, can there be a reasonable doubt of the import of the *δίκαιος* which is contained in the verb and informs it? Then *δικαιοῦν* will plainly mean to 'make just,'—*intrinsically*.

Ver. 16. *εἰδότες δε ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* 'Knowing, however, that a man is not justified 'out of' the works of the *νόμος*, —*νόμου* the Genitive subjecti (originis) out of works produced by the power or by means of the *νόμος*,—Law-begotten justice. *ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως* I. X. *κ.τ.λ.*; 'but only by faith in Jesus Christ.' That is, 'but is *only justified by Faith*;' *not* 'but is justified *only by Faith* or by Faith *only*.' See Winer, Ellicott and Lightfoot for the former and Meyer for the latter, who here discovers the 'solâ fide' of Luther. The Greek *ἐὰν μὴ* and the English 'only' (here) make the *διὰ πίστεως* the sole path to justification but by no means isolate the *πίστις*. Faith in Christ is the beginning and root of a *ζήτησις* opposed to that of the Judaiser. Yet at the same time, the *πίστις*,

whether here or elsewhere (Romans and Galatians) mentioned, precisely indicates *only* Faith and no other object, and nothing more, though more follows in the path that leads to the divine bestowal of the δικ. θεοῦ. So, in like manner, the Council of Trent by 'Fides' denotes, purely, Faith; and then goes on to enumerate certain other virtues distinct from Faith and co-operating with it as dispositions necessary for the reception, from God, of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (Sess. vi. chap. 6).

Ver. 16. καὶ ἡμεῖς κ.τ.λ. And we, (turning our back on the νόμος), have turned our face to Christ, that we might be rendered just by means of the faith of Christ and not out of the works of the Law. Seeing that,—as to the latter,—no 'flesh,' (man called σάρξ inasmuch as devoid of the πνεῦμα ζωοποίοῦν = the πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης), shall attain justice by the works of the Law.

Ver. 17. εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες, κ.τ.λ. With the points of this whole argument, from ver. 15 to ver. 21, we shall no further concern ourselves than by offering the following suggestions,—as perhaps throwing some light upon them. "The attitude, O Cephas, which you have externally and transiently assumed towards the νόμος and your conduct with regard to its ritual by *compelling*, (here lay the main, if not the sole point, of St. Paul's remonstrance, for St. Peter was perfectly at liberty Ἰουδαΐζειν, *himself*, if circumstances advised it, but he should not have *compelled the Gentiles* to do the same, for that was to infringe

upon their just liberty in the Gospel, they not being required to live as the Jews did),—by *compelling* the Gentiles to live, (as to food and customs connected therewith), after the manner of the Jews, have become a subject of complaint among your Gentile fellow Christians, (*ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν*, see Meyer and others), are calculated to have the effect of making *us*, (who, in seeking justification through Faith in Christ, have altogether turned our backs on the *νόμος*,—St. Paul here, as Apostle of the Gentiles, associating himself with them, Jew though he was, and 'standing up' for them), of 'making *us* out' *ἁμαρτωλοί*. And they may bring about the further result of making some Christians turn themselves again to the Law and so forfeit Christ."*

Ver. 19. *ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον*, κ.τ.λ. 'For by means of the Law I am become dead to the Law', &c. Not dead to intrinsic justice but dead to the *νόμος as the means*, whether jointly or solely, to intrinsic justice. The following verses represent, in a profound manner, the *self-conscious*† development of the Apostle's justified life in Christ. Of this life the *πίστις*, (which, in the justified soul, is the fruit of the *πνεῦμα δικ.* and of that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* which was in the first instance bestowed on account of prevenient Faith, see Rom. chap. iv.), is, in the *πνεῦμα*, the radical agent;—evolving

* Though such an act was, of course, far indeed from St. Peter's mind and such a result far indeed from his intention.

† *Supernaturally* self-conscious. Or else he is speaking *theoretically*.

and 'working' out the conscious δικαιοσύνη with hope and charity,—the soul by these three 'embracing' Christ as it were. But the spiritual Christ was *before*,—being one with the πνεῦμα and 'the second Adam.' Christ is therefore 'first and last' in the 'life' of the soul,—of the soul that has received the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν (Rom. i. 17).

This conscious spiritual, (and at the same time moral), 'life' of the Apostle brings to mind the unconscious life of the δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς which he had received in infancy,—ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ (Rom. vii. 9); when, as yet, (1) conscious spiritual existence, (2) morality and (3) the Law *were not*. And herein we see that that only is essential to Justification, viewed as a scheme for the Salvation of *all*, which *all* the justified *have in common*. That essential thing is (1) neither the πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, (which those *cannot* have to whom the Gospel of Christ has never been preached,) nor (2) even the πίστις θεοῦ, (which infants cannot have), but solely the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ—the infused justice of the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν.

Ver. 21. εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου κ.τ.λ. 'If intrinsic justice comes by means of the νόμος,—if the Law can give 'life' and justice 'of life', then Christ need not, through his death (comp. Rom. iv. 25), have become the source of Justice. Christ, 'who has become to us (ἐγενήθη ἡμῖν) justice, sanctification and redemption'. 1 Cor. i. 30.

Chapter iii. ver. 1. Ὦ ἀνοητοὶ Γαλάται. κ.τ.λ. The Galatians, who had been converted to Christ by St. Paul, had become perverted,* or were on the point of being perverted, to Judaism by false teachers actively engaged among these new-born Christians for this purpose.† 'Did you', the Apostle asks, 'did you receive the Spirit through the works of the Law or through the hearing of Faith'? By the τὸ πνεῦμα he means the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν and that very δικ. θεοῦ which is the gift of the spirit of justice to those who, having heard the Gospel, embrace it by Faith. 'Or, is he who ministers the abundance of the heavenly gift among you and is a power working powers within you,—is he moved to this liberality by the works of the νόμος, (your own Law-begotten justice), or by the hearing of Faith?' 'Is it not by the hearing of Faith': *just as* "Abraham believed God and it was reckoned to him *unto* Justice." We see here, throughout, the identification of the gift of the Spirit with the δικ. θεοῦ. For his theme is Justification. It is Faith, he earnestly contends, which inherits the promise and blessing of Abraham. The καθὼς, too, *proves* the λογισμὸς to be 'of award.'‡

Ver. 10. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ. 'For as many as are of the works of the Law, (and as such

* 'Nondum ceciderant sed inclinabantur ut caderent.' S. Aug. Comm. Gal.

† See Introduction to this Epistle by Meyer, Bleek, Jowett, Lightfoot, and others.

‡ Mark well the connexion here, and comp. with Rom. iv. 3 ff.

are devoid of the πίστις and the δικ. θεοῦ and unregenerate of the Spirit), are under a curse.' Certainly, for they are shut down under a Law which they cannot fulfil, and of which their ἔργα are no fulfilment: and what remains for them but the condemnation of a Law whose demands they cannot of their own strength satisfy. The Extrinsicist takes and presents the νόμος as if it were good for nothing but 'cursing'; as if it were nothing but a κατάρα, as if its sole office were to provoke, to bring out and to condemn sin and to work wrath. But has not the Mosaic Law its 'blessings' as well as its cursings? Are the curses of the Legal Books to be a dread reality and the blessings a mere *ignis fatuus?* Has the Law no τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήση?

Ver. 11. ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ κ.τ.λ. 'Whereas, on the other hand, that in the νόμος,—that is, on the *principle* of the νόμος, sc. ποίησις,—no one is justified 'with God,' (παρὰ θεῷ, Rom. ii. 13) is *plain on the face of it;* for it is 'by faith' that the just man attains the justice with which he lives to God. But, to those who address themselves to it, the Law presents the principle of the ποιεῖν. It *provides,* however, *no means* for the attainment of the ποίησις. To those, on the other hand, who address themselves to Faith for Justice Faith presents Christ, who freely bestows on us the divine Spirit of 'life' and 'justice'; and indeed *in it* bestows *himself,* the spiritual Christ, the second Adam. He, by the Spirit, *is* Our Righteousness.

Ver. 13. Χριστὸς ἡμας ἐξηγόρασεν κ.τ.λ. 'Christ, by

his redemption, (which was instituted from the time of the Fall of man), has delivered us,—us who were ἔννομοι and *while* we were ἔννομοι,—from the curse of the Law. How delivered us? By giving us, at the price of his blood, along with the remission of sins, that δικ. θεοῦ by which we are enabled to fulfil the will of God,—as manifested under the νόμος,—and thus to escape its blow and its curse. Has *ever* delivered us in time past. For this divine deliverance did not commence with the preaching of the Gospel and the day of Pentecost, but was being realized from the hour of Adam's transgression onward.

And this deliverance is the portion of *all* who believe in Christ, that so the blessing of Abraham might come, (as in time past it *had* come), in Christ upon the Gentiles, and thus that *all* might receive the promise of the Spirit through Faith.

Ver. 17. Τοῦτο δὲ λέγω, κ.τ.λ. 'But this I say; that the covenant, (the διαθήκη according to which the δικαιοσύνη is made dependent on the πίστις), confirmed by God to Abraham,—this covenant, the νόμος which came in four hundred and thirty years after, does not annul to make the promise (ἐπαγγελία) of no effect. Therefore the κληρονομία belongs to the ἐπαγγελία and not to the νόμος. For, if it were belonging to the νόμος, it would *not* belong to the ἐπαγγελία. Whereas, *in point of fact*, it was attached to the ἐπαγγελία (ver. 18). Justification, therefore, is not within the sphere and

office of the *νόμος*. At this point we are reminded of Rom. iii. 31 (*νόμον οὖν καταργοῦμεν κ.τ.λ.*). 'What then *is* the sphere and office of the *νόμος*?' The Apostle puts things in their right places. The Law, he replies, 'was brought in (*προσετέθη*) for the sake of the transgressions (*χάριν τῶν παραβ. not ἕνεκα*) to last until the Seed should come.' The Law was added 'in the interests of justice',—to *deter* men from sinning by investing (as its presence would invest) sin with the additional enormity of 'transgression' (*παράβασις*). It was not 'set' to *produce* transgressions. Though certainly it would 'provoke to' them and, as in the case of St. Paul himself, 'provoke' them. But then there is the *δικ. θεοῦ* on the other side, by the counter force of which the 'provocation' ought to be ineffectual, but *without* which the 'provocation' of the *νόμος* would, but too surely, prove effectual.

Here now we have two views before us: (1) The *true* sphere and office of the *νόμος*,—that which it held by the ordinance of God: (2) the *false* sphere and office which the Judaisers found for it,—that, namely, of its being the Means or, as it were, Instrument of Justification and Salvation. *παιδαγωγὸς* indeed it *was*; *ζωοποιὸς* it was *not*. As the former it was a temporary and transient provision. And, so far from its being the latter,—so far from its being able (*δυνάμενος*) to produce the 'life of justice' or the 'justice of life,' the fact was that those

under it who were devoid of the δικ. θεοῦ were all, without exception, ὑφ ἁμαρτίαν, and were recognised as ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν by the Scriptures. For the Scriptures had 'shut up all (τὰ πάντα),' Jews as well as Gentiles, 'under sin.' οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς. Rom. iii. 10. In order that the ἐπαγγελία ἐκ πίστεως might indeed be an ἐπαγγελία ἐκ πίστεως by the δικ. θεοῦ being bestowed on those alone who believed.

But before the Faith came forth supreme, (upon the Death of Christ), 'we' were shut up in ward under the νόμος, waiting for the unveiled, the full, the perfect revelation of the πίστις; which could not be until Christ had 'died for our sins and risen again for our justification.' The Law, therefore,—the Apostle tells the Jews,—was our παιδαγωγὸς to Christ. That was its true sphere and office, and with the 'coming' of Christ that office has come to an end and passed away, for now we are alone with God and Christ. 'For ye are all sons of God through the faith which is in Christ Jesus.' '*For* (ὅσοι γὰρ) as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have *put on* Christ?' But if the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ be intrinsic and if the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ be the δικ. θεοῦ and if Christ is 'our justice', then here we have baptismal regeneration. And the phrase Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε is of purely intrinsic import. If this be so, then, certainly, the reason why baptismal regeneration was post-Apostolic, (as it confessedly was), would be,—because it was Apostolic.

Ver. 28. Οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, κ.τ.λ. 'There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is neither male nor female'. Every one of these words: Ἰουδαῖος, Ἕλλην, δοῦλος, ἐλεύθερος, ἄρσεν, θῆλυ are of intrinsic import. 'You are not *these*, (and therefore *divided*), any longer, but you are all *one* by virtue of a new nature, or intrinsic condition common to all. You are 'one man' in Christ Jesus—'the 'seed' of Abraham and heirs according to the promise.'

Chapter iv. In this chapter the Apostle expostulates with the Galatians for returning, or wishing to return, to the ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα out of which they had been advanced to higher, nay the highest things,—in the fulness of God's time. Now these 'weak and poor elements' are by no means obedience, righteousness, the divine triune charity of the νόμος, the fruits of the Spirit, the mystic life of the Spirit (ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ του θεοῦ, ii. 20) but circumcision, the ceremonial observances of the Law, the letter, the teaching, and the 'demand' of the νόμος *turned to* as the 'means' of justification and salvation.

Ver. 6. Ὅτι δὲ ἐστε υἱοί, κ.τ.λ. 'But, since you are made sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying Abba, Father.' The relation of sonship is twofold; (1) the *fact* of sonship, and (2) the developed filial relation. 'So that thou art no longer a servant, but a son;—a son who has entered into revealed filial relation-

ship: but if a son then also an heir,—an heir of God through Christ.

Ver. 21. Λέγετέ μοι, κ.τ.λ. 'Tell me, ye that desire to be under the νόμος (for justification), will ye not hear this νόμος itself'? Here follows the allegory of the two sons of Abraham and the two covenants,—through the medium of which he shows the Galatians that they must be as resolute in casting out the νόμος—hard and heavy as it is, compared with the Gospel of Christ, and, instead of the means of justification, a veritable ζυγὸν δουλείας,—as Abraham was in casting out the son of the bondwoman. For 'we', says the Apostle, 'we, brethren, are with Isaac the children of the promise.' And again: 'we are not the children of the bondwoman but of the free;—with the freedom wherewith Christ has made us free.' What freedom? Freedom from what? From the δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ of Rom. ii. 13,—from the intrinsic justice upon which our salvation in the day of Judgment and Salvation will as *a matter of fact* purely depend, and which during the days of the νόμος consisted ('actually') in the fulfilment of the Law? No. But freedom from the yoke of the νόμος now dissolved by the death of Christ, and freedom *to* the δικ. παρὰ θεῷ through Christ by virtue of the δικ. θεοῦ which is bestowed on all who turning away from the Law betake themselves to Christ. Not freedom *from* justice but freedom *to* justice,—itself freed from the cast-off accident of the νόμος. In freeing justice from

the Law the Apostle frees men from the Law—*to* justice. This twofold freedom, the freedom both of men and of righteousness *to* the *χάρις* and *from* the *νόμος*, is the true and the only freedom. And it is the freedom of those who, for justification and salvation, are not under the Law but under Grace. What grace? The grace of God's Holy Spirit by which souls live to God—infant as well as adult, believer in God as well as believer in Christ.

Chapter v. 2. Ἴδε ἐγὼ Παῦλος, κ.τ.λ. 'If, by the gate of circumcision, you re-enter the *νόμος* for justification and salvation, Christ will profit you nothing to that end. And, secondly, by so doing, you place yourselves altogether under the yoke of the Law,—become under the obligation of fulfilling even its ceremonial precepts, every one of them. And, besides this, you are cut off from Christ—as many among you as would be justified through the *νόμος* —and are cast out from his grace.'

Ver. 5. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. 'For it is in the Spirit and by Faith that we receive the expectation of justice. For in Christ Jesus—that is, in the regenerate who have received the *δικ. θεοῦ*—neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision but Faith working by Love.' Nothing can be more separate and separable from the *νόμος* than that intrinsic *δικαιοσύνη ζωῆς* which St. Paul preaches: that *δικαιοσύνη* which during the period of the Law of Moses was, in its actual 'phase' or form, the fulfilment of the Law with those who were 'shut up'

under the Law,—as the Passage of the four γὰρ clearly demonstrates. For,—*οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθησονται.*

The preceding explanations, &c., are presented to the reader as an approximation to the true meaning of the Apostle in the Eight Chapters on Justification taken from the two Epistles. And, in conclusion, we submit to the scientific critic that the (1) *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, the (2) *δίκαιος*, the (3) *δικαιοῦν*, the (4) *δικαιοῦσθαι* and the *δικαίωσις* of St. Paul are of precisely the same import and nature, (term and thing), as the (1) Justitia Dei, the (2) justus, the (3) justificare, the (4) justificari and the Justificatio of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent; and are altogether opposed to the 'Justice of God', the 'just,' the 'justify' (the 'accounting' or 'being accounted' just), and the Justification of all these Symbolical writings which are to be traced back to Luther as their 'great original'. Of the Pauline Doctrine with the Tridentine doctrine of Justification the identity is such that the difference between the two forms,—the Pauline and the Tridentine,—may be aptly described as the difference between St. Paul *before*, and St. Paul *after*, the scriptural interpretations of the German Reformer.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ARGUMENT AS TO THE *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* OF ROM. II. 13, 14,—FROM (1) THE *ζήσεται* OF I. 17, AND (2) FROM THE *ἥμαρτον* OF III. 23.—CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

As a final proof of Intrinsic Justification; that is, of the fact that the Pauline *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, and,—in the case of the justification of adults,—the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως*, is purely intrinsic we will conclude with an argument drawn, *first*, from the *ζήσεται* of Rom. i. 17, and dealing with the first and second chapters exclusively, and drawn, *secondly*, from the *ἥμαρτον* of iii. 23, and dealing with the second and third alone. As an exegetical proof nothing, it seems to us, could well be stronger and it is one which, in a concise and concentrated form, is rightly reserved to the last; as its force and cogency will be the better appreciated in consequence of all that has been said in the preceding pages. The Apostle says (i. 17) *ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.* 'He and he only who is just with the justice which is of Faith shall live.' Or: 'The just man shall be just and live, *only* by

the justice which is of Faith.' Now, whether the *ζήσεται* forms the predicate of the Evangelic Aphorism or not, (and although it includes the life of grace, the 'living' to God, here on earth), yet, by the agreement of all, it especially and pre-eminently means 'shall have eternal life hereafter.'

Turning to the first half of chapter ii, what do we find? We find this same *ζήσεται*,—not the word itself but the thing which it connotes, viz. the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*,—presented to us in the most decisive connexion possible, namely, the Judgment Day. We find it entering in by a process of final retribution which is a certain fact of the future and the fixed and immutable 'order of the day'. Upon what is this *ζήσεται*,—the *ζήσεται* of the Evangelic Aphorism, reappearing in the Second Chapter,—here made to depend? Upon what is it *founded?* Upon the presence of intrinsic righteousness in the person judged; and upon that righteousness alone. *ὁ δίκαιος ζήσεται*: no *δικαιοσύνη*, no *ζήσεται*,—a truth, or rather a matter of fact, as certain as the Judgment-day itself is certain. Moreover, in connexion with the *νόμος*,—as it is viewed from ver. 12,—it is the *ζήσεται* of the Legal Aphorism. The Apostle here reproduces and reaffirms (1) the *ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς* of the Law, (2) the *τοῦτο ποίει καὶ ζήσῃ* of Jesus Christ to the Lawyer, and (3) *εἰ δὲ θέλεις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν τήρει τὰς ἐντολὰς* of the same to the young man. Through

what principle is the *ζήσεται* connected with this intrinsic justice? The judicial principle,—and, in the case of the *νόμος*, the legal principle,—of retribution or recompence,—one of the strongest forms of acquisition. What then is the true logical outcome of the chain of reasoning from ver. 2 to ver. 16, reproducing, as it does, the *ζήσεται* of the first chapter in connexion with the Law and the Judgment Day? Clearly Intrinsic Justification 'of life'—a *δικαίωσις ζωῆς* of which the *δικαιοσύνη* is intrinsic. But, if the *δικαιοσύνη* and the *δίκαιος* upon which the *ζήσεται* of the two chapters is founded in the *second* chapter be intrinsic and indeed legal (vv. 12, 13), what must the *δικαιοσύνη* and the *δίκαιος* upon which the same *ζήσεται* as manifestly depends in the first chapter (ver. 17),—what must this pair be? The *ζήσεται* itself answers us that *they* also must denote intrinsic justice: the words themselves thus bearing the meaning which, in the earliest instance of their occurrence, it would from a lexical point of view be most usual and natural to assign them.* From the one *ζήσεται*, then, of the two chapters we necessarily deduce *one* sustaining *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* which, in the second chapter, is shown to be intrinsic. Intrinsic through vv. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and legal as well as intrinsic in vv. 12, 13.

Turning from the *ζήσεται* to the *ἥμαρτον* we find that

* It is immaterial whether we join the *δίκαιος* with *ἐκ πίστεως* (as Meyer and others do) or not.

as the former is common to the first and second Chapters so the latter is common to the second and the third; and again, as the former has a direct logical connexion with the *δικαιοσύνη παρὰ θεῷ* of i. and ii., so the latter has a direct logical connexion with the *δικ. π. θ.* of ii. and iii. What is the connexion between the *ἥμ.* and the *δικ. π. θ.* of chap. ii.? The *δικ. π. θ.*, as is shown by the reasoning of the passage of the four *γὰρ*, logically *casts out* the *ἥμ.* so that it cannot enter in to prevent blissful and saving relations between the soul and God either here or hereafter. The *οὐ γὰρ* and the *ἀλλὰ* of ii. 13 prove that the *δίκαιοι π. θ.* are under neither the *ἥμαρτον* nor the *κριθήσονται* of ver. 12: prove, therefore, that the *δικ. π. θ.* of ver. 13 casts out and abolishes the *ἥμ.* as in this life, so at the Judgment day. Now in chap. iii. we meet with the same *ἥμαρτον* again and in logical connexion with the *δικ. θεοῦ*. *πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν, κ.τ.λ.* 'For all have sinned, *being* freely (*h.e.* by a free gift of justice) justified', &c. (ver. 23.)

Here again the *δικ. θεοῦ* abolishes or cancels the *ἥμαρτον*, so that it can no longer enter in to prevent blissful and saving relations between the soul and God. For, if it did not do this, what would Justification, through the blood of Christ, profit? or how would it be the reconciliation of the sinner with God?* Now must not the

* From these and other considerations the conclusion plainly follows that *no* system of Justification which does not *remove* the intrinsic

δικ. π. θ. which *does away* with the ἥμ. in chap. ii. 12, 13, be the same δικ. as that which 'does away' with the ἥμ. of chap. iii. 23? And must not the δικ. of iii. 10, which logically excludes the ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν of ver. 7, be the same as the δικ. of ver. 20, which in like manner logically includes the ἁμαρτία there? But the δίκαιος π. θ. of ii. 13, and the δίκαιος (π. θ.) of iii. 10, are manifestly intrinsic. The first is legal; the second is St. Paul's *own word* substituted for the ποιῶν χρηστότητα of the Psalmist. And, if so, then the δικαιοσύνη ἐνώπιον θεοῦ of iii. 20, and the δικ. ζωῆς of iii. 23,—holding, as they do, the same annulling* relation to the ἁμαρτία and the ἥμαρτον as the former pair,—*must be intrinsic also.*

Lastly, the δικαιοσύνη, occurring eight times in chap. iv., is the same as the δικ. δωρεὰν of iii. 23. Thus one intrinsic δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ reigns through the first four chapters of Romans. Whether, therefore, we apply to the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ of the first and third chapters the ζήσεται, or the ἥμαρτον, we still arrive at the same conclusion, the conclusion, namely, that the δικαιοσύνη of the Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith is an *intrinsic* Justice or Righteousness.

ἥμαρτον and replace it by the intrinsic δικαιοσύνη can be a system of Salvation. But the Extrinsic system *glories* in *not* removing the one and replacing it with the other.

* *Casting it out* so that it cannot enter in to prevent blissful and saving relations between the soul and God here and hereafter.

As to the desperate theory of *inadvertence,* on the part of the Apostle in the second chapter, adopted by Baur and Pfleiderer to account for the contrariety between the teaching of this chapter and the Extrinsic system of Justification, it is abundantly evident, from the depth, the force, the definiteness and the close, elaborate reasoning which characterise the chapter throughout, that St. Paul was fully alive to its vital bearing on the subject which he was unfolding and on the argument he was conducting.

We may add here that as to chapter ii. Melancthon says "Hæc descriptio est justitia Legis quæ nihil prorsus impedit alia dicta de justitiâ Fidei."* A dexterous gloss which we have twice before quoted. And the Protestant commentator Hodge says that St. Paul "is here laying down those general principles of justice according to which, *irrespective of the Gospel,* all men *are to be* judged."†

But, in the first place, St. Paul is *not* 'laying down principles'. He is describing an *event,* a certain fact of the future. An event which consists, (or *will* consist,—it is the same thing), in the application, the putting into execution and practical exhibition of certain principles,—and, among them, the principle of 'merit',—a 'law' or principle which Protestant Theology has steadfastly

* Melan. Comm. Rom. ii. 13.

† Hodge, Comm. Rom. Quoted from Farrar's 'Life of St. Paul', vol. 2, p. 230. *note.* The italics are our own.

resisted for upwards of three hundred years. Yet here it is, beyond all doubt, recognised and put into execution at the Last Day, in the form of a judicial *ἀπόδοσις* (ver. 6).

In the second place, if St. Paul, (supposing it possible), were describing, (for a description verses 6 ff. most certainly are), this event 'irrespective of the Gospel,' then he is describing it irrespective of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως*. But in this case how comes the *ζήσεται*,—the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* to be here at all? To be here as a matter of fact? For it belongs solely to the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. Take away the one and you take away the other. Remove the *δικ. θεοῦ* and the *ζήσεται* could not be found here,—no not even *hypothetically*, much less as a *matter of fact*. Because the *δικ. θεοῦ* is *absolutely* the only *δικ. ζωῆς*. No human being ever was or ever will be saved without it. Without the *πίστις* I. X. he can be saved, (*e.g.* as a pious heathen believing God, &c.*) (2) Without the *πίστις θεοῦ* he can be saved (*e.g.* as an infant): but without the *πνεῦμα δικαιοσύνης never*.

In conclusion, we would point out that from the second and the fourth chapters of Romans are established:

1. The Catholic doctrine of 'condign merit.' *ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ*. (ver. 6.)

Here is *one* word conveying *one* principle extending to

* Comp. Gury. S. J. 'De necessitate Fidei'. Art. 2, which gives the 'Sententia Probabilior'; with the remarkable words: "Christus media non mutavit."

the good, on the one hand, and to the evil on the other. The principle being one the relation is the same, though to different objects. Again, where the judicial principle and the legal principle come in,—there *merit* comes in. The Reformers upheld this from the beginning and their followers *now*. This principle of merit, which is carried into execution at the day of Judgment, is, to use the words of Hodge, "one of the principles of justice according to which all men are to be judged."*

2. The existence of 'mortal' and 'venial' sin. *οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται.* Now, we know that no man is perfect, or *perfectly* fulfils the *νόμος*, or the will of God *χωρὶς νόμου*. Yet, for all that, St. Paul says that, if a *ποιητὴς νόμου*, he is *δικαίος παρὰ θεοῦ* and, (as *π. θ* implies, see Gal. iii. 11), heir of the *ζήσεται*.

3. The purgation of Purgatory. For the *ποιηταὶ νόμου* must be purged and purified of venial sin, or its remains, before they can be admitted into that kingdom into which nothing defiled shall enter.

4. The doctrine of merit of congruity. *Ἐπίστευσεν Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην* (iv. 3.)

Here the connexion between the *πίστις* and the *δικ.* is one of 'inducement', that is to say, 'merit of congruity', which, properly speaking, is not 'merit' at all. For

* Though how the principles which regulate the proceedings of a day which is to be a day of Salvation for all the faithful can operate 'irrespective of',—that is in fact *exclude*,—the 'principles' of the Gospel,—who can understand?

Justification is a 'grace' and 'not of works lest any man should glory.' Yet, for all that, God gives the δικαιοσύνη 'on account of' the fulfilled condition of the πίστις. Διὸ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ. iv. 22. The connexion, we repeat, is one of 'inducement' and *not* one of 'instrumentality.'

Besides its clear condemnation in the fourth chapter of Romans, the notion of Faith's being the ὄργανον λητικὸν, or 'instrument of apprehension' in respect of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, is also condemned on psychological grounds. The πίστις *cannot* apprehend the δικ. whether that be the free gift of the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν or, (which, however, it is *not*), an extrinsic 'favourable regard'; but can only 'induce' the divine bestowal of the one or the divine and gracious extension of the other. The ὄργανον λητικὸν, like the 'extrinsic justice' with which it is matched, may well be called 'an idol of the Schools'. The historic πίστις of the Reformation can in *reality*, (and in the matter of Man's Justification we are dealing with 'realities'), perform no such task as that which the system of Extrinsic Justification has assigned it. Such a function is at variance with the known laws of things, as well as with St. Paul's own account of the connexion.

"There is no small difference," says Bacon,* "between the idols of the human mind and the *ideas* of the Divine mind; that is to say between certain idle dogmas and

* Bacon's *Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphorism 23.

the real stamp and impression of created objects, as they are found in nature:"—and we may add 'of certain real processes as they are presented to us in the pages of St. Paul.'

CAVE. PAULUM. ROMANIS. GRAECE ALLOQUENTEM. NE. ROMANUS. IPSE. FIAS.

END OF PART I.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The Author of these pages deems it desirable, at the conclusion of them, to tell the reader that they are not at all put forth as a reply to Canon Farrar's recent exposition of the Life and Work of St. Paul. For they were written during a period of years, and finished months before the appearance of that work. Upon a careful study, however, of certain parts of it, after it had been given to the world, a note was here and there placed in them; and also Canon Farrar's name was added to the Catalogue of Protestant Commentators and Theologians given in the Preface.

Since, by his learned, lengthy, powerful and applauded work on the life and teaching of the Apostle, this divine had now become a conspicuous exponent and sustainer of the Extrinsic—which to him is the Pauline—system of Justification by Faith.

At the same time, it cannot be denied, (and those who are, so to speak, best able to comprehend a theological situation will become the most fully alive to the fact,) that, if the Exegesis and reasoning of these pages be sound and true, then Canon Farrar's Exposition of St. Paul is, from the first chapter of his Work to the last, essentially destroyed.

January 19, 1880.

APPENDIX.

Note A.

We have said (chap. i. p. 1, *note*) that the Pauline *νόμος*, whether *with* or *without* the article, ever means the Law of Moses and no other. This was the construction put upon it not only by all the ancient expositors down to the time of the Reformation, but also by the Reformers themselves, and this is the exegetical conviction of the great majority of the modern commentators, &c. And this majority seems on the increase.

Among the other evidences, more or less cogent, of the 'unique' meaning of the word,—and they are very many,—the passage *περιτομὴ μὲν ὠφελεῖ ἐὰν νόμον πράσσῃς* (Rom. ii. 25) holds a conspicuous place, and seems, (at least to us), quite decisive on the point. The Apostle says: 'Circumcision, (not *ἡ περιτομὴ* but simply *περιτ.* comp. ver. 27), profiteth if thou keep the *νόμος*.' Now there never was but one *νόμος* through the fulfilment of which *ὠφέλεια* accrued to the *ἔννομος* from *περιτομὴ*. And that Law was the Law of Moses. It is only by virtue of the divine ordinance that the two things are connected together at all. Take away the Mosaic Institute which makes the *νόμος* what it is in connexion with the *περιτομὴ*, and the *περιτομὴ* what it is in connexion with the *νόμος*; make *περιτομὴ* circumcision in the abstract,—the Mosaic Circumcision or *any other* Circumcision,—and make the *νόμος* the Law of Moses, or *any*

other positive Law, and what becomes of the ὠφέλεια which could only be derived from the divinely-ordered connexion of two particular things;—a particular circumcision and a particular νόμος? Nay, where is the connexion between circumcision and positive law? There is none whatever,—any more than there is between positive law and unshorn locks! Christians both have been and are under a divine Law. Yet could the Apostle say to the Gentile Christians *then* or to the Gentile Christians *now:* 'Circumcision profiteth if thou keep Law.' Remove the Divine Ordinance, and no connexion exists between the rite of Circumcision and Positive Law.

Vaughan, who, with Hoffmann and Lightfoot and others, maintains the division between νόμος—'Law' generally, and ὁ νόμος—the 'Law of Moses,' puts his explanation on this passage, and translates the περιτομὴ of the text (ver. 25) by "such a thing as circumcision," and the νόμος of the text by "such a thing as a law." Now περιτομὴ means definitely the rite of circumcision and no other rite, (whether the Jewish rite or any other rite of circumcision is a further question);—therefore, if by his words Vaughan means 'a rite,' such as *e.g.* Circumcision, he is drifting from his author, who means Circumcision and nothing else. And again: what has 'such a thing' as Circumcision to do with 'such a thing' as law? Nothing at all: unless the law in any particular instance happened to prescribe it. But 'such a thing as a law' includes, and is meant to include, ALL instances of a Positive Law. If, however, the words "such a thing as Circumcision" mean *the thing Circumcision* (be it Jewish or any other), still what connexion has *the thing* Circumcision with 'such a thing' as Law. It is clear, therefore, that the ὠφέλεια, logically taken, only holds of a particular Circumcision and a particular Law. Yet to neither word is the article prefixed. Its absence, therefore, from

the *νόμος*, whether here or elsewhere, affords no intimation that the *νόμος* has in that case a wider range than belongs to the *ὁ νόμος*. The same holds good of the *περιτομὴ*.

The *νόμος* throughout the whole argument of this chapter is one and the same, namely, the Law of Moses: for every *νόμος* from ver. 13 to ver. 27 is strung on the same chain of reasoning;—of reasoning with the Jew or the Judaiser.

Note B.

ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. Rom. v. 12.
Eo quod omnes peccaverunt.

The *ἥμαρτον* of this famous passage is not the *ἥμαρτον* of chap. iii.; nor is the *πάντες* here the *πάντες* there. For the *ἥμαρτον* of this passage means the *ἁμαρτία* pertaining to the transgression (*τὸ παράπτωμα*) of Adam, whereas the *ἥμαρτον* of chap. iii. means the intrinsic and actual sins,—the *ἁμαρτία*—pertaining to the personal transgressions or 'sins' of each individual himself for himself. Consequently, the *ἥμαρτον* of Rom. chap. v. supplies no argument at all against intrinsic justice such as the *ἥμαρτον* of chap. iii. would certainly do if it were 'universaliter' universal of moral adults. Here we have only the *ἁμαρτία* derived from Adam's *παράπτωμα* to each individual. Now, if God could justify Adam with an intrinsic justification from the results or effects of this one *παράπτωμα*, (the only transgression, for all we know, of which he ever was guilty), restoring to him,—and more than restoring, even though human frailty and human infirmity was allowed to remain,—the Justice in which he had been originally constituted and which he had lost, —if God could do this, (and the divine never lived who would deny that God *could* do this if he chose,) *much*

more could he justify Adam's descendants with intrinsic justification,—who had no personal and actual participation in his crime. It is not necessary to enter further into the exegesis of this passage. Compare, however, with it the following passage from Isaiah liii. 6: *πάντες ὡς πρόβατα ἐπλανήθημεν. ἄνθρωπος τῇ ὁδῷ αὐτοῦ ἐπλανήθη. καὶ κύριος παρέδωκεν αὐτὸν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἡμῶν.* But, surely, the Prophet is here comprehending, in one exhaustive view, *all* human sin (*ἁμαρτία*), (1) *original* and (2) *actual*, and, as to actual, (*α*) *mortal* which *destroys*, and (*β*) light or *venial* which, though it destroys not, yet *impairs* the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* (or *παρὰ θεῷ*).

Note C.

παρὰ θεῷ (ii. 13) and *ἐνώπιον θεοῦ* (iii. 20).

Meyer says of these two forms that they are 'exactly alike' (*ganz gleich*); and, though that is true in the connexion in which he says it, yet, between the two prepositions, there is some difference.

The *παρὰ* can go with what is *subjective* as well as with what is *objective*, *e.g.* (1) *οὐ γὰρ ἔστι προσωπολημψία παρὰ θεῷ.* Here the *παρὰ* is joined to a subjective thing:—an *attribute*. (2) *οὐ γὰρ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ θεῷ.* Here it is associated with what is 'intrinsic' and 'objective'; namely the intrinsic divine justice in man which according to the judgment of God (*Deo Judice*) is true justice. Compare *μωρία παρὰ θεῷ* (1 Cor. iii. 19)—an intrinsic and objective folly. See Winer, N. T. Grammar (*παρὰ*). But, on the other hand, the *ἐνώπιον* would always seem to demand an *object* to correspond with it: *either* an object confronting the *simple apprehension*:—'he fell down *before him*'; 'they

fled before him', *or* an object confronting the *judgment*, where the objective agreement or conformity of two things is the object before the Judge, *e.g.* ἦσαν δὲ δίκαιοι ἀμφότεροι ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ. κ.τ.λ. (Luke i. 6).

Note D.

The Protestant Symbols.

I. For the Protestant confessions and symbolical writings embodying, (with modifications), the Extrinsic system of Justification the reader should consult:

(1) Schaff's Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches.

(2) Schaff's History of the Creeds.

(3) Winer's Collection of the Confessions of Christendom.

(4) Winer's Comparative View of the Doctrines and Confessions of the various Communities of Christendom.

(5) Moëhler's Symbolism (Protestant Symbols). All these are in English.

II. The theologian will hardly need to be reminded that, *if* the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (= δικ. παρὰ θεῷ) of Romans ii. is *the same* as the δικ. θεοῦ of Romans i., iii., and iv., and the same as the δικ. θεοῦ or the δικ. (*absol.*) of Galatians ii., iii., iv., and v., then the Pauline doctrine of Justification is in direct and fatal collision with ALL the symbolical writings or statements of the 'reformed' (or Protestant) communities, and among them—*e.g.*, (1) the 'Confession of Augsburg,' (2) Melancthon's 'Apology,' (3) the 'Westminster Confession,' (4) the Fifty-three Sermons, the N. T. 'notes' and Catechism of Wesley, (5) the 'Formula Concordiæ,' and (6) lastly the Thirty-nine Articles and Homilies (on Justification) of the Anglican Church.

Note E.

De Wette's Explanation of Romans ii. 12, 13, 14, 15.

The following is De Wette's solution of the problem of the Passage of the Four γὰρ. . . . "The main thought evidently is that even the Gentiles have *a rule of accounting* [of being accountable], viz., *in the law of nature*. The correct view of the connexion of our verses with the foregoing will, therefore, be this: that they are intended to make good (*begründen*) what is affirmed in verses 12, 13,—with reference to the Gentiles, by exhibiting the rule of accounting which *applies also in their case:* namely, not merely to make good the one-sided proposition in ver. 12 A.—that the Gentiles also will be *punished*—but to show that there is also a *justification* given, which is *said*, in ver. 13, merely in reference to the Jews, but is *tacitly extended also to the Gentiles."—De Wette*, Comm. Rom. ii. (*Compare original.*)

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